

Introduction

This section examines the crisis of State power that faces a number of South Asian countries today and the problems and prospects of regional cooperation. The crisis had been sparked by a process of imitative economic growth that generated acute inequalities between regions and social groups; and a centralized political process in which significant sections of the people are denied participation in the decisions that affect their existence. Centralized political power even where it is associated with a representative democratic system in some areas takes the form of tyrannizing minorities. Alternatively, where the democratic process is weak, centralized political power is wielded by a military-bureaucratic oligarchy against the interests of the majority of the people. The resultant upheavals have polarized the polity along ethnic, religious or regional lines. State structures in which immature elites are equipped with powerful coercive forces, have responded to these upheavals not from the perspective of strengthening fragile democratic structures, but from the narrow imperatives of regime survival. Consequently, the use of coercive force against the dissident social groups and the cynical political manipulation of religious/ ethnic emotion by the ruling elite has only deepened the crisis. The tendency of growing militarization and the fragmentation of society along ethnic, linguistic or religious lines, creates the internal conditions for external Intervention. The crisis of the State thereby assumes an international dimension and inhibits bringing out the full potential of regional Cooperation, which can reinforce both sustainable development and democracy.

The paper by Akmal Hussain examines these issues in historical perspective, with reference to Pakistan. The paper by Gunasinghe and Sivathamby on Sri Lanka examines the class character of the current conflict and indicates the elements of a nonviolent solution. The recent Indo Sri-lanka accord may give the Impression that the alternative articulated in this paper now has a merely academic character, Yet the violent events following the arrival of Indian troops in Sri Lanka, testify to the continued relevance of the nonviolent solution proposed in this paper. The question arises: Is there an alternative to the gradual undermining of the democratic potential in South Asia? Harsh Sethi in his paper attempts to answer this question by examining the possible creative responses to existing political trends in India. If the political alternative of building a viable democratic polity is to be actualized, it must be located in the culture of the people. The question then arises, are there elements in the cultural tradition of South Asia, which could constitute the ideological basis of the political alternative which is now on the historical agenda of South Asia?

The paper by Gowrie Ponniah examines the elements of a vital personality rooted in the collective historical experience of the people, with special

reference to the female image. Akhar S Ahmed examines the potential in folk consciousness of Islam as a made of containing ethnic conflict within the dialectic of unity in diversity. These two papers bring out the importance of culture in the process of building democratic states in South Asia. Ashis Nandy examines political culture with reference to the image of decontrolled State power. At the end of Part II. Pran Chopra considers the history of the attempts at regional cooperation, and shows how the inherent asymmetry of the region can possibly function in favor of developing a stake in regional cooperation among the countries of South Asia. Q K Ahmad takes a critical look at the future prospects of the first intergovernmental initiative at regional cooperation in South Asia: SAARC, and sets out some elements the future research agenda for a sustainable SARC.

8. The Crisis of State Power in Pakistan: Militarization and Dependence*

AKMAL HUSSAIN

INTRODUCTION

South Asian States are today undergoing a severe crisis. The process of economic growth which was supposed to create the material basis of a national identity is beginning to undermine it: Although the growth of GNP in most cases has been impressive, it has created increasing affluence for the few, while leaving a substantial proportion of the population in acute poverty. At the same time, the level of domestic savings has continued to remain at such a low level in a number of South Asian countries that economic growth has been accompanied by increased t on foreign loans, while the conditions attached to such loans have begun to constrain the ability for independent economic planning. In the political sphere, there is an increasing polarization between social classes and there are growing tensions based on ethnic and regional hues. 'the armed forces which were supposed to be the guardians of geographic boundaries, are increasingly being used as coercive instruments against sub nationalist movements, and in many cases the military—bureaucratic oligarchy is dominating political Institutions rather than being subordinate to them.

In this paper we will attempt to examine these stresses on State and civil Society in Pakistan in terms of the interplay between political and economic forces in a historical perspective. Part I of the paper analyzes the nature and genesis of the Pakistan movement and shows how thus conditioned the political and State structure at the dawn of independence. Part II investigates the dominance of the State apparatus over the political process. Here we focus on the changing social origins and ideology of the army. Finally, in Part III we analyze the nature of economic dependence and the growing militarization of civil society— a process whose trajectory brings the power of the State into a potential confrontation with the power of the People.

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PART 1

THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF THE PAKISTAN MOVEMENT

In considering the nature and origins of the Pakistan Movement, one comes across two kinds of equally simplistic views at opposite ends of the indo-logical spectrum. At one end, there is the metaphysical view of Muslim communal ‘historians’, who confine the concepts of culture and history strictly within the bounds of religion. In this view Pakistan is seen as historical inevitability rooted in the doctrinal differences between Islam and Hinduism. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the view that

The origin of the demand for Pakistan can be located in the dynamic interaction of three political forces within India during the period from 1857 to 1940:

1. The British imperial government, which, it can be argued was interested in undermining the gathering momentum of the national liberation movement by accentuating its internal contradictions.
2. The Congress, representing the interests of an Indian national bourgeoisie, which was essentially underdeveloped and that backpacked genuine secularism in its political choices and language. Consequently, the Congress was susceptible to communalist pressures, thereby increasingly alienating the Muslim trading elite from the Indian bourgeoisie.
3. The Muslim trading elite, which could be regarded as a nascent fraction of the Indian bourgeoisie, was even less mature than its Hindu counterpart. Due to its acute weakness, in its rivalry with the more powerful Hindu fraction, the Muslim ‘bourgeoisie’ was induced to seek support from Muslim landlords and the colonial State on the one hand, and reliance on an explicitly religious ideology on the other.

THE EMERGING MUSLIM ‘BOURGEOISIE’, THE BRITISH AND THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT 1857—1928

One of the earliest attempts at articulating the political and economical interests of propertied Muslims in British India can be traced to the Muslims educational movements of Syed Ahmed Khan. His political ideas during the 1850s expressed the interests of the rising Muslim ‘bourgeoisie’ and the

smaller landlords, who resented the feudal system in India and wished to receive economic concessions from the British authorities. Thus, Syed Ahmed Khan opposed the 1857 War of Independence as an attempt to restore the old feudal nobility and supported the British on this issue. While being a staunch loyalist of the British raj he urged industrial and commercial development and argued for administrative reforms whereby Indians could be given a place in the country's administration.¹ He called upon Muslims to educate themselves and to be receptive to modern scientific ideas. In the pursuit of this objective he founded a scientific society in 1864. In 1877, helped by the British, Syed Ahmed Khan founded the Muslim College at Aligarh. This institution sought to inculcate loyalty to the raj in Muslims and at the same time became an influential political and ideological center of Muslim propertied classes. Aligarh College made an important contribution in producing a corpus of literature and a Muslim separatist consciousness, which were vital to the subsequent emergence of a Muslim political party in India.

The correspondence between the interests of the British and the political efforts of Syed Ahmed Khan can be, from his complete change in posture in the period before and after the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. Until 1885, he was a champion of Hindu—Muslim Unity and conceived of Hindus and Muslims as part of the same nation: 'Do not forget that Hindu and Muslim are names referring to the religious denomination, but whether Hindu, Muslim or Christian, so long as these people live in our country, they form one nation regardless of their faith.

The formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was an attempt by Indian nationalists to challenge the political status quo and pressurize the British authorities for reforms and self—rule. Although in the early part of the Congress this struggle was conducted strictly within the structure of the colonial State, Syed Ahmed Khan and the Muslim propertied interests whom he represented strongly opposed the Congress struggle. Syed Ahmed Khan, who only a few years earlier had championed Hindu—Muslim unity within a single nation, now made an equally passionate attack on the Concept of composite Indian nationalism. In a speech at Lucknow on December 28, 1887, he remarked:

Now suppose that all the English were to leave India—then who would the rulers of India. Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations, Mohammedan and Hindu, could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and inconceivable (emphasis added).³

¹ Syed Ahmed Khan, *Asbab-i-Baghavat-i-Hind*, cited in Y B Gankovsky and L R Gordon Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan 1947-48* (Lahore: People's Publishing, n.d.), p. 14.

² A Akhtar, ed., Muzamin-I Sir Syed cited in Gankovsky and Polonskaya, supra, p. 16.

³ Speech by Syed Ahmed Khan, *The Times* (London), January 16, 1888.

The sharp change in Syed Ahmed Khan's position on the relationship between religion and nationhood expressed the imperative operating upon the infant Muslim bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie of north—west India historically emerged much later than the bourgeoisie operating in Bengal and Bombay. In the latter regions, because of their proximity to the sea, the pattern of expansion of the colonial economy brought to them commercial and industrial activity much earlier than in northern India, where the production of cash crops remained the predominant function of the colonial economy. Consequently, the Muslim bourgeoisie which originated in northwest India was much weaker than the Hindu bourgeoisie, and in its competitive struggle against the latter, it had to rely on the support of Muslim landlords and British authorities. Accordingly, as the Congress emerged to threaten the interests of British metropolitan capital, the weak Muslim fraction of the Indian bourgeoisie saw that in opposing the Congress it could win concessions from the British.

Soon after the formation of the Congress, a Hindu movement against cow slaughter, which provoked Hindu-Muslim riots, arose as part of a movement for the purity of Hinduism.⁵ The Congress then declared that it was an all-India organization representing both Hindus and Muslims. However, the Indian national bourgeoisie was not fully developed, since it had emerged within the highly restrictive structure of a dependent colonial economy. Its growth had not occurred in the context of an economic and cultural conflict with feudalism, as in the case. Consequently, the Indian national bourgeoisie had not transcended the religious elements in its culture to achieve a secular political language. It was therefore, not in a position to oppose effectively the anti—cow slaughter movement. This failure led Syed Ahmed to brand the Congress a Hindu organization and to argue that the Congress' notion of self—rule would result in Hindu dominance of India.

As the Congress gained organizational strength and enlarged its social base, its demand for a system of democratic representation of the Indian people began to press the British authorities. It was at this stage that Aligarh College began to lay an active role against the Congress by posing the fact of different religious communities in India as an argument against a simple democratic representation, in which the Hindus would have been in the majority.

⁴ *Soon after the founding of the Congress, Syed Ahmed Khan organized the first anti-congress organization of Muslim landlords and intellectuals, called the United Friends of India Society. As he said in a letter to his English friend, Graham, the purpose of this society was to combat the politics of the Congress.*

As the Congress Organization was formed, the newly appointed governor general of India, Lord Dufferin, assisted by the British politician Allen Hume discussed with British officials the chances of provoking anti-Congress disorders, in an attempt to undermine the nationalist movement. A B Rajput, Muslim League Yesterday and Today, cited in Gankovsky and Polonskaya, op. cit., p. 19.

⁵ *Ibid*, P. 18

⁶ *The Lucknow speech was reported in The Times (London), January 16, 1888.*

The Indian national bourgeoisie, because of its low level of development had not been able to achieve genuine secularism in its consciousness. It was therefore susceptible to Hindu religious influence in both its political language as well as occasionally its political choices. This was an important factor in fostering a sense of insecurity about Congress intentions among the Muslim fraction of the Indian bourgeoisie. The nascent Muslim bourgeoisie is relatively so much weaker than its Hindu counterpart that it felt obliged to conduct its rivalry by aligning itself with the British authorities and Muslim landlords and by using an explicitly Muslim communal ideology in its anti-Congress rhetoric. This pushed the Congress even further towards a Hindu direction. Thus, the veiled communalism of the Congress and the open communalism of the Muslim bourgeoisie fed off each other due to the underdeveloped nature of both the Hindu and Muslim fractions of Indian bourgeoisie. Whenever the nationalist movement led by the Congress intensified, the doubts and misgivings between the Hindu and Muslim communities were also accentuated. This psychological characteristic of the relations between the Hindu and Muslim fractions of the Indian bourgeoisie was reinforced by the political imperatives operating on the British colonial regime, which aimed at intensifying communal conflict as a device to weaken the nationalist movement. It is this particular interplay of forces that explains the fact that at the high tide of the nationalist movement in 1905, the Muslim League emerged as a separate political party of the Muslims.

The growing communalism in India (during the first decade of the twentieth century) was not merely the result of British intrigue. The particular form of political mobilization conducted by the Congress also accentuated the existing distrust between the Hindu and Muslim communities. While the Congress was formally a secular organization, in practice, its campaigns and political language were characterized by Hindu symbolism. For example, during the 1905—11 campaign against the partition of Bengal, the Congress could have won the support of most Muslim landlords since few Muslims supported the division of Bengal. Yet the Congress leaders alienated their Muslim supporters by using Hindu anthems and Hindu symbols in their campaigns. Many Muslim nationalists were outraged by this imagery and left the movement.

The Muslim middle classes in the competition for jobs felt at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their Hindu counterparts. The Aligarh group, with the support of the British authorities, directed this tendency towards the demand for separate electorates and an intensification of the communal issues.

Evidence of the British attempt at fomenting Hindu—Muslim communal tension is provided by a private conversation between Mohsin—ul—Malik and

⁷ *Aligarh Institute Gazette, January 9, 1907, cited in Gankovsky and Polonskaya, op. cit., p. 34.*

⁸ *Ibid., p. 27.*

the Viceroy, Lord Minto. The Viceroy emphasized that Muslim political activities should aim at achieving community representation for Muslims in order to combat the political power of the Hindus; the viceroy further pointed out that the British had high hopes for the loyalty of the Aligarh Group.⁹

The British policy of opposing the Hindu and Muslim communities finally found a formal expression in the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which brought about separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims.

MUSLIM LEAGUE AND THE DENOUEMENT OF HINDU-MUSLIM CONFLICT: 1907—1947

The efforts of the Muslim landlords and Muslim commercial interests to form a separate Muslim political party intensified in an environment characterized by the Congress' mass campaign for self-rule. This was increasingly couched in Hindu mythological images, thereby generating a growing concern among the bourgeoisie, landlords and middle class elements of the Muslim community.

The first specific proposal for a Muslim political association was made by Nawab Salimullah of Dacca. He argued that such an association should support the British administration, combat the mounting influence of the Congress and protect Muslim communal interests.¹⁰ The essentials of Salimullah's proposals were accepted at a subsequent Dacca conference of Muslim leaders, chaired by the well-known Aligarh figure, Viqar-ul-Malik. This conference named the new organization the All-Indian Muslim League.

The first conference of The All-India Muslim League opened in Karachi on December 29, 1907. The founding fathers of the Muslim League belonged to the Muslim groups of landlords and intellectuals from the Central and the United Provinces, Bengal and the Punjab. The most influential group among them was the Aligarh group. These were intellectual nawabs from established families who had begun their careers in the Indian Civil Service in the United Provinces, later supported Syed Ahmed's educational Movement and finally devoted themselves to Aligarh College. Included among the founders of the Muslim league were a few Muslim manufacturers, the most notable being Adamjee Pirbhai. The Aga Khan (elected the first president of the League), apart from being head of the Ismaili community, was closely connected to the Muslim manufacturers of Bombay.

The resolution in the Dacca conference where the Muslim League was born defined the following goals:

1. To promote among the Mussalmans of India feelings of loyalty to the British Government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of the government with regard to its measures.

⁹ *Gankovsky and Poloskaya*, , *op. cit.*, p. 30.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

2. To project and advance the political rights and interests of the Mussalmans of India and to respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the Government.
3. To prevent the rise among the Mussalmans of India of any feeling of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other aforementioned objects of the League.¹¹

Those few industrialists who had joined the Muslim League, while wanting to use the pressure of the League to win concessions from the British, also wanted the freedom to conduct business with the Hindu and Parsi communities. These Muslim industrialists put pressure on the predominantly landlord leadership of the League to adopt a less antagonistic attitude towards the Congress. It was this influence of the industrialists that resulted in the League adopting the third point of non-hostility towards other communities.

In 1908—10 the Muslim League established its main provincial bodies. These were headed by big landlords and conservative Muslim intellectuals closely associated with the landed elite. Thus, for example, the Punjab League was led by Shah din and Mian Mohammad Shafi; the East Bengal branch was headed by Nizamuddin and Nawab Salimullah. The Muslim League leader from the United provinces was Rajah Naushad Ali Khan (the biggest landlord of the region), and in South India the Nizam of Hyderabad and other princes and landlords headed the League. Only in Bombay, Bihar and Madras was League leadership in the hands of members of the bourgeoisie.

By the eve of the First World War, big Muslim merchants had begun to invest in industry. This generated a new dialectic of unity and rivalry between the Hindu and Muslim fractions of the Indian bourgeoisie: On the one hand, the developing Muslim industrial bourgeoisie had an interest in strengthening and uniting the struggle of the Indian bourgeoisie against the colonial regime, and, on the other, as the Muslim commercial interests entered the domain of industry, their contention with the established Hindu industrialists intensified.

Jinnah grasped this dialectic before any of the other League leaders and called for united action by the Congress and the League for a constitutional struggle for self—rule. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a well—known Bombay lawyer. Gifted with an incisive intellect and fierce personal integrity, he was to emerge later as the Quaid-i-Azam, the charismatic leader of the Muslim community. With his vigorous constitutionalist approach to issues and liberal ideas, Jinnah in his early political career was ideally suited as the champion of Hindu—Muslim unity. During the First World War, Jinnah while still a member of the Congress, rose to become an influential leader of the Muslim League. Both the League and the Congress accepted his idea for a joint session of the two parties in Bombay in December 1915. During this

¹¹ *Ibid.*, P. 34

session, while urging rapprochement with the Congress, Jinnah also proposed that the agreement provide for the principle of special Muslim, representation in the legislative bodies. The latter device was used, incorporate within the agreement the tendency of rivalry with the Hindu hat prevailed among the Muslim bourgeoisie and rising middle class.

The efforts bore fruit in the Lucknow Pact of 1916, which was endorsed by the League and the Congress at their respective sessions. The pact envisaged that the two parties would jointly struggle to established government bodies by direct elections on the territorial principle, retaining the system of separate representation for about ten years.

Between 1916 and 1920 there was a limited degree of cooperation between the Congress and the Muslim League. However, strains began to appear when during 1918—1920 anti—British Muslim *ulema* mobilized Muslim masses for the Khilafat movement and the Congress declared Support for it. Jinnah and his group in the League disapproved of the Khilafat movement constitutional grounds. Matter came to a head when at the end of 1920 the Congress launched a mass civil disobedience movement, and Jinnah attacked the decision on tactical grounds. He stated in a letter to Mahatma Gandhi that he would not support it, Because the movement put the masses in motion and this would lead to chaos: ‘What the consequences of this may be, I shudder to contemplate.’ At the 1921 session of the Muslim League in Calcutta, Jinnah argued that Gandhi’s was the wrong way. ‘Mine is the might way,’ he declared. ‘The constitutional way is the right way.’ The opposing positions adopted by Gandhi and Jinnah on the issue of civil disobedience movement partly reflected the opposing political styles of the two leaders.: Gandhi’s dramatic politics of the street as opposed to Jinnah’s constitutional style of the legislative assembly. In any case, following disagreement on the civil disobedience movement, Jinnah resigned from the Congress In 1921 and the lukewarm Congress—League cooperation begun with the Lucknow Pact in 1916 suffered a serious setback.

During the period 1923 to 1927 the frequency of communal riots between Hindus and Muslims increased alarmingly, resulting in 450 dead and thousands injured. To reduce the mounting communal tension, Gandhi and Muslim nationalists like Abdul Kalam Azad initiated a move for a new ‘national pact’ between the Congress and the Muslim League. Jinnah and the League responded favorably.

¹²H Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan* (London: John Murray, 1954), p. 84.

¹³ While the civil disobedience movement was in progress, the Moplah revolt broke out in 1921. This was essentially an uprising by the poor peasantry of Malabar against the landlords. However, since the peasants were mainly Muslims and the landlords mostly Hinds, the British press publicized it as a communal Hindu-Muslim war. The British interpretation was questionable, since in many places poor Hindus joined the revolt. Kunna Ahmad Haji, a peasant chief, wrote to Madras daily *The Hind* rebutting charges of communalism and accusing the government of attacking Hindu temples to induce discord between the communities.

In March 1927 at Delhi, there was a meeting of Muslim intellectuals who favored a united movement for home rule by the Congress and Muslim League. During this meeting a press statement was issued by the Muslim intellectuals declaring that the principle of general elections to central and provincial legislative bodies (as advocated by the Congress) was acceptable on the following conditions:

1. The establishment of Sind as a separate province.
2. Provincial self—government for NWFP and Baluchistan on an equal footing with other province.
3. Seats for Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal provincial legislative bodies in proportion to the Muslim population of these provinces.
4. Not less than one—third of the seats for Muslims in the central legislatures.

This document, which became famous as the Delhi Manifesto, was drawn up by Jinnah and Maulana Mohammad Ali and was the basis of a new, albeit transient, understanding between the Muslim League and the Congress. The League declared that it was prepared to disown the separate representation system on the terms set out in the manifesto, a position it was to maintain until 1937. This was an important concession. The Congress in its Madras session the same year also declared approval of the Delhi Manifesto and called for an all-parties conference to devise a new constitution.

These events appeared to indicate that a favorable situ for Hindu— Muslim unity had arisen. Yet communal conflicts soon expressed them selves in the relations between the Congress and the League, as indicated earlier. The Congress, in spite of its secular ideology, was susceptible to Hindu communal influence in its political language and its choices. The political position adopted by the Congress at the All—Parties Conference was an important illustration of this fact. Under pressure from the right-wing Hindu religious party called the Hindu Mahasabha, the Congress leader ship in violation of its earlier stand rejected the basic points of the Delhi Manifesto. Jinnah urged that the basic demand of the Delhi Manifesto be Worked into the constitution being devised at the All-Parties Conference in both Lucknow (June 1928) and Calcutta (December 1928). Thoroughly disillusioned by the Congress, Jinnah declared after the abortive Calcutta Conference: ‘This is the parting of the ways.’¹⁴ History proved him right.

After the failure of the attempts at League-Congress cooperation in 1928, and with the onset of the world economic crisis (1929—33), the prospects of growth of the Muslim bourgeoisie in alliance with the Indian national bourgeoisie were severely constricted. There was a growing awareness among the leaders of the Muslim League that its political future lay across classes with all Muslims. This required an ambitious political program with a

¹⁴ H. Bolitho, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

broad-based appeal. The first step towards this objective was the formula of Jinnah's fourteen points, after the All-Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi in January 1929. The crucial feature of these fourteen points (later submitted to the Round Table Conference in 1930) was the recognition of the regional diversity of India and the need for provincial autonomy. Jinnah demanded a federal constitution with residuary powers vested in the provinces and a uniform measure of autonomy for all provinces. Jinnah also demanded guarantees for the free development of the various national languages and the freedom of religion.

Jinnah's fourteen points won the support of almost all the Muslim political groups, including those which had taken part in the civil disobedience campaign. This constituted the first step in enlarging the support of the Muslim League among all Muslims.¹⁵

When the British government announced the Communal Award, the fundamentals of the new constitution, the Muslim League initially supported it. However, by the time the Government of India Act was published in 1935 the campaign of the Congress against the new constitution had gained wide popularity among the masses, including many Muslim peasants. Jinnah had the sagacity to recognize that continued support for the constitution would preclude possibility of the Muslim League gaining a mass following among the Muslims. Accordingly, in its April 1936 session at Bombay, the Muslim League reversed its earlier position and refused to approve the constitution of 1935. This was a turning point in the history of the Muslim League, for it represented a recognition by the Muslim League leadership of the need to gain the support of broad sections of the Muslims of India.

The results of the 1937 elections showed that the Indian National Congress had emerged as an all-India organization, capturing 716 out of 1585 seats and qualifying to form ministries in six provinces.¹⁶ At the same time the Congress claim that as a secular party it represented all communities was not borne out by the election results. For the Congress failed to get a

The most important of the points affecting the interests of Muslims were as follows,:

1. *The reservation of not less than one third of the seats in the central and provincial cabinets for Muslims.*
2. *Granting Muslims an adequate share along with other Indians in all the services of the State and local self-governing bodies.*
3. *Solutions of communal questions to be subject to an affirmative vote of three fourths of the community concerned.*
4. *Establishment of Sind province, which was to be separated from the Bombay presidency.*
5. *Legislative bodies for NWFP and Baluchistan*

¹⁶ Z H Zaidi, 'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy 1937-47' in C H Philips and M D Waiwright (eds.), *the Partition of India* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 253.

significant percentage of the Muslim vote, having won only twenty-six out of total 482 seats reserved for Muslims (i.e. 5.4 percent). While the Muslim League made a stronger showing compared to the Congress in the Muslim— reserved seats, winning 109 seats out of 482 (i.e. 23 percent), it could not claim on the basis of 23 percent of the Muslim reserved seats to be the representative of Indian Muslims.¹⁷ What was perhaps even more worrying for the Muslim League was that it was weakest in the Muslim-majority provinces. For example, the League won only two seats in the Punjab (compared to the Unionists, who won 101 out of 167 provincial assembly seats); in Sind and NWFP the Muslim League could not win even a single seat.

The results of the 1937 elections brought home an important lesson to the Muslim elite which led the League: If the Muslim League were to negotiate with the British as a representative of Indian Muslims, then an effective party organization in at least the Muslim—majority areas was of crucial importance. Equally important was the need to articulate a new political program and new slogans which could mobilize the emotional charge of broad sections of the Muslim masses.

Soon after the elections the Muslim League, in its October 1937 session at Lucknow, adopted a new constitution. The basis of this new constitution was the ‘two—nation theory’ and the demand for autonomy of Muslim— ma provinces within a fully independent Indian federation. The new constitution catered to poorer sections of Indian Muslims by opening its membership to all Muslims regardless of class, reducing its membership fee to a nominal two annas per month and envisaging a reduction in rent, relief from usury and a guaranteed minimum wage for workers.

The demand for the autonomy of the ‘Muslim nation’ was accompanied by campaigning for specifically Muslim chambers of commerce, industry and similar organizations in the agriculture sector. ‘the Muslim League campaign of focusing politics along the communal principle found expression in the first session of the Sind branch of the Muslim League. At this Session (presided over by Jinnah) there was a demand for the division of India into a federation of Hindu and Muslim states.

‘the new constitution contributed to the increased influence of the Muslim League among the Muslims of India, Another factor enhancing Support for the League among Muslims was the deterioration of Hindu— Muslim relations as a result of the mode of operation of the Congress provincial ministries. ‘the Congress ministries, while ignoring the demands of Muslims, claimed to represent the interests of Muslims as well as Hindus. What outraged the religious feelings of the Muslims was that whereas legislation passed in provinces where Congress governments were in power permitted songs and dances in front of mosques, yet killing cows, which was against the religious beliefs of Hindus was made a criminal offense. The

¹⁷ *Imran Ali, Punjab Politics in the Decade Before Partition, Research Monograph Series No. 8, South Asian Institute (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 1975), P. 1.*

Suspicion among Muslims that the Congress had a Hindu communal orientation was given further weight by the fact that *Bande Mataram*, a patriotic hymn expressed in Hindu images, was declared the national anthem. The Congress stand on the language issue also incensed many Muslim intellectuals. Hindi was made compulsory in schools while the Congress refused to introduce the Urdu language and Arabic and Persian literature even in regions where the traditional Muslim community regarded these as the basis of Muslim education.

The susceptibility of the Congress to Hindu communal influences, together with the appeal to Muslim communalist sentiment by the political c of the League, intensified the polarization between the Hindu and Muslim communities. By the time of the Second World War, the earlier demand of Muslim leaders for autonomy of Muslim—majority provinces within an Indian began to be replaced by the demand for secession of these provinces. The Working Committee of the Muslim League, in the session of September 17—18, 1939, rejected the federal objective on grounds that such a federation would ‘necessarily result in a majority community rule’ and argued that this was totally unacceptable in a country ‘which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state.’¹⁸

In December 1939, with the resignation of Congress ministries in NWFP Sind and Assam, followed by anti-Congress riots in many provinces, communal passions rose to a new pitch. As the momentum of communal conflict built up, the Muslim League at its Lahore session on March, 23, 1940 made a historic declaration. It was proclaimed that the Indian Muslims sought the division of India on religious principles and the establishment of a Muslim State called Pakistan.¹⁹ Subsequently, between 1940 and 1946, the Muslim League in its negotiations with the Congress and the British authorities kept open the option of a number of solutions short of the outright partition of India. However, by 1946 all other options were closed, and Pakistan came into being as an independent state on August 14, 1947.

As Imran Ali in a well documented paper on the decade 1937-1947 has argued, the growth of mass popularity of the League in this period was associated with the growth of tension between the Hindu and Muslim communities. However, on the regional level, ‘... the role of non-communal factors such as class, the existing power structure ... and internecine rivalries can by no means be discounted.’²⁰ In the Punjab, the emergence of the League as a major political force involved not only an exercise in the use of popular politics, but also an accommodation with the Punjab national Unionist Part – the party of the big feudal landlords of the Punjab. An important factor in the victory of the Muslim League in the 1946 election.

¹⁸ *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921 – 1947, 2 Vols, (London, 1957), pp. 488-90, quoted in Gankovsky and Poloskaya, op. cit., p. 71.*

¹⁹ *Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 38-9.*

²⁰ *Ibid., p. 48.*

was that by then, through a combination of intimidation and conciliation the Muslim League had Won over from the Unionist Party the most power full of the Muslim feudal landlords of the Punjab.²¹ In the vital months that followed the 1946 elections up to August 1947, the Muslim League and the Pakistan movement were controlled mainly by the Punjabi feudal elite. This phenomenon led to the dominance of Pakistan's power structure by the landlords of the Punjab during the post-partition era.

It has been seen that the vicissitudes of Jinnh's attempts at achieving Hindu-Muslim unity (1909-1928) expressed the contradictions of an emerging, Muslim bourgeoisie, which was competing for a market against an established Hindu bourgeoisie. These contradictions became antagonistic because they occurred in a situation where the economic space for both was severely restrict ed by the economic structure of a colonial regime and the predominance of metropolitan capital. What gave these economic contradictions between two fraction of an embryonic class an explosive political potential was a deep—rooted tension between the Hindu and Muslim communities, which had ebbed and flowed with the rise and fall of the Mughal empire. The process of the development of State structures and ruling ideologies in India had not succeeded in creating the institutions within which diverse communities of the subcontinent could evolve a fundamentally unified identity.

PART II

THE DOMINANCE OF THE MILITARY-BUREAUCRATIC OLIGARCHY

The predominant position of the bureaucracy and the army in the structure of State power in the newly formed country was due to the form of the freedom struggle on the one hand and the nature of the Muslim League on the other. Since the freedom struggle was essentially a constitutional one, the State apparatus of the colonial regime remained largely intact at the time of independence. The bureaucracy and the army, which constituted the 'steel frame' of the raj, continued after the emergence of Pakistan to determine the parameters within which political and economic changes were to occur. The predominance of the bureaucracy an(l military in the exercise of State power in Pakistan was also due to the fact that unlike the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League was more a movement than a Political party. During the Pakistan movement it had not been able to institutionalize its popular support in terms of a stable party structure, a manifesto based on mass support for I lie solution of Pakistan's economic and political problems and a political culture which could ensure the primacy of representative political government in the structure of State power. The dominance of the Muslim League by retrogressive landlords had further

²¹ *Punjab Legislative Debates 1936 and 1946, cited in Imran Ali, op. cit., p. 48.*

²² *For a more detailed analysis and documentation of this proposition see Imran Ali, op.cit., pp., 7-54.*

undermined the ability to create, in the new country, a political framework within which popular aspirations could be realized.

At the time of independence, the principal protagonists in the exercise of State power were the bureaucracy, the military, the big landlords and the nascent bourgeoisie. Hamza Alavi in his pioneering work has argued that because of colonial development the institutions of the army and bureaucracy are 'overdeveloped' relative to the ruling classes (the landlords, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the metropolitan bourgeoisie). Accordingly, the military-bureaucratic oligarchy has 'relative autonomy' within the State and is able to intervene and mediate whenever the rivalry between the ruling classes becomes so intense that it threatens the framework within which the rivalry is conducted:

I have argued that this relatively autonomous 'overdevelopment of the, state in such peripheral societies as Pakistan and its dominating presence in civil society is related to the plurality of economically dominant classes in these societies, namely metropolitan capital, the indigenous bourgeoisie, and landowning classes whose rival interests and competing demands are mediated by the state. The post colonial state which thus sits in judgment over them must enjoy a degree of freedom vis a vis each of them individually, though collectively it must remain subject to imperatives of the social order in which these rival classes are together ensconced and the structural imperatives of peripheral capitalism.²³ (Emphasis mine).

The relative autonomy of the military—bureaucratic oligarchy and its ability to perform a mediating function has been considerably undermined since the seventies. The reason is that important changes have occurred since the sixties within the military-bureaucratic oligarchy and its relationship to civil society.

The military—bureaucratic oligarchy in Pakistan was never a static monolith but an institution whose internal social composition and relationship to society were subject to change in the process of economic and social development. In the immediate post-independence period the officers were predominantly from the landowning class with an ideology derived essentially from the British military traditions: Attitudes of professionalism and the need to insulate the armed forces from the daily conduct of civil prevailed. However, during the mid-sixties and seventies the social origin of the officer corps shifted towards the petit bourgeoisie in the urban areas and in the countryside. This shift in the class origins of the officer corps accompanied by increasing ideological factionalism in terms of a mentalist religious ethos on the one hand and a liberal left-wing ethos on the

²³ Hamza Alvi, *Class and State in Pakistan*, in H Gardezi and J Rashid (ed.), *Pakistan: The Unstable State* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1983).

other.²⁴ The tendency towards the emergence of opposing political perspectives within the officer corps was reinforced by two important developments. First, the right-wing Jamaat-i-Islami systematically sent its sympathizers and many of its cadres to seek a commission in the armed forces; second, the radical nationalist rhetoric of former Prime Minister Z A Bhutto and the rapid promotion of officers who appeared committed to his regime also influenced the officer corps.

The most important consequences of the opposing ideological trends within the military was its politicization as an institution and thus the erosion of its 'relative autonomy'. To the extent that the military was politicized by opposing political forces operating outside it, the ability of the 'military—bureaucratic oligarchy' to 'mediate' between these opposing political forces was undermined. Moreover, the task of mediation was also made increasingly difficult as the regional question gained importance in Pakistan, and the military began to be seen as the representative of the interest of the ruling elite of the Punjab by the people of other provinces of Pakistan.²⁵

²⁴ These ideological factions do not normally manifest themselves due to the rigid chain of command in the military hierarchy and the stake of all officers in the integrity of the armed forces as an institution. Nevertheless, the successful attempt at a coup d'état in 1977 by what later emerged as a religious fundamentalist military regime, and the unsuccessful attempt by younger officers against the regime in January 1984, are symptomatic of the differences in ideological perspectives within the military.

²⁵ In Pakistan, the military and the bureaucracy assumed control of State power soon after independence. Such dominance of the military—bureaucratic oligarchy was derived from the structure of State power itself; moreover, political institutions and the dominance of mobilizing political power were not developed enough to ensure the dominance of the popular will. In contrast to the political institutions, the military-bureaucratic oligarchy which Pakistan inherited from the colonial State was highly developed, and after independence it began to reign supreme.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor General of Pakistan, was a man with a towering personality and a democratic vision. However, at the dawn of independence he was too ill to wield effective control over the State (he died in September 1948, a year after independence). He was, therefore, unable to establish an institutional framework through which the military and the bureaucracy could be subordinated to the political process.

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah's trusted assistant, lacked the initiative and imagination to control the affairs of State effectively after Jinnah's death. 'the provincial assemblies were elected on the basis of a limited franchise extending to only 15 percent of the populace. Consequently, members of these assemblies and the cabinets which they elected were aware of their isolation from the masses. They, therefore, willingly became instruments of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. 'this comes out clearly in the events of 1953. In April 1953, the Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad, who was an old bureaucrat, dismissed the Nazimuddin government even though the Constituent Assembly had given it a vote of confidence. Soon after the dismissal of the Nazimuddin government by the Governor General, the Constituent Assembly met again and passed another vote of confidence—this time in favour of the new Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, who had been nominated to the office by the Governor General. Not only did the Governor General appoint the new Prime Minister, but he also nominated ministers and assigned

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE OFFICER CORPS

Indian officers in the British Indian Army were recruited from the landowning class, though not necessarily from the aristocracy. As MacMunn, suggests, ‘the staunch old Indian yeoman who came into the Indian commissioned ranks via the rank and file of the Indian landowner of lesser class made the Indian officer as we know him.’²⁶

In the post—partition period in Pakistan, two factors have further integrated the officer corps into the propertied class:

1. Since the Ayub era, the policy of giving land grants to senior army officers has created a landed elite among even those officers who did not come from large landowning families. This phenomenon has continued to this date, with the addition that now many officers are being granted land in urban estates.
2. Many army officers have been provided with opportunities of joining the trading or industrial elite. A number of officers were given prestigious places on boards of companies after retirement, while for other contracts and credits were arranged to help set up prosperous firms. Since 1977, this tendency has appreciably intensified, ‘the appointment of army officers as Chairmen of many public corporations in the nationalized sector as well as WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) and the N LC (National Logistics Cell) has increased the military’s ability to grant lucrative contracts to officers operating private firms in trade and industry.

Thus, an influential section of the army establishment is now closely integrated with the landed and business classes of Pakistan.

According to Stephen Phillips Cohen, there have been three distinct generations in the Pakistan officer corps:²⁷

1. The ‘British’ generation: pre—1947.
2. The ‘American’ generation: 1953—1965.
3. The Pakistani generation: 1965 to date.

them their respective portfolios. Thus, State power effectively passed into the hands of the Governor General. The function of the Constituent Assembly was reduced merely to rubber-stamping the actions of the Governor General and the military-bureaucratic oligarchy whom he represented. Over the years, there have been some shifts in the relative power exercised by each partner, but what has remained is the complementarity between these partners in the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. For a detailed discussion of this period, see I I Alavi: *The Military in the State of Pakistan*. Sussex, 1974 (mimeo.)

²⁶ Sir George MacMunn, *The Martial Races of India* (n.d.), p. 233 in Stephen P P Cohen, *Security Decision-making in Pakistan*, US Department of State. Office of External Research (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954).

²⁷ Stephen P Cohen, *Security Decision-making in Pakistan*, op. cit. chapter 4.

It must be emphasized that each generation absorbed some of the characteristics it inherited from the earlier generation, through the culture embodied in the process of training, promotion and daily social life of the officer.

The British—trained officers who entered the Pakistan Army at the time of partition consisted of three distinct groups: but all three had served during the 1939—45 War. Two of these groups had entered the British Indian Army during peacetime and received their training either at Sandhurst (e.g., Ayub Khan) or at the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun (e.g., Mohammad Musa). The third group of officers (the Indian Emergency Commissioned Officers) joined the British Army during the Second World War (e.g., Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq). All the prewar officers have retired, and only a few who entered during the Second World War remain in the Pakistan Army today. However, the older officers left a permanent impact on the culture and attitude of the officer corps, for they had organized the main training and educational establishments after partition and served as a model for the younger officers.

Officers who joined the British Indian Army on regular commissions before the Second World War were carefully selected from prestigious or upper—middle class families. A few were included from the ranks and were generally the sons of JCOs who had distinguished themselves in service. However, the same rigorous criteria of selection did not apply to officers who had joined during the war through the Emergency Commissioned Officers scheme. The official British analysis regarding such officers was that they were on the whole inferior to both regular Indian commissioned Officers and their British Emergency Commissioned officers equivalent.

Apart from the differing professional and attitudinal characteristics of the officers who originated in the British Indian Army, there was another important sociological characteristic. About 12 percent of the Muslim officers in the British Indian Army were not from areas that later constituted Pakistan. Many Muslim officers from Delhi, UP, Eastern Punjab and Central Provinces constituted an important section of the senior ranks of the Pakistan army until recently. The sons of these officers constitute an important fraction of the current officer corps. These officers exercised the option of migrating from their home towns in India and are especially charged with a sense of communal feeling against the Hindus and a sense of mission about living in an Islamic State. For example, one of the most senior officers of the Pakistan army stated in an interview with Cohen:

I am a pure Rajput my family has been Muslim for only two or three generations. But I felt that India had to be divided, and told Messervy (the first Commander of the Pakistan Army) that I would rather live in a small country as a free man than as a sweeper in a large country . . . I did not want to see my children serve under Hindus.²⁹

²⁸Stephen P Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Berkeley: University of California, 1971), p. 145

²⁹Stephen P. Cohen, *Security Decision making in Pakistan*, op. cit., p. 61.

Another Senior officer Who was fit lieutenant colonel in 1946, and who also chose to leave his home for Pakistan, saw the new State as an opportunity to build a society according to Islamic values:

I basically belong to India, Lucknow; all the people who belong to this halt of the world (Pakistan) , they came here automatically We had the choice or option; but I think more than anything else it was a desire to have a homeland of your own where you could model it according t your own ideology, your own genius.³⁰

With the establishment of Pakistan’s military relationship with the United State in 1953, extensive changes took place in the Pakistan military establishment at the level of organization and training. But perhaps even more important was the Americanization of the ethos of the officer corps. This occurred essentially as the result of two aspects of the American military aid program:

1. Hundreds of Pakistan army officers were sent to the United States m specialized training. The mental attitudes that were inculcated during this period and the ideological perspective adopted were then diffused within the officer corps on their return.
2. An extensive motivation program was mounted by United States Army personnel in Pakistan. This was done by creating a separate cell in the Inter—Services Directorate and involved systematic indoctrination of the Pakistan officer corps.

Evidence of the extensive organizational changes and of the Americanization of the Pakistan army’s ethos is provided by a close associate of former President Ayub Khan:

The changes brought in this army—few other armies went through such extensive tremendous changes. The field formations, the schools, the centers and even General Headquarters —every thing was changed. The Americans affected everything—the scales were completely different, hundreds of our officers went to America, and we had new standards of comparison.³¹

The profound effect which the training of Pakistan army officers in the United States had on their minds can be judged by the views of a young Pakistani colonel who was trained with the United States Special Force.

...We were friends. I made many friends in the United States. Didn’t you know we were the best friends and allies you had in the area, the

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 72,

only dependable one? Why did you not realize that? Our two countries are SO much alike, we think alike, we like the same things....There could be a new alliance to hold off the Russians.³²

Perhaps the most effective penetration by United States Army personnel at the ideological level was done by means of the motivation program conducted by a special cell in the Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate. Cohen writes:

‘The USIS extended its operations in Pakistan under the so—called Motivation (later Troop Information) Program. A separate cell was created in the (Pakistan) Inter—Services P.R. Directorate to handle the collection and Distribution of American journals, books and films throughout the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force. The so—called Motivation Program was an elevation of normal P.R. to a higher sphere of intellectual education and indoctrination. It formed an integral part of the entire military aid program.³³

This infiltration of the ideological and institutional structure of the Pakistan military establishment by United States military personnel reached a stage where the very national image of the armed forces was affected: The American military presence somewhat compromised the purely national image of the armed forces. It seemed as if there were two military establishments in one country: one national, the other foreign.³⁴

The foregoing analysis has indicated that close organizational and ideological links between the Pakistan and United States military establishment developed during the period 1953 to 1965. Thus, in the very period in which the military—bureaucratic oligarchy could be regarded as being ‘relatively autonomous’ from the domestic ruling classes, we find that it had close structural connections with the institutions of metropolitan capital.

The important characteristics of officers who have joined the Pakistan Army in the last fifteen years are as follows:

1. They are drawn much more from the middle classes than the land—owning classes as in earlier years.
2. They have been subjected the least to direct foreign professional influence and are the products of a purely domestic educational system.

Many such officers who joined in about 1971 are now majors or colonels. As Eqbal Ahmed has suggested, this generation of officers with petit bourgeois social origins and a purely indigenous socialization is highly

³²*Ibid.*, p. 73

³³*Ibid.*, p. 74

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 75

susceptible to the fascist ideology of the Jamaat—i— Islami. This tendency may be further reinforced by two factors:

1. The active attempt made by the Jamaat-i-Islami to penetrate the officer corps with its own trained cadres on the one hand and to distribute its literature in the military establishment on the other.
2. The new programme of sending combat officers to universities in Pakistan has subjected many officers to more systematic indoctrination by the Jamaat, which dominates SO of the important universities of the country.

POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY

During the period after 1971 not only were the officer corps subjected to the indoctrination of the Jamaat—i—Islami but they were also exposed to the populist rhetoric of the Pakistan People's Party. Many young officers with a social conscience who were worried about the economic deprivation of the masses and the crisis of the State saw in Bhutto time harbinger of a strong new Pakistan. The nationalization of some Big industries, the melodramatic handcuffing of some of the biggest industrialists, and the radical rhetoric against feudalism had an impact on not only the middle peasants and urban professional classes but also the new generation of army officers who originated from these classes. That the army top brass itself is aware and concerned about the influence of the Bhutto phenomenon on the minds of army officers is indicated by a 'player' issued to all units by General Headquarters, Military Intelligence Directorate, Rawalpindi in 1978-89:

'God will provide men to the army who have strong minds, great hearts true faith and ready hands ...There is an implicit reference to the just executed Prime Minister Bhutto: 'men who can stand before a demagogue and damn his treacherous flatteries without winking.'

It appears that perhaps the fundamental feature of the 'Pakistani generation' of officers is that they were politicized from both the left and the right wing of the political forces in civil society. 'this suggests that underlying the strict discipline there may be potential or actual factionalism among the officers, which may manifest itself if the armed forces as an institution at times used to crush a popular political movement in Pakistan.

To the extent that politicization of the officer corps has occurred, the military may have lost the 'relative autonomy' which could be regarded as the basis of its ability to mediate between opposing political forces. In fact it can be argued that the politicization of the army and the erosion of its ability to mediate between opposing political forces are apparent from the nature of Pakistan's military regime. It has three characteristics which provide evidence for our arguments:

1. The fact that the military regime is not using a politically, natural

³⁵*Eqbal Ahmad, 'Pakistan: Sign Posts to a Police State,' Outlook, May, 18, 1974.*

ideology (as was the Ayub regime) but is using a particular form of religious ideology that is explicitly linked with the political position of a particular political party (the Jamaat—i—Islami.)

2. The thinly veiled support of the regime for the Jamaat-i-Islami and more importantly, the provision of access to the political apparatus of the Jamaat into various institutions of the government.
3. The failure of the military regime to constitute a convincing civilian facade behind which it can retract. Thus, for example, the president General Zia—ul—Haq continued to retain the office of Chief of Army Staff, even after the formal withdrawal of Martial Law.

The above three characteristics of the regime suggest that this military regime is organically linked with particular political forces. Therefore the military cannot now be regarded as having political ‘neutrality’ and relative autonomy on the basis of which it is supposed to mediate opposing political forces or ‘sit in judgment over them.’

PART III

CIVIL SOCIETY UNDERMINED

The ruling elite at the dawn of independence consisted of an alliance between the landlords and nascent industrial bourgeoisie backed by the military—bureaucratic oligarchy. The nature of the ruling elite conditioned the form of the economic growth process, and however, the latter in turn influenced the form in which State power was exercised. Economic growth was of a kind that brought affluence to the few at the expense of the many. The gradual erosion of social infrastructure, endemic poverty and the growing inequality between regions undermined civil society and accelerated the trend towards militarization. In this section we will examine the relationship between an increasingly coercive State structure, external dependence and the nature of economic growth during the Bhutto and Zia periods respectively.

CONTRADICTIONS AND THE NATURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: 1960—1970

The basic objective of the planning strategy during the decade of the sixties was to achieve a high growth rate of GNP within the framework of private enterprise, investment targets were to be achieved on the basis of the doctrine of ‘functional inequality’. This meant deliberately transferring income from the poorer sections of society who were thought to have a low marginal rate of savings, to high income groups who were expected to have a high marginal rate of savings.³⁶ It was thought that by thus concentrating

³⁶ *It is clear that the distribution of national production should be such as to favor the savings sectors. Government of Pakistan Planning Commission. The third Five Year Plan, 1965-70 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, May 1965), P. 33.*

income in the hands of the rich, the total domestic savings, and hence the level of investment, could be raised.’ It was argued that in the initial period when domestic savings would be low, the gap between the target level of investment and actual domestic savings would be filled by a large inflow of foreign aid. It was thought that as growth proceeded and income was transferred from the poor to the rich, domestic savings would rise, until by the end of the Perspective Plan in 1985, the country would become independent of foreign aid.³⁸

During the decade of the sixties, the above strategy was put into practice, and at a superficial level at least, in terms of its growth targets it was successful. For example, the growth rate of GNP⁷ was 5.5 percent per annum; manufacturing output increased by an average annual rate of about 8 percent, with large-scale manufacturing increasing at over 10 percent per annum. The elite farmer strategy of concentrating new agricultural inputs in the hands of rich farmers also bore fruit by generating a growth rate in agricultural output of 3.2 percent per annum (compared to less than 1.5 percent in the previous decade). However, underlying this impressive performance in terms of aggregate growth rates was an economy which became structurally and financially so dependent on the advanced capitalist countries that the very sovereignty of the State began to be undermined. Apart from this, the nature of the growth process generated such acute inequalities between regions that the internal cohesion of society began to be seriously eroded.

The particular growth process in Pakistan generated four fundamental contradictions:

1. A dependent economic structure and the associated high degree of reliance on foreign aid.
2. An acute concentration of economic power in the hands of forty-three families and the resultant gulf between the rich and the poor in urban areas.
3. Growing economic disparity between regions.
4. Polarization of classes in the rural sector and a rapid increase in landlessness.

Dependent Economic Structure

Underlying the apparently impressive figures of the growth of manufactured output (10 percent per annum in the large-scale manufacturing sector) was an inefficient and lopsided industrial structure. Growth was concentrated not in heavy industries which could impart self-reliance to the economy but

³⁷ *Savings are a function not only of the level of income but also of its distribution* Mahbub-ul-Haq . *Strategy of Economic Planning* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 30.

³⁸ *Government of Pakistan, Third Five Year Plan., P. 17.*

rather in consumer goods produced with imported machines. Thus, by 1970—71, cotton textiles alone accounted for as much as 48 percent of value added in industry, while basic industries such as basic metals and electric and transport equipment accounted for only 1 percent of the value added in manufacturing in Pakistan. Not only was growth concentrated in consumer goods industries, but also the efficiency of these industries was very low. This was due to the high degree of protection and support given by the Government in the form of high import tariffs, an overvalued exchange rate, tax holidays and provision of cheap credit industrialists could thus earn annual profits of 50 percent to 100 percent or more and were under no pressure to increase efficiency. Apart from this, export subsidies enabled manufacturers to export goods at an extremely high rupee cost per dollar earned. In some cases, goods were profitably exported at dollar prices, which were less than the dollar value of the raw materials embodied in the goods.⁴⁰

Given the failure to develop a heavy industrial base and time emphasis on import—dependent consumer goods industries, the structure of Pakistan's industry induced increasing dependence on imported inputs. At the same time, the failure to increase domestic savings pushed the economy further into reliance on foreign aid. The policy of distributing income in favor of the industrialists succeeded, but the assumption that this would raise domestic savings over time failed to materialize. Griffin points out, for example, that 15 percent of the resources annually generated in the rural sector were transferred to the urban industrialists, and 63 percent to 85 percent of these transferred resources went into increased urban consumption.⁴¹ Far from raising the domestic savings rate to the target level of 25 percent of GNP, the actual savings rate never rose above 12 percent of GNP and in some years was as low as 3 percent to 4 percent.⁴²

The low domestic savings caused by the failure of capitalists to save out of their increased income resulted during the decade of the sixties in growing dependence on foreign aid. According to Government of Pakistan figures foreign aid inflow increased from US\$ 373 million in 1950-55 to US\$ 2.7 billion in 1965-70.⁷⁰ This seven-fold increase in the volume of aid was accompanied by a continuing change in the composition of aid from grants to loans so that whereas 'grant and grant-type' assistance constituted 73

³⁹ For a discussion of inefficiency of Pakistan's industry. See R Soligo and J J Stern, "Tariff Protection, Import-Substitution and Investment Inefficiency," *Pakistan Development Review* (Summer 1967). See also, C C Winston, 'over-invoicing and Industrial Efficiency,' *Pakistan Development Review* (Winter 1970).

⁴⁰ R D Mallon, 'Export Policy in Pakistan,' *Pakistan Development Review* (Spring 1966).

⁴¹ K Griffin, 'Financing Development plans in Pakistan,' in K Griffin and A R Khan (ed.), *Growth and Inequality in Pakistan* (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 133.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 41-2

⁴³ Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-74* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1974), P. 133.

percent of total aid received during 1950 this type of assistance declined to 9 percent by 1965-70. Thus, not only had the volume of aid increase dramatically but also the terms on which it was received became increasingly harder. The result was that debt servicing alone by the end of the sixties constituted a crippling burden. While debt servicing as a proportion of commodity export earnings was 4.2 percent in 1960-61, by 1971—72 it had become 34.5 percent. Clearly, such a magnitude of export earnings could not be spent on debt servicing if vital food and industrial inputs were to be maintained. Thus, by the end of the sixties, economic survival began to depend on getting more aid to pay back past debts. This pattern of aid dependence continues to this day. In 1986, for example, 73 percent of gross aid received was returned as payment for debt servicing charges on past debt. What is perhaps even more significant is that the conditional clauses of 'foreign aid' specify in great detail the economic policy that the Government of Pakistan is required to follow.⁴⁴ Aid—giving agencies, for example specify policies from the price of gas and fertilizer to import policy, from the method of administering railways to the allocations to be made by the Government in each sector of the economy. These increasingly comprehensive macro—economic policy packages accompanying foreign aid seriously erode the sovereignty of Pakistan's economic decision—making.

Concentration of Economic Power

The process of economic growth upon which Pakistan embarked during the sixties was designed to concentrate incomes in the hands of the industrial elite on the one hand and the big landowners on the other. It is surprising therefore that by the end of the 1960s a small group of families with interlocking directorates dominated industry, banking and insurance in Pakistan. Thus forty—three families represented 76.8 percent of all manufacturing assets (including foreign and government assets). In terms of value added 46 percent of the value added in all large—scale manufacturing originated in firms controlled by forty—three families.⁴⁵

In banking, the degree of concentration was even greater than in industry. For example, seven family banks constituted 91.6 percent of private domestic deposits and 84.4 percent of earning assets. Furthermore, there is evidence to show that the family banks tended to favor industrial companies controlled by the same families in the provision of loans. State bank compilation of balance sheets of listed companies indicates which banks industrial families were one of the two to four banks that the industries controlled by the some industrial families dealt with.⁴⁶

⁴⁴See 'The Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Pakistan and the World Bank, 1980,' (typescript). Also see 'Economic Policy Memorandum of the Government of Pakistan for 1981-82,' May 1981 (mimeo).

⁴⁵L J White, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 63.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 74-5.

The insurance industry, although smaller in size than banking, also had a high degree of concentration of ownership. The forty-three industrial families controlling 75.6 percent of assets of Pakistani insurance companies tendered to favour industrial companies owned by the same group. The insurance company investments were used for providing a ready market for the shares of the families' industrial companies whenever they wished to sell shares without depressing the share price.⁴⁷

The major industrial families and entrepreneurs were a fairly closely knit group. Not only did many of them have caste and kinship relations, but members of the families tended to sit on each other's boards of directors. About one—third of the seats on the boards of directors of companies controlled by the forty-three families were occupied by members of other families within the forty-three.⁴⁸

Not only were the forty-three families dominating industry, insurance and banking, they also had considerable Power over Government agencies sanctioning industrial projects. For example, PICIC (Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation) was the agency responsible for sanctioning large-scale industrial projects. Out of the twenty-one directors of PICIC, seven were from the forty-three leading industrial families and were actively involved in the administrative institutions that directly affected their economic interests.

During the process of rapid economic growth of the sixties, while an exclusive and highly monopolistic class was amassing wealth, the majority of Pakistan's population was suffering an absolute decline in its living standards. For example, the per capita consumption of food grain of the poorest 60 percent of Pakistan's urban population declined from an index of 100 in 1963—64 to 96.1 in 1969-70. The decline was even greater over the same period in the case of the poorest 60 percent of rural population. In their case, per capita consumption of food grain declined from an index of 100 in 1963—64 to only 91 in 1969—70.⁴⁹ There was an even larger decline in real wages in industry. For example, Griffin suggests that in the decade and a half ending in 1967, real wages in industry declined by 25 percent.⁵⁰ S M Naseem, in a more recent study for the I.L. has estimated that in 1971-72 poverty in the rural sector was so acute that 82 percent of rural households could not afford to provide even 2100 calories per day per family member. (2300 calories a day per head are regarded as the minimum for a healthy active life.)

Regional Economic Disparity

In an economy where investment takes place on the basis of private profitability alone, there would be a cumulative tendency for investment to be

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 79—80.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 81—5.

⁴⁹N Hamid, *The Burden of Capitalist Growth: A Study of Real Wages in Pakistan*, *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* (Spring 1974)

⁵⁰K Griffin and A R Khan, *Growth and Inequality in Pakistan*, *op.cit.*, pp. 204-205.

concentrated in the relatively developed regions. Consequently, regional economic disparities would tend to widen over time. This is in fact what happened in the case of Pakistan. Punjab and Sind provinces, which had relatively more developed infrastructures, attracted a larger proportion of industrial investment than the other provinces, in Sind, however, the growth in income was mainly in Karachi and Hyderabad. Thus, economic disparities widened not only between East and West Pakistan, but also between the provinces within West Pakistan. during the sixties the factor which accelerated the growth of regional income disparities within what is today Pakistan was the differential impact of agricultural growth associated with the so-called 'Green Revolution'. Since the yield increase associated with the adoption of high—yield varieties of foodgrain required Irrigation and since the Punjab and Sind had a relatively larger proportion of their area under irrigation, they experience much faster growth in their in conies, compared to Baluchistan and NWFP.⁵¹

In a situation where each of the provinces of Pakistan had a distinct culture and language, the systematic growth of regional disparities within the framework of the market mechanism created acute political tensions, defusing these tensions required a genuinely federal democratic structure with decentralization of political power at the provincial level. Only such a polity and large federal expenditures for the development of underdeveloped regions could ensure the unity of the country in the absence of such a polity, the growing economic disparities between provinces created explosive political tensions.

Polarization of Classes

The failure to conduct an effective land reform in Pakistan has resulted in a continued concentration of landownership in the hands of a few big land lords.⁵² Thus, in 1972, 30 percent of total farm area was owned by large landowners (owning 150 acres and above).⁵³ The overall picture of Pakistanis agrarian structure has been that these large landowners have rented out most of (heir land to small and medium—sized tenants (i.e. tenants operating below twenty—five acres).⁵⁴ in such a situation, when the 'Green Revolution' technology became available in the hate sixties, the large landowners found it profitable to resume some of their rented—out land for

⁵¹*For a detailed study of regional disparities within West Pakistan, see: N Hamid and A Hussain, 'Regional Inequalities and Capitalist Development, 'Pakistan Economic and Social review (Autumn 1974).*

⁵²*For discussion and evidence on the failure of the attempts at land reforms in 1959 and 1972, see Akmal Hussain, 'The Land Reforms in Pakistan: A Reconsideration, ' Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (Colorado, January – March, 1984).*

⁵³*Ibid.*

⁵⁴*Landowners with 150 acres and above rent out 75 percent of their owned area to tenants operating 25 acres or less. See a Hussain, 'Impact of Agricultural Growth on Changes in the Agrarian Structure of Pakistan, 1960-1978, with Special Reference to the Punjab Province (D. Phiol. Thesis, Sussex University, 1980).*

self—cultivation on large farms using hired labour and capital investment. It is this process of the development of capitalist farming which has generated new and potentially explosive contradictions in Pakistan's rural society. These contradictions have resulted from the highly unequal distribution of landownership.

During the period when high-yielding varieties of foodgrains were being adopted, there was a rapid introduction of tractors. The number of tractors increased from 2,000 in 1959 to 18,909 in 1968.⁵⁵ By 1975 there were 35,714 tractors with an additional 76,000 tractors being imported between 1976 and 1981.⁵⁶ Significantly, most of these tractors were large sized in a country where 91 percent of the farms are below twenty-five acres, and about 57 percent of total farm area is operated in farms below twenty-five acres.

An important reason why large tractors were introduced was that large landowners, responding to the new profit opportunities; began to resume rented—out land for self—cultivation of large farms. Given the difficulty of mobilizing a large number of laborers during the peak Season in an imperfect labor market and supervising laborers to ensure satisfactory performance, the large farmers found it convenient to mechanize even though there is no labor shortage in an absolute sense.

As a result of the development of capitalism in agriculture, polarization has occurred in the size distribution of farms, especially in the Punjab; i.e., the percentage share of large and small farms is increasing, while the percentage share of medium-sized farms (eight to twenty-five acres) is declining.⁵⁷ This Polarization is essentially the result of large landowners resuming their rented—out land for self-cultivation on large farms. The land resumption had the greatest impact on medium sized tenants.

Along with polarization in the rural class structure, landlessness has increased because many tenants are evicted following land resumption by big landowners. It has been estimated that during the decade of the sixties, 794,042 peasants became landless laborers; i.e. 43 percent of the total agricultural laborers had entered this category following proletarianization of the poor peasantry.⁵⁸

Unlike Europe, where the growth of capitalism in agriculture was associated with the emancipation of the peasantry, in Pakistan the development of capitalist farming has intensified the dependence of the poor peasantry. The reason is that in Pakistan capitalist farming has occurred in a situation where the political and economic power of the landlords is still intact. Consequently, the big landlord is able to control local institutions for the distribution of credit and other inputs. The result is that the poor peasant, in order to buy tube well water, seeds, fertilizer and pesticides and to market his output, has to depend on the good offices of the landlord. Thus, as the

⁵⁵ Akmal Hussain, 'Land Reforms in Pakistan: A Reconsideration,' *op. cit.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Akmal Hussain, *Impact of Agricultural Growth. 1960-78,* ' *op. cit.*

⁵⁸ Akmal Hussain, 'The Land Reforms in Pakistan: A reconsideration,' *op. cit.*

inputs for agricultural production become monetized and insofar as access to the market is via the landlord, the poor peasant's dependence is intensified.

As money costs of inputs increased without a proportionate increase in yield per acre of the poor peasant (due to poor timing and inadequate inputs) his real income is being reduced. Evidence shows that both the quantity and quality of diet of poor peasants have deteriorated.⁵⁹

The particular form that capitalist farming in Pakistan has taken is increasing landlessness, unemployment, class polarization and Poverty. Each of these features has arisen because capitalist farming is occurring in a situation where landownership is highly unequal, and where the feudal power of the landlords is intact.

CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AND THE STATE APPARATUS

The PPP was originally composed of radical elements of the petit bourgeoisie of the Punjab and Sind on the one hand and substantial elements of capitalist farmers on the other. The radical elements of the petit bourgeoisie were dominant in the PPP until 1972. This was evident from its manifesto which was anti—imperialist, anti feudal, and against monopoly capitalism. The same stratum also played a key role in devising a propaganda machine suited to the manifesto and presenting it as a 'revolutionary' program, thereby getting the support of the urban workers and the poor peasantry.

The radical stratum was drawn from diverse social origins and had differing political objectives, and its members therefore connected themselves to Bhutto in separate groups or factions. The inability of different factions of the radical petit bourgeoisie to constitute themselves into a single block within the PPP facilitated the purges that came after 1972.

By 1972 Bhutto had consolidated his power and began to shift the balance of class forces within the PPP in favor of the landlord group. This shift was not accidental, nor was it a personal betrayal of the radicals on Bhutto's Part as it was subjectively experienced by the party cadres. Changes in the internal class composition of the PPP were objectively determined by the changed position of the PPP in relation to the State. In the pre—election period the dominance of the radical petit bourgeoisie and its political rhetoric were necessary if the PPP was to get a mass base for an election victory.

After the election, Bhutto realized that if the socialist rhetoric of the left wing of the PPP was to be implemented, it could not be done through the existing State apparatus. It would involve institutionalizing party links with the working class and the peasantry by building grass-roots organizations. This would soon generate a working—class leadership which would not only threaten his own position within the party but would also unleash a momentum

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

of class conflict that would place the PPP on a collision course with the military and the bureaucracy. Given Bhutto's own commitment to seek social democratic reforms within the framework of the State as constituted at the time, he was unwilling to take a path that would lead to a confrontation with the State apparatus. Consequently, the socialist rhetoric of the PM had to be toned down, its radical petit bourgeoisie elements quietened or purged from the party, the rudimentary organizational links with the working class and poor peasants broken and the landlord elements of the PM firmly established as the dominant element within the party.

The decision to purge the radical elements within the PPP and to separate it structurally from its worker-peasant base meant that Bhutto had to rely on the bourgeois State apparatus to respond to the political challenges emanating from three directions: First, the intensification of the nationalist struggle in Baluchistan; second, the growing militancy of the working class in the Punjab and Sind; and finally, parties representing the industrial bourgeoisie.

The strategy of selective repression of the political opposition necessitated changes in the State apparatus so as to make it more effective as a coercive instrument. Bhutto brought about three types of changes:

1. He streamlined and strengthened the internal security service and formed a new paramilitary organization called the Federal Security Force, consisting initially of 10,000 men. This was essentially a political police force responsible directly to the Prime Minister
2. An attempt was made to reduce the power and autonomy of the elite CSP (Civil Services of Pakistan) cadre of the bureaucracy. This was done first by purging 1,300 officers on grounds of misuse of power and filling their vacancies by pro-PPP men. Second, a new system of lateral entry was instituted. Through this, direct appointments at all levels of the administrative services were made on recommendation from the PPP leadership. By the short-circuiting the hierarchy of the CSP and penetrating it with officers who were loyal to the PPP, large sections of the bureaucracy were politicized and made more amenable for use by the PPP.
3. In the armed forces, Bhutto conducted two purges in quick succession. He first discarded the five top generals who had dominated the Government before and during the Bangladesh crisis, and second, he ousted those commanders like Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan who had been instrumental in the transfer of power to Bhutto himself. Thus, enemies and benefactors alike were removed on grounds that they had Bonapartist tendencies. The new chief of the army staff was Tikka Khan, who was succeeded by Zia-ul-Haq, whom Butto promoted by superseding four other generals in the hope that he would be obliged to be loyal. However, as was realized later, a coup d'état cannot be prevented by simply placing loyal generals in command. What is necessary is to change the

very structure of the armed forces and its relationship to the political system. What he had to do to prevent a COUP was to subordinate the armed forces as an institution to the political system. This change in the structural position of the armed forces within the State, from position of dominance to a position of subordination to the political system, could only have been achieved by organizationally linking the PPP to its mass base. This was something that Bhutto was not prepared to do.

While Bhutto in his attempt to use the State apparatus to quell political opposition was internalizing some sections of the State apparatus into his political apparatus, a parallel process of infiltration was being covertly conducted by another political party: The Jamaat-i-Islami.

The Jamaat-i-Islami is an extreme right-wing religious party composed of the most retrograde section of the urban petit bourgeoisie. It had suffered a humiliating electoral defeat in 1970, having obtained only 5 percent of the vote and three National Assembly seats. After this defeat it started concentrating on preparing for a COUP by increasing its infiltration of the army and bureaucracy.⁶⁰ The Jamaat from its very inception was a semisecret, extreme right-wing organization of disciplined cadres, some of whom were given combat training. After 1970 it was able to expand its influence over strategic Sections of the State apparatus for a number of reasons:

1. The earlier generation of generals in the high command were British trained, liberal officers, drawn largely from the affluent landowning class. However, in the sixties a new generation of officers began to occupy command positions. These were less literate and more religious, drawn largely from the economically depressed migrants of the Potwar region of West Punjab (like General Zia-ul-Haq) and the unirrigated Potwar region of West Punjab. This new generation of officers was socially more conservative than the earlier generation, was brought up in a religious culture and was highly susceptible to the puritanical ideology of the Jamaat.⁶¹
2. Similarly, patterns of general recruitment in the army had changed whereby many of the rank and file as well as the junior officers tended to come not from the prosperous central Punjab, but from the relatively impoverished northern districts of the province, where a fundamentalist religious ethos still prevails.⁶²
3. The demoralization of the armed forces following the defeat in Bangladesh had opened the way for an obscurantist ideology. In the absence of ideological work among the ranks by the left, the average soldier turned to the Islamism of the Jamaat for an explanation both of his failure as well as his future purpose.⁶³

⁶⁰For a more detailed description of the Jamaat-i-Islami, See Aijaz Ahmad, 'Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan', *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (Winter, 1978).

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 503.

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³*Ibid.*

4. The Jamaat propaganda among troops was tolerated and in some cases sanctioned by commanding officers at the battalion level and above.⁶⁴

It appears that the relative autonomy and internal coherence of the State apparatus has been considerably undermined due to its infiltration by PPP sympathizers on the one hand and by Jamaat cadres on the other. The consequent factionalizing process within the armed forces and the bureaucracy is an important factor in the nature of the July 1977 coup as well as an element in the present crisis of the State.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE ANTI-BHUTTO MOVEMENT, AND THE BHUTTO LEGACY

The essential political aspect of the nationalization of nine basic industries, banks and insurance companies was that it enabled the PPP to buy the political support of a section of the urban petit bourgeoisie through provision of credit and contracts for consultancy, construction projects and production of components. The nationalization of banks particularly enabled the PPP to strengthen its support among the kulaks by providing them with low—interest loans. For example, in 1975 alone, Rs 1,650 million were provided to kulaks. In the period 1971—72 to 1975—76, loans from nationalized ‘commercial banks for tractors and tubewells increased by 400 percent and loans for other farm needs (so-called taccavi loans) increased by 600 percent. Similarly, Government subsidies for chemical fertilizers rose from US \$2.5 million to US \$60 million during the period 1971 to 1976. The same rapid expansion of rural credit is indicated by loans given by the Agricultural Development Bank

	1971—1972	1975—1976
Tractors	Rs 370.41 million	Rs 2,200 million
Tubewells	Rs 180.41 million	Rs 860.67 million

The nationalization of banks and the subsequent credit expansion for financing loans to industries and capitalist farming led to heavy deficit financing and an increase in the money supply. Thus, notes in circulation increased from Rs 23,000 million in 1971—72 to Rs. 57,000 million in 1976—77. There was a sharp slowing in the growth rate of both agriculture and industry. Thus, industrial growth fell from an average of 13 percent per year during the sixties to only 3 percent per year during the Bhutto period from 1972 to 1977. Similarly, the agricultural growth rate declined from an average of 5.65 percent in the sixties to a mere 0.45 percent in the period 1970-75

⁶⁴*Ibid*

The sharp increase in the money supply during a period of virtual stagnation in agriculture and industry was reflected in a very sharp rise in the rate of inflation. The wholesale price index at 1959—60 prices rose from 150.3 in 1971—72 to 288.8 by 1974—75, with the sharpest increase being recorded in foodgrain prices, which rose by 200 percent over the three-year period. It appears then that, although nationalization of industry and credit expansion enabled the PPP to buy the support of a section of the urban petit bourgeoisie through the provision of jobs, contracts, licenses and loans, the available funds and contracts were not large enough to enrich the entire petit bourgeoisie. In fact a section of the lower middle class that did not gain from the PPP, suffered an absolute decline in their real incomes due to the high inflation rate. It was the frustrated section of the urban petit bourgeoisie and the large lumpen proletariat which had been stricken by inflation that responded to the call for a street agitation in March 1977. Although the apparent form of the street agitation was spontaneous, it was orchestrated and given political focus at key junctures of the movement. This organizational and coordinating function was performed by the highly trained cadres of the Jamaat-i-Islami. The agitation was of course fueled by the fact that the P1' was alleged to have rigged elections in a number of constituencies, although it was subsequently recognized that the PPP would have won a majority even without the rigging.

While internal factors were important determinants of the anti-Bhutto movement, nevertheless they must be seen in the context of the international forces at play during the last days of the Bhutto regime. Bhutto by means of his nuclear program and his diplomacy with the Arab regimes was attempting to acquire leverage against the power of the United States in the region. His defiance in the face of US disapproval of his policies occurred in a situation where his domestic political support had not been secured and institutionalized through a political party. This was a factor as important in his overthrow as the organized opposition by elements of the petit bourgeoisie. The overthrow of the Bhutto regime and the subsequent hanging of the only popularly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan dramatically represented the limits of populism within a State structure dominated by the military—bureaucratic oligarchy. Through his charismatic personality and populist rhetoric Bhutto had in his early years galvanized mass consciousness and unleashed powerful popular forces. His failure to institutionalize these essentially spontaneous forces within a grass—roots party and the resultant failure to subordinate the military—bureaucratic elite to the political system led to his tragic downfall. Yet, the style and content of Bhutto's political message has left a lasting legacy in the popular consciousness: that the poor have the right and the ability to be freed of the shackles of oppression; that they too can dream of threatening the citadels of power. His lonely defiance of military authority during his months in the death cell has given this dream an immediacy and the Bhutto name an intense emotional charge.

MILITARIZATION AND DEPENDENCE UNDER THE ZIA REGIME

The Fragmentation of Civil Society

Each regime that came to power sought to legitimize itself through an explicit Ideology: The Ayub regime propounded the ideology of modernization and economic development. The Bhutto regime sought legitimacy in the ideology of redeeming the poor ('Food, Clothing and Shelter for all') through socialism. It is an index of Zia's fear of popular forces, that the initially sought justification of his government precisely in its temporary character. If anything, it was the ideology of transience (That he was there for only 90 days for the sole purpose of holding fair elections). It was this fear that impelled the Zia regime to seek (albeit through a legal process) the physical elimination of the one individual who could mobilize the popular forces. It was the same fear that subsequently induced Zia to rule on the basis of military terror while propounding a version of Islamic ideology. Draconian measures of military courts, arbitrary arrests and public lashings were introduced. Thus the gradual erosion since independence of the institutions of civil society, brought the power of the State into stark confrontation with the people. Earlier in 1971, this confrontation had been a major factor in the break—Lip of Pakistan and the creation of an independent Bangladesh. Now a protracted period of Martial Law under the Zia regime served to brutalize and undermine civil society in what remained of Pakistan.

As the Zia regime militarized the State structure, its isolation from the people was matched by its acute external dependence. In the absence of domestic political popularity it sought political, economic and military support from the United States. This pushed Pakistan into becoming a 'front line State' in America's Afghan war which was an important factor in further undermining civil society.

Since 1977, with the steady inflow into Pakistan of Afghan refugees and use of Pakistan as a conduit for arms for the Afghan war, two trends have emerged to fuel the crisis of civil society:

1. A large proportion of weapons meant for the Afghan guerrillas have filtered into the illegal arms market.
2. There has been a rapid growth of the heroin trade. Powerful mafia-type syndicates have emerged which operate the production, domestic transportation and export of heroin. Many Afghan refugees who now have a significant share of intercity overland cargo services have also been integrated into the drug syndicates.

The large illegal arms market and the burgeoning heroin trade have injected both weapons and syndicate organizations into the social life major urban centers. At the same time the frequent bombings in the NWFP resulting from the Afghan war and the weakening of State authority in

parts of rural Sind has undermined for many people confidence in the basic function of the State: That of providing security of life to its citizens. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that an increasing number of people are seeking alternative support mechanisms in their communities to seek redress against Injustice and to achieve security against a physical threat to their per and families. The proximate identity or group membership through which the individual seeks such security can be an ethnic, sub religious, sub-nationalist or biraderi (kinship) group. Thus, civil society has begun to get polarized along vertical lines. Each group, whether ethnic, sub-religious, sub-nationalist or biraderi, has an intense emotional charge and a high degree of firepower derived from the contemporary arms market.

The Mechanism of Economic Dependence Under the Zia Regime

The development strategy under the Martial Law regime was formulated within the framework of the IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Program. This is a comprehensive macro-economic policy package which constitutes IMF/World Bank conditionality and contains three principal policy guidelines:

1. Import liberalization
2. Withdrawal of subsidies
3. Exchange rate devaluation.

These guidelines are essentially interrelated and effectively propose that the economy be 'opened up' to the flows of foreign goods and capital and that resource allocation in the domestic economy take place on the basis of world market prices. Import liberalisation and withdrawal of subsidies from local goods means that foreign goods would be freely available locally and compete more effectively against domestically produced goods whose prices would rise as the result of subsidy withdrawal. Apart from this, formerly overvalued exchange rates constituted an implicit subsidy to domestic industrialists using imported inputs. This too would be withdrawn following exchange rate devaluation. As import expenditures following import liberalization increase and export earnings from manufactured goods using imported inputs fall, there would consequently arise an acute pressure on the balance of payments. Hence, exchange rate devaluation, which is the third element in the IMF/WB policy package, would induce a downward adjustment in the exchange rate as a device to sustain import liberalization and subsidy withdrawal.

The overall effect of this policy would be that resource allocation in the domestic economy would take place in response to world market prices. This means that the domestic resources would tend to be concentrate the agriculture sector where the country has a comparative advantage (in a static sense) and a shift away from the strategy of industrialization., which was an emblem of national independence in the post—colonial period. In such

a development strategy growth of (NP is predicated primarily on the agriculture sector and foreign exchange earnings critically dependent Oil agricultural exports. Accordingly, while readily available agricultural goods would enable an increase in foreign exchange earnings in the short run, the decline in the terms of trade against agricultural exporters and the low ceiling to agricultural growth, would combine to restrict the growth of export earnings in the long run. Thus, the IMF/WB policy package while would Create the capacity to service debts in the short term, would Constrain the growth of foreign exchange in the long run, and hence maintain a continued dependence of the national economy on foreign loans.

Let us now consider how the IMF/WB conditionality was implemented in Pakistan, and then examine its implications for industrialization and planning in this country.

The Sixth Five Year Plan which was formulated by the Martial Law regime reflects the Structural Adjustment Program imposed on Pakistan's planners as a condition for the loans given by the IMF/WB. The Sixth Plan places emphasis on resource allocation based on present comparative advantage,⁶⁵ agriculture as the basis of achieving aggregate GNP growth targets and concentration on agricultural exports. For example, the World Bank Review of the Plan states: 'The plan's principal objectives are to achieve a major breakthrough in agricultural production, an expanding foothold in export markets for agricultural products, rapid development of selected industries in which the country has a comparative advantage . . .

The Plan document itself makes clear the strategy of making agriculture (rather than industry) as the spearhead of growth in GNP: ' . . . the growth strategy of the Plan is based on a major breakthrough in agriculture production . . . '66It goes on to emphasize the objective of agricultural exports:

The growth strategy of the Plan relies on a combination of policies including:

1. A major increase in agricultural yields through more efficient use of fertilizer, water and farm technology.
2. An expanding foothold in export markets for wheat and rice as well as for fruits, vegetables, flowers, poultry and meat.
3. Increased self-sufficiency in oil seeds.
4. Rapid development of steel based engineering goods; modernization of textile industry and establishment of agro-industries for processing agricultural surpluses...⁶⁷

The policy of import liberalization, subsidy withdrawal and resource

⁶⁵ *World Bank, Pakistan: A Review of the Sixth Five Year Plan, A World Bank Country Study (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1956, p. 17).*

⁶⁶ *Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, The Sixth Five Year Plan 1983-88, p. 11.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

allocation based on the market mechanism is indicated clearly in the World Bank Review of the Sixth Plan:

Another significant feature of the Plan is the expanding role assigned to the private sector. With private investment projected to increase more than twice as rapidly as public investment, and the involvement of the public sector in manufacturing to decline sharply, the attainment of the overall targets of the Plan will depend to a greater extent than in the past on the performance of the private sector. . . . As is recognized in the Plan, major actions in pricing, deregulation, tariffs and import liberalization and other incentives will be needed to induce the private sector to play the iii- creased role expected of it . . . (emphasis mine).⁶⁸

The implementation of the third element in the conditionality package of the IMF/WB (indicated above), namely devaluation of the rupee, was done by means of de-linking the rupee from the fixed exchange rate with the dollar and putting the rupee on a 'managed float' with a weighted average of the currencies of Pakistan's major trading partners. This resulted in effectively devaluing the rupee against the dollar by 37.9 percent between January 1982 and May 1985.⁶⁹ As suggested in the foregoing analysis, the imperative to devalue the exchange rate arises as the result of pressure on the balance of payments associated with import liberalization, subsidy withdrawal and reliance on agricultural exports which are subject to declining terms of trade. Thus in Pakistan, after an initial increase in foreign exchange earnings and a strong balance of payments position between 1978 to 1982, export earnings declined sharply by 17.3 percent in 1983.⁷⁰ The balance of payments continued to deteriorate in subsequent years until in March 1985 the gross foreign exchange reserves fell drastically to \$883 million which is equivalent to only 1.6 months of import expenditures.⁷¹ One of the most important factors in the deterioration in the balance of payments, and the resultant increase in the reliance on foreign loans was a deterioration in Pakistan's terms of trade in a situation where its exportable are mainly agricultural goods. Thus, terms of trade have been declining steadily from 87.5 in 1978—79 to 60 in 1983_84.⁷²

We have argued in the foregoing analysis that Pakistan has moved towards the implementation of each of the major elements of the IMF/W conditionality package which the latter prescribes for loan receiving countries, namely, import liberalization, withdrawal of subsidies and exchange rate devaluation. The Sixth Plan has explicitly adopted the framework of resource allocation in response to world market prices on the basis of

⁶⁸ World Bank, *Pakistan: A Review of the Sixth Five Year Plan*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁶⁹ *Government of 1 Pakistan Economic Survey 1954.85*

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

private profitability criteria, i.e., agriculture as the spearhead of growth of GNP and agricultural exports as the major instrument of foreign exchange earnings. In so far as this has occurred, the Sixth Plan represents a marginalization of planning in the process of economic growth. For the basic premise of economic planning in an underdeveloped economy is that the present comparative advantage imposes a structure of production (i.e., specialization in raw material production) that works against the long—term interests of the economy and the free market mechanism merely reinforces the existing structure of production. Hence planning is thought to be necessary to pull the economy out of the existing structure of production based on specialization in agriculture towards one based on industrialization. The logic of planning is that the existing set of world prices is not an appropriate indicator for resource allocation. Insofar as the Sixth Plan has explicitly adopted world prices and comparative advantage as the basis of resource allocation, it constitutes an abandonment of National Economic Planning in the strict sense of the term.

CONCLUSION

The current crisis of the State in Pakistan has arisen out of a State structure in which the dominance of the military—bureaucratic oligarchy systematically constrained the development of the political process. The oligarchy devised a political framework which, while allowing rivalry between the landlords and the industrial bourgeoisie for the division of the economic surplus, maintained the mode of appropriation of the surplus through which the existence of these elites could be perpetuated.

The predominance of the army and bureaucracy in the structure of State Power in Pakistan was due to the form of the freedom struggle in the pre partition period on the one hand, and the nature of the Muslim League on

The other. At the time of independence, the state apparatus of the colonial regime was largely intact, and it articulated the framework within which politics were to occur. The second factor in the failure to subordinate the army and bureaucracy to the political system lay in the two basic characteristics of both the Muslim League before partition and the Pakistan People's Party during the seventies:

1. Both the Muslim League in the pre—partition period as well as the Pakistan people's Party during the seventies were movements rather than parties. They were therefore unable to establish an organizational structure on the basis of which the power of the people could be institutionalized and used to subordinate the army and the bureaucracy to the political system.
2. The Muslim League in the decade before partition, and the PPP during the early seventies, were taken over by landlords whose political interest lay in constraining the process of political development within the confines specified by the military—bureaucratic oligarchy.

The nature of economic growth which occurred in an economy dominated by the landlords and the industrial bourgeoisie generated acute economic inequality between the rich and the poor on the one hand and between regions on the other. These economic contradictions manifested themselves in growing political tensions between social groups and regions—tensions which could have been mitigated (although not necessarily resolved) only within a democratic political system that was responsive to the aspirations of the dispossessed classes and poorer regions. As it was, in a State structure within which the political system was severely constrained by the military- bureaucratic oligarchy, these tensions merely built up pressure on the State structure.

The growing political tensions between social groups and regions developed at a time when the relative autonomy of the military—bureaucratic oligarchy was being eroded as the result of its politicization. 'I while the task of mediating the conflicting political forces became increasingly difficult, the ability of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy to do so became weaker. Consequently, as civil society became polarized the State increasingly used coercive forms of control. Unlike the earlier Martial Law governments, the Zia regime was unable to effectively hand over power to its civilian facade. Thus, in spite of formally declaring the end of Martial Law, the posts of Chief of Army Staff and the President continued to be held by General Zia—ul—Haq. This has made possible the presence of the military in the daily affairs of the State. It has also created the institutional basis of short—circuiting the civil administration by the military chain of command, whenever this is felt necessary by the Chief of Army Staff. It is in this perspective that the following major elements of the crisis of State and civil society can be understood:

1. The State dominated by the repressive apparatus is highly centralized and is unable to recognize, let alone grant, the rights of the various nationalities. This has enhanced sub-national tendencies, given the fact that the army is drawn predominantly from the Punjab province.
2. The State's interpretation of religion is seen by the people as sanctifying particular class interests and justifying repression against those who dare to question it. The State is, therefore, bereft of a legitimizing ideology. For this reason the army, unlike in the past, cannot withdraw behind a civilian facade.
3. The prolonged military rule and the demise of the 1973 constitution have eroded the balance between the various institutions of the State, i.e., the armed forces, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, etc. There is, therefore, an institutional crisis of State authority.
4. The fragmentation of civil society along various sub-religious, ethnic, biraderi and sub-regional lines, and the rapid arming of conflicting groups has weakened the basic function of the State: The protection of life of the ordinary citizen. This has accentuated the tendency of the individual to seek security in the most proximate identity, and to militantly assert this parochial identity as an emblem of his membership in it.