

PART IV

THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF STATE POWER

The Political Economy of State Power*

South Asian States are today undergoing a severe crisis. The process of economic growth which was supposed to create the material basis of a national identity is beginning to undermine it: Although GNP growth in most cases has been impressive, it has created increasing affluence for the few, while leaving a substantial proportion of the population in acute poverty. At the same time, the level of domestic savings has continued to remain at such a low level in a number of South Asian countries that economic growth has been accompanied by increased dependence on foreign loans, while the conditions attached to such loans have begun to constrain the ability for independent economic planning. In the political sphere, there is an increasing polarization between social classes and there are growing tensions based on ethnic and regional lines. The armed forces which were supposed to be the guardians of geographic boundaries, are increasingly being used as coercive instrument⁸ against sub-nationalist movements, and in many cases the military bureaucratic oligarchy is dominating political institutions rather than being subordinated to them.

The chapters in this Part IV will attempt to examine

these stresses on state and civil society in Pakistan in terms of the interplay between political and economic forces in a historical perspective. Chapter 11 analyzes the nature and genesis of the Pakistan movement and shows how this conditioned the political and state structure at the dawn of independence. Chapter 12 investigates the dominance of the state apparatus over the political process. Here we focus on the changing social origins and ideology of the army. Finally, in chapter 13 we analyze the nature of economic dependence and the growing militarization of civil society — A process whose trajectory brings the power of the state into a potential confrontation with the power of the people.

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The Nature and Origins of the Pakistan Movement

INTRODUCTION

In considering the nature and origins of the Pakistan Movement, one comes across two kinds of equally simplistic views at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. At one end, there is the metaphysical view of Muslim communal 'historians', who confine the concepts of culture and nation strictly within the bounds of religion. In this view Pakistan is seen as a historical inevitability rooted in the doctrinal differences between Islam and Hinduism. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the view that conceives history in terms of the political manipulations of individuals or governments. This view regards Pakistan as the result simply of a British conspiracy to divide and rule. Such approaches, however, cannot explain why religious differences between Hindus and Muslims acquired the importance they did in the first half of the twentieth century in India; or why the British policy of sowing discord falls on such fertile ground? These questions can be answered only by examining the nature of the political and economic forces at play during the twilight of the raj.

The origin of the demand for Pakistan can be located in the dynamic interaction of three political forces within India during the period from 1857 to 1940:

1. The British imperial government, which it can be argued was interested in undermining the gathering momentum of the national liberation movement by accentuating its internal contradictions
2. The Congress, representing the interests of an Indian national bourgeoisie, which was essentially underdeveloped and therefore lacked genuine secularism in its political choices and political language. Consequently, the Congress was susceptible to Hindu communalist pressures, thereby increasingly alienating the Muslim' trading elite from the Indian bourgeoisie.
3. The Muslim trading elite which could be regarded as a nascent fraction of the Indian bourgeoisie, was even less mature than its Hindu counterpart. Due to its acute weakness, in its rivalry with the more powerful Hindu fraction, the Muslim 'bourgeoisie' was , induced to seek support from Muslim landlords and the colonial state on the one hand, and reliance on an explicitly religious ideology on .,the other.

I The Emerging Muslim "Bourgeoisie", the British and the National Movement 1857-1928.

One of the earliest attempts at articulating the political and economic interests of propertied Muslim in British India can be traced to the Muslim educational movement of Syed Ahmed Khan. His political ideas during the 1850s express the interests of the rising Muslim 'bourgeoisie' and the smaller landlords, who resented the feudal system in India

and wished to receive economic concessions from the British authorities. Thus, Syed Ahmad Khan opposed the 1857 War of Independence as an attempt to restore the old feudal nobility and supported the British on this issue. While being a staunch loyalist of the British raj he urged industrial and commercial development and argued for administrative reforms whereby Indians could be given a place in the country's administration¹. He called upon Muslims to educate themselves and to be receptive to modern scientific ideas. In the pursuit of this objective he founded a scientific society in 1864. In 1877, helped by the British, Syed Ahmad Khan founded the Muslim College at Aligarh. This institution sought to inculcate loyalty to the raj in Muslims and at the same time became an influential political and ideological centre of Muslim propertied classes. Aligarh College made an important contribution in producing a corpus of literature and a Muslim separatist consciousness, which were vital to the subsequent emergence of a Muslim political party in India.

The correspondence between the interests of the British raj and the political efforts of Syed Ahmed Khan can be judged from his complete change in posture in the period before and after the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. Until 1885, he was a champion of Hindu- Muslim Unity and conceived of Hindus and Muslims as part of the same nation:

“Do not forget that Hindu and Muslim are names referring to the religious denomination, but whether Hindu, Muslim or Christian, so long as these people live in our country, they form one nation regardless of their faith (emphasis added).”

The formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was an attempt by Indian nationalists to challenge the political status quo and pressurize the British authorities for reforms and self-rule. Even though in the early phase of the Congress

this struggle was conducted strictly within the structure of the colonial state, Syed Ahmed Khan and the Muslim proper tied Interests whom he represented strongly opposed the Congress struggle. Syed Ahmad Khan, who only a few years earlier had championed Hindu-Muslim unity within a single nation, now made an equally passionate attack on the concept of; composite Indian nationalism. In a speech at Lucknow on December 28, 1887, he remarked as follows:

“Now that all the English were to leave India — who would be rulers of India? is it possible that under these circumstances two nations, Mohammedan and Hindu could sit, on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and in (emphasis added)”³

The sharp Change in Syed Ahmed Khan’s position on the relationship between religion’ and nationhood expressed the Imperative operating upon the infant Muslim bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie of northwest India historically emerged much later than • bourgeoisie operating in Bengal and Bombay. In the latter regions,) of their proximity to the sea, the pattern of expansion of the colonial economy brought to it commercial and industrial activity much earlier than in northern India, where the production of cash crops remained the predominant function of the colonial economy. Consequently the Muslim bourgeoisie which originated in north-west India was much weaker than the Hindu bourgeoisie, and in its competitive struggle against the latter, it had to rely on the support of Muslim landlords and British authorities. Accordingly, as the Congress emerged to threaten the interests of British metropolitan capital, the weak Muslim fraction of the Indian bourgeoisie saw that in opposing the Congress⁴ it could win concessions from the British.

Soon after the formation of the Congress, a Hindu movement against cow slaughter, which provoked Hindu-Muslim riots, arose as part of a movement for the purity of Hinduism. The Congress then declared that it was an all India organization representing both Hindus and Muslims. However, the Indian national movement was not fully developed, since it had emerged within the highly restrictive structure of a dependent colonial economy. Its growth had not occurred in the context of an economic and cultural conflict with feudalism, as in the European case. Consequently, the Indian national bourgeoisie had not transcended the religious elements in its culture to achieve a secular political language. It was therefore not in a position to oppose effectively the anti-cow slaughter movement. This failure led Syed Ahmed to brand the Congress a Hindu organization and to argue that the Congress' notion of self-rule would result in Hindu dominance of India.⁶

As the Congress gained organizational strength and enlarged its social base, its demand for a system of democratic representation of the Indian people began to press the British authorities. It was at this stage that Aligarh College began to play an active role against the Congress by posing the fact of different religious communities in India as an argument against a simple democratic representation, in which the Hindus would have been in the majority.

The Indian national bourgeoisie, because of its low level of development, had not been able to achieve genuine secularism in the consciousness. It was therefore susceptible to Hindu religious influence in both its political language as well as occasionally its political choices. This was an important factor in fostering a sense of insecurity about Congress intentions among the Muslim fraction of the Indian bourgeoisie. The nascent Muslim bourgeoisie was relatively so much weaker than its Hindu counterpart that it felt obliged to conduct its rivalry by aligning itself with the 'British

authorities and Muslim landlords and by using an explicitly Muslim communal ideology in its anti-Congress rhetoric. This pushed the Congress even further towards a Hindu direction. Thus, the veiled communal of the Congress and the open communalism of the Muslim bourgeoisie fed off each other due to the underdeveloped nature both the Hindu and Muslim fractions of the India bourgeoisie. Whenever the nationalist movement led by the Congress intensified, the doubted misgivings between the Hindu and Muslim communities were also accentuated. This psychological characteristic of their relations between the Hindu and Muslim fractions of Indian bourgeois was reinforced by the political imperatives operating on the British colonial regime which aimed, at intensifying communal conflict as a device to weaken the nationalist movement. It is this particular interplay of forces that explains the fact that at the high tide of the nationalist movement, in 1905, we see the emergence of the Muslim League as a separate political party of the Muslims.

The growing communalism in India during the first decade of the twentieth century was not, merely the result of British intrigue. The particular form of political mobilization conducted by the Congress also accentuated the existing mistrust between the Hindu and Muslim communalities. While the Congress was formally a secular organization, in practice, its campaigns, and political language were, characterized by Hindu symbolism. For example, during the 1909-11 campaign against the partition of Bengal, the Congress could have won the support of most Muslim landlords since few Muslims supported the division of Bengal. Yet the Congress leaders alienated their Muslim supporters by using Hindu anthems and Hindu symbols in their campaigns. Many Muslim nationalists were, outraged by this imagery and left the movement.

The Muslim middle classes in the competition for jobs felt at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their Hindu counterparts. The

Aligarh group, with the support of the British authorities, directed this tendency towards the demand for separate electorates and an intensification of the communal issues.

Evidence of the British attempt at fomenting Hindu- Muslim communal tension is provided by a private conversation between Mohsin-ul-Malik, and the viceroy, Lord Minto. The viceroy emphasized that Muslim political activities should aim at achieving community representation for Muslims in order to combat the political power of the Hindus. The viceroy further pointed out that the British had high hopes for the loyalty of the Aligarh group.⁹

The British policy of opposing the Hindu and Muslim communities finally found a formal expression in the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which brought about separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims.

II Muslim League and Denouement of Hindu. Muslim Conflict: 1907-1947

The effort of the Muslim landlords and Muslim commercial interests to form a separate Muslim political party intensified in an environment characterized by the Congress' mass campaign for self-rule. This was increasingly couched in Hindu mythological images, thereby generating a growing concern among the bourgeoisie, landlords and middle class elements of the Muslim community.

The first specific proposal for a Muslim political association was made by Nawab Salimullah of Dacca. He argued that such an association should support the British administration, combat the mounting influence of the Congress and protect Muslim communal interests.¹⁰ The essentials of Salimullah's proposals were accepted at a subsequent Dacca conference of Muslim leaders, chaired by the well-known Aligarh figure, Viqarul-Mulk. This conference named the new organization the All-India Muslim League.

The first conference of the, AU-India Muslim League opened In Karachi on. December 29, 1907. The founding father of the Muslim League belonged to the Muslim groups of landlords and intellectuals from the Central and the United Provinces Bengal and the Punjab. The most influential group' among these founding fathers was the Aligarh group. These were intellectual Nawabs from established families who had begun their careers in the Indian Civil Service in the province of UP later supported Syed Ahmed's Educational Movement and finally devoted themselves to Aligarh College. Included in the founders of the Muslim League were a few Muslim manufacturers, the most notable being Adamjee Pirbhai. The Agha Khan (elected the first president of the League), apart from being head of the Ismaili community, was closely connected to the Muslim manufacturers of Bombay.

The resolution in the Dacca Conference where the Muslim League was born defined the following goals:

1. To promote among the Mussalmans of India feelings of loyalty to the British government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of the government with regard to its measure.
2. To project and advance the political rights and Interests of the Mussalmans of India and to respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the government.
3. To prevent the rise among the Mussalmans of India of any feeling of, hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other aforementioned objects of the League.¹¹

Those few industrialists who had joined the Muslim League, while wanting to use the pressure of the League to win concessions from the British, also wanted the freedom to

conduct business with the Hindu and Parsi communities. These Muslim Industrialist put pressure on the predominantly landlord leadership of the League to adopt a less antagonistic attitude towards the Congress. It was this influence of the industrialists that resulted in the League adopting the third point of non-hostility towards other communities.

In 1908-10 'the Muslim League established its main provincial bodies. These were headed by big landlords and conservative Muslim intellectuals closely associated with the landed elite. Thus, for e the Punjab League was led by Shah Din and Mian Mohammad Shafi; the East Bengal branch was headed by Nizamuddin and Nawab Salimullah. The Muslim League leader from the United Provinces was Rajah Naushad Au Khan (the biggest landlord of the region), and in South India the Nizam of Hyderabad and other princes and landlords headed the League. Only in Bombay, Bihar and Madras was League leadership in the hands of members of the bourgeoisie.

By the eve of the First World War, big Muslim merchants had begun to invest in industry. This generated a new dialectic of unity and rivalry between the Hindu and Muslim fractions of the Indian bourgeoisie. On the one hand, the developing Muslim Industrial bourgeoisie had an interest in strengthening and uniting the struggle of the 'Indian bourgeoisie against the colonial regime, and, on the other, as the Muslim commercial interests entered the domain of industry; their contention with the established Hindu industrialists intensified.

Jinnah grasped 'this dialectic before any of the other League leaders and called for a constitutional struggle for self-rule. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was well known Bombay lawyer. Gifted with an incisive intellect and fierce personal integrity, he was to emerge later as the Quaid-i-Azam, the charismatic leader of the Muslim community. With his vigorous constitutionalist approach to issues and liberal ideas, Jinnah in his early political career was ideally suited as the champion of

Hindu-Muslim unity. During the period of the First World War, Jinnah, while still a member of the Congress, rose to become an influential leader of the Muslim League. Both the League and the Congress accepted his idea for a joint session of the two parties in Bombay in December 1915. During this session, 'while urging rapprochement with the Congress, Jinnah also proposed that the agreement provide for the principle of special Muslim representation in the legislative bodies. The latter device was used to incorporate within the agreement the tendency of rivalry with the Hindus that prevailed among the Muslim bourgeoisie and rising middle class.

These efforts bore fruit in the Lucknow Pact of 1916, which was endorsed by the League and the Congress at their respective sessions. The pact envisaged that the two parties would jointly struggle to establish self-government bodies by direct elections on the territorial principle while retaining system of separate representation for about ten years.

Between 1916 and 1920 there was a limited degree of co-operation between the Congress and the Muslim League. However, strains began to appear when during 1918-1920 anti Muslim 'ulem mobilized Muslim masses for the Khilafat Movement and Congress declared support for it. Jinnah and his group in the League disapproved of the Khilafat Movement on constitutional grounds. Matters came to a head when at the end of 1920 the Congress launched a mass civil disobedience movement, and Jinnah attacked the decision on tactical grounds. He stated in a letter to Mahatma Gandhi that he 'would not support it, because the movement put the masses in motion and this would lead to chaos:

"What the consequences of this may be, I shudder to contemplate" At the 1921 session of the Muslim League in Calcutta, Jinnah argued that Gandhi's way was the wrong way. "Mine is the right way", he declared. "The constitutional way is the right way." The opposing positions adopted by Gandhi

and Jinnah on the issue of civil disobedience movement partly reflected the opposing political styles of the two leaders Gandhi's dramatic politics of the street as opposed to Jinnah's constitutional style of the legislative assembly. In any case, following disagreement on the civil disobedience movement, Jinnah resigned from the Congress in 1921, and the lukewarm Congress-League co-operation begun with the Lucknow Pact in 1916 suffered a serious setback.

During the period 1928 to 1927 the frequency of communal riots between Hindus and Muslims increased alarmingly, resulting in 450 dead and thousands injured. To reduce the mounting communal tension, Gandhi and Muslim nationalists like Abul Kalani Azad initiated a move for a new 'national pact' between the Congress and the Muslim League. Jinnah and the League responded favourably.

In March 1927 at Delhi, there was a meeting of Muslim Intellectuals who favoured a united movement for home rule by the Congress and Muslim League. During this meeting a press statement was issued by the Muslim intellectuals declaring that the principle of general elections to central and provincial legislative bodies (as advocated by the Congress) was acceptable on the following conditions:

1. The establishment of Sind as a separate province.
2. Provincial self-government for NWFP and Baluchistan on an equal footing with other provinces.
3. Seats for Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal provincial legislative bodies in proportion to the Muslim population of these provinces.
4. Not less than one-third of the seats for Muslims in the central legislatures.

This document which became, famous as the Delhi Manifesto, was drawn up by, Jinnah and Maulana Mohammad Ali and was the basis of a new, albeit transient, understanding between the M League and, the Congress. The Leagues declared that it was prepared to disown the separate representation system on the terms, set out in the manifesto, a position it was to maintain until 1987. This was an important concession. The Congress in its Madras session the same year also declared approval of the Delhi Manifesto and called for an all parties conference to devise a new constitution.

These events appeared to, indicate that a favourable situation for Hindu-Muslim unity had arisen. Yet communal conflicts soon expressed themselves in the relations between the Congress and the League, as indicated earlier. The Congress, in spite of its secular ideology, was susceptible to Hindu communal influence in its political language and its choices. The political position adopted by the Congress at the All-Parties Conference was an important illustration of this fact. Pressure from the right wing Hindu religious party called the Hindu Mahasabha, the Congress leadership in violation of its earlier stand rejected, the basic points of the Delhi Manifesto, Jinnah urged that the, basic demand of the Delhi Manifesto be worked into the constitution being devised at the All-Parties Conference in both Lucknow (June 1928) and Calcutta (December 1928). Thoroughly disillusioned by the Congress, Jinnah declared after the abortive Calcutta conference: "This is the parting of the ways."¹⁴ History proved him right.

After the failure of attempts at League-Congress

co-operation in 1928, and with the onset of the world economic crisis (1929-33), the prospects of growth of the Muslim bourgeoisie in alliance with the Indian national bourgeoisie were severely constricted. There was a growing awareness among the leaders of the Muslim League that its political future

lay across classes with all Muslims. This required an ambitious political program with a broad-based appeal. The first step toward this objective was the formulation of Jinnah's fourteen-point after the All-Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi in January 1929. The crucial feature of these fourteen points (later submitted to the Round Table Conference in 1930) was the recognition of the regional diversity of India and the need for provincial autonomy. Jinnah demanded a federal constitution with residuary powers vested in the provinces and a uniform measure of autonomy for all provinces. Jinnah also demanded guarantees for the free development of the various national languages and the freedom of religion.

Jinnah's fourteen points won the support of almost all the Muslim political groups, including those which had taken part in the civil disobedience campaign. This constituted the first step in enlarging the support of the Muslim League among all Muslims.

When the British government announced the Communal Award the fundamentals of the new constitution, the Muslim League initially supported it. However, by the time the Government of India Act was published in 1935 the campaign of the Congress against the new constitution had gained wide popularity among the masses, including many Muslim peasants. Jinnah, had the sagacity to recognize that continued support for the constitution would preclude the possibility of the Muslim League gaining a mass following among the Muslims. Accordingly, in its April 1936 session at Bombay, the Muslim League reversed its earlier position and refused to approve the constitution of 1935. This was a turning point in the history of the Muslim League, for it represented a recognition by the Muslim League leadership of the need to gain the support of broad sections of the Muslim India.

The results of the 1937 elections showed the Indian National Congress had emerged as an all India-organization,

capturing 716 Out of 1885 seats and qualifying for ministries in six provinces. At the same time Congress claimed that as a secular party it represented communities was not but election resulting the Congress failed to get a significant percentage of Muslim vote, having won only twenty six out of a 482 seats reserved for Muslims (I.e. 5.4 percent). the Muslim League made a stronger showing in the Muslim reserved seats, winning 109 seat of 482 (i.e., 23 percent), it could not claim on the basis of 23 percent of the Muslim reserved seats to be the representative of Indian Muslim. Perhaps even more worrying for the Muslim League was that it the weakest in the Muslim majority provinces For example League won only two seats in the Punjab (compared to the Unionists, who won 101 out of 167 provincial assembly seats); in Sind and NWFP the Muslim League could not even a single seat.

The results of the 1937 elections brought home an important lesson: to the Muslim elite which led the League If the Muslim League was to negotiate with the British a representative of Indian Muslims, then an effective organization in at least the Muslim majority areas was of crucial importance. Equally important was the need to articulate a new political program and new slogans “could mobilize the emotional charge of broad sections of the Muslim masses.

Soon after the elections, the Muslim League in its October 1937 session at Lucknow, adopted a new constitution which propounded the 'Two-Nation theory' and the demand for autonomy of Muslim majority p within a fully independent Indian federation. The new cons catered to poorer sections of Indian Muslin by opening its membership to all Muslims regardless of class, reducing its membership fee to a nominal two annas per month and envisaging a reduction in rent, relief from usury and a guaranteed minimum wage for workers.

The demand for the autonomy of the 'Muslim. nation' was accompanied by campaigning for specifically Muslim chambers of commerce industry and sin organizations in the agriculture sector. The Muslim League campaign of focusing politics along the communal principle found expression in the first session of the Sind Branch of the Muslim I At the session (presided over by Jinnah) there was a demand for the division of India into a federation of Hindu and Muslim states.

The new constitution contributed to the increased influence of the Muslim League among the Muslims of India. Another factor enhancing support for the League among Muslims was the deterioration of Hindu-Muslim relations as a result of the mode of operation of the Congress provincial ministries. The Congress ministries, while ignoring the demands of Muslims, claimed to represent the ix of Muslims as well as Hindus. What outraged the religious feelings of the Muslims was that whereas legislation passed in provinces where Congress governments were in power permitted songs and dances in front of mosques, yet killing cows, which was against, the religious beliefs of Hindus, was made a criminal offence. The suspicion among Muslims that the Congress had a Hindu communal orientation was given further weight by the fact that Bande Matram, a patriotic hymn expressed in Hindu images, was declared the national anthem.

The Congress stand on the language issue also incensed many Muslim intellectuals. Hindi was made compulsory in schools while the Congress refused to introduce the Urdu language and Arabic and Persian literature even in religious where the traditional Muslim community regarded these as the basis of Muslim education.

The susceptibility' of the Congress to Hindu communal influence, together with the appeal to Muslim communalist sentiment by the political campaign to the League intensified the polarization between the, Hindu and Muslim communities. By the time of the Second World War, the earlier demand of Muslim leaders for autonomy of Muslim majority provinces within an Indian federation began to be replaced by the demand for secession of these provinces. The Working Committee of the Muslim League, in the session of 17-18 September 1939, rejected the federal objective on grounds that such a 'federation would "necessarily result in majority community rule" and argued that this was totally unacceptable in a country "which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state."

In December 1939 with the resignation of Congress ministries in NWFP, Sind and Ass 'followed by' anti Congress riots in many provinces, communal passions rose 'to a new pitch. As the momentum of communal conflict built up,' the Muslim League at its Lahore session on 23rd of March 1940 made 'a historic' declaration. It was proclaimed that the Indian Muslims sought 'the division of India on the principles and the establishment of' a Muslim state called Pakistan. Subsequently, between 1940 and 1946, the Muslim League halted negotiations with the Congress and the 'British authorities kept open 'the option of a number of Solutions' short of the outright partition of India. However, by 1946 all other options were closed, and Pakistan came into being as an independent state on 14th of August 1947.

As Imran Ali in a well-documented paper on the decade 1937-1947 has argued, the growth of mass popularity of the League in this period was associated with the growth of tension between the Hindu and Muslim communities. However, on the regional level, “. . . the role of non - communal factors such as class, the existing power structure. . . and internecine rivalries can by no means be discounted.”²⁰ In the Punjab, the emergence of the League as a major political force involved not only an exercise in the use of popular politics, but also an accommodation with the Punjab National Unionist Party — the party of the big feudal landlords of the Punjab. An important factor in, the victory of the Muslim League in the 1946 election was that by then, through a combination of intimidation and conciliation, the Muslim League had won over from the Unionist Party the most powerful of the Muslim feudal landlords of the Punjab. In the vital months that followed the 1946 elections up to August 1947, the Muslim League and the Pakistan Movement were controlled mainly by the Punjab feudal elite. This phenomenon led to the dominance of Pakistan’s power structure by the landlords of the Punjab during the post- Partition era.

CONCLUSION

It has been seen that the vicissitudes of Jinnah’s attempts at achieving Hindu-Muslim unity (1909- 1928) expressed the contradictions of an emerging Muslim bourgeoisie, which was competing for a market against an established Hindu bourgeoisie. These contradictions became antagonistic because they occurred in a situation where the economic space for both was severely restricted by the economic structure of a colonial regime and the predominance of metropolitan capital. What gave these economic contradictions between two fractions of an embryonic class an explosive political potential was a deep-rooted tension between the Hindu and Muslim communities, which had ebbed and

flowed with the rise and fall of the Mughal empire. The process of the development of state structures and ruling ideologies in India had not succeeded in creating the institutions within which diverse communities of the subcontinent could evolve a fundamentally unified identity.

References and Notes

1. Syed Abmed Khan, *Asbab-i-Baghavat* cited in Gankoveky and L.R. Gordon Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan 1947-48* (Lahore Peaple's Publishing, n.d p. 14.
2. A. Akhtar, ed., *Muzamin-i Syed* cited in Gankovaky and Polonakaya History, p. 16.
3. Speech by Syed Abmed Khan, *Times* (London), 16 January 1888.
4. Soon after the founding of the Congress, Syed Ahnied Khan organized the first anti-Congress organization of Muslim landlords and intellectuals, called the United Friends of India Society. As Syed Ahmad said In a letter t his English friend, Graham, the purpose of this society was to combat the politics of the Congress.

As the Congress organization was formed, the newly appointed Governor General of India, Lord Dufferin, assisted by the British politician Allen Hums discussed with British officials the chances of provoking anti-Congress disorders, in an attempt to undermine the nationalist movement. A.B. Rajput, *Muslim League Yesterday and l'oday* cited in Gankovsky and Polinskaya, History, p. 19.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
6. The Lucknow Speech was reported in *The Times* (London), 16 January 1888.
7. *Allgarh Institute Gazette*, 9 January, 1907, cited In Oankovsky and Polonskaya, History, p. 84.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
9. Oankovsky and Polonskaya op. cit. p. 30.

10. Ibid., p. 82.
11. Ibid., p. 34.
12. H. Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan* (London, 1954), P. 84.
13. While the civil disobedience movement was in progress, the Moplah revolt broke out in 1921. This was essentially an uprising by the poor peasantry of Malabar against the landlords. However, since the peasants were mainly Muslims and the landlords mostly Hindus, the British press publicized it as a communal Hindu-Muslim war. The British Interpretation was questionable, since in many places poor Hindus joined the revolt. Kunna Ahmad Haji, a peasant chief, wrote to the Madras daily *The Hindu* rebutting charges of communalism and accusing the government of attacking Hindu temples to induce discord between the communities.
14. H. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 95.
15. The most important of the points affecting the interests of Muslims were as follows
 1. The reservation of not less than one-third of the seats in the central and provincial cabinets for Muslims.
 2. Granting Muslims an adequate share along with other Indians in all the services of the state and local self-governing-bodies.
 3. Solution of communal questions to be subject to an affirmative vote of three-fourths of the community concerned.
 4. Establishment of Sind province, which was to be separated from the Bombay presidency.
 5. Legislative bodies for NWFP and Baluchistan.
16. Z.H. Zaidi, *Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy 1937-47* in C.H. Phillips and M.D. Wainwright, eds., *The Partition of India* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 258.
17. Imran Ali, *Punjab Politics in the Decade Before Partition*, Research.

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19. Chaudhri Mohammad Au, The Emergence Of Pakistan (New York Columbia University Press, 1967), pp 38 9
20. Ibid., p. 48.
21. Punjab Legislative Debates 1936 and 1946, ed In Imran Ali Punjab Politics p 48.
22. For a more detailed analysis and documentation of this proposition see Imran Au, Punjab Politics, pp. 7-54.