

CHAPTER 3

Profile of the Power Structure

If Pakistan's political history is to be presented in a capsule form, it will be seen largely as an interplay of three competing and often conflicting elements: (i) the popular forces seeking to assert themselves either spontaneously or organizationally on foreign policy issues as well as domestic ones; (ii) the power structure, sometimes cohesively responding to individual instructions or an institutional interest, or multiple channels, often working at cross purposes; and (iii) the American factor which has sought with varying degrees of success, to alimentially or concurrently influence both the popular forces and the power structure.

In this interplay of forces, the most important element has been the power structure which has grown and evolved over time. Its present profile does not represent a monolith but multiple and competing channels of authority that derive strength from the institutions established by the state. The position of the various components in the power structure has changed and often the wielders of power have to become mere implementers of decision making as is the case of the foreign office or others like the civil bureaucracy. These are now viewed lower in authority than, say the Intelligence, which today ranks second only in importance to the army in the power structure.

During the decade of the eighties the change in the power structure was characterized by two significant developments. First, the nature of the power sharing experiments which General Zia-ul-Haq initiated in 1985. The power structure was influenced by a diarchy in the person of the President and Chief of Army Staff, (since General Zia held both offices on the one hand, and the Prime Minister on the other. Later a triarchy emerged when

the office of the President, Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff began to be held by three different individuals. The second significant change was the extent of American involvement, both in Pakistan's power structure and at the popular level.

THE PAKISTAN ARMY

The most important component of the power structure, predictably, is the Pakistan Army. Three elements of the army's role in the power structure are noteworthy: Its objectives, the way it wields powers and its internal sociology.¹ In terms of its objectives, the army's self-image is important, it sees its role as an institution different from the rest, that is, the civilians, and it prides itself on what it sees as its professionalism, patriotism and discipline. It was in General Zia's period that an ideological component was added to its role, which apart from defending national security became a "defender of the faith" as well. This was what General Zia frequently referred to as defence of the country's "ideological frontiers". If in the fifties the American connection was initiated by the army, in the eighties it became the vehicle for formulating and implementing the Afghan policy in close concert with the Americans via the ISI.

The broader self-image of the army as the backbone of national security and by extension, national unity, is exemplified by what it sees and refers to as "nation building" activities. Assisting the government in the provision of disaster relief during floods and earthquakes, the distribution and sale of food and often supplies under Benazir Bhutto through the National Logistics Cell, the building of the Karakoram Highway and the Kahuta project are all elements of a role that the army sees for itself that is not merely confined to the defence of the country's geographical frontiers.

As far as its internal sociology goes, the army sees itself as an indigenous and Islamic force. During the Zia years, the components of what constituted the "Club", remained closely knit on policy matters. A largely corporate view of issues prevailed. These two elements were retained in the aftermath of General

Zia's demise, and were manifested by the position taken on such issues as the Survey episode, the attitude towards Sahibzada Yaqub Khan and the decision to oppose Benazir when she wanted to grant an extension to Lt. General Alam Jan Mahsud.

This process was helped of course by the fact that the Pakistan army continues to be insulated from "outside influence", that is, interference from the civilian leadership. The military continues to enjoy considerable internal autonomy, certainly more than any other component of the power structure, with the COAS deciding on internal army matters, particularly those pertaining to retirement, extensions and promotion of personnel.

In the wake of the end of the third and longest Martial Law in Pakistan's history it would be instructive to examine how this military regime functioned. In 1987, under pressure of the Prime Minister some close associates of the President ceased to hold office. They included General K.M. Arif and General Rahimud din Khan as well as Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. It would be interesting to analyze the impact of these developments on the power structure. Two aspects are important: the relationship of the President with 'his men' (i.e., colleagues in the power structure) and the manner in which this 'club' changed over time.

When he came to power in July 1977 a 'club' functioned and General Zia was initially considered merely the first among equals. This was in line with his image then of being a 'reluctant coup-maker' who was 'pushed' into ousting the civilian government. In those days, referring to his rufaqa (colleagues), he was fond of saying that 'we came together and we will go together'. However, after that shaky start, General Zia managed to comfortably occupy the chair of authority and slowly but surely he did 'load-shedding' of extra-baggage.

A close camaraderie and relaxed relationship defined the bond between the General and the 'dub'. For the first year of the regime, a military council functioned which comprised General Zia's three other service colleagues: the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, (General Sharif), Air Chief Marshal Zulfikar Au Khan and Admiral Sharif. They were also the four signatories to the 26 April 1977 joint statement swearing loyalty to the

Bhutto government. Although they were members of the military council, General Zia and the 'club' had not taken them into confidence regarding the plan to make the coup on 5 July. The original coup-makers, led by General Zia, included all the Corps Commanders: Chishti, Sawar Khan, Iqbal Khan, Ghulam Hassan Khan and Jahanzeb Arbab.

The first major change in the 'club' took place in March 1980. During this period between 1977-1980, there was a tussle for the number two slot. This Chishti-versus-Arif conflict ultimately resulted in the exit of the former while the latter continued in his powerful position as Chief of Staff to the President. This tussle was only a part of the reason for Chishti's exit, the other more important being that he had started giving 'presidential looks'. Tall, heavy-built with a moustache, Faiz All Chishti, a Lt. General from the Artillery, was Corps Commander based in Rawalpindi. In this position he prided himself on being the 'real power and motivator' of the coup. In fact, around that time, stories were being spread that while General Zia was the General Najib of the regime, Chishti was the Nasser. Najib was the titular head of the July 1952 military coup in Egypt, and it was Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser who emerged later as the real strongman. In March 1980, two members of the 'club' Chishti and Ghulam Hassan, were sent out. The next change in the 'club' came in March 1984 when another two members of the 'club' Iqbal Khan and Sawar Khan, both Pothwar proteges of Thkka Khan, were retired and replaced by Rahimuddin and Arif respectively.

During this period, between 1980-1984, three important developments had taken place with reference to the military regime. First, the revival of the American connection, which was a source of strength and stability for the regime. Given a weak domestic base, regimes in Pakistan have relied on intimacy with America to bolster their domestic confidence and signal their political opponents that the US is lined up behind them. When the regime had rejected Carter's \$ 400 million aid offer in February 1980 as 'peanuts', the regime had to look around for political allies at home.³ General Fazle Haq was deputed to talk to Wali Khan and Mahmood Haroon had a dialogue with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi.

After the revival of the American connection, the regime felt no need to talk to the political forces and after that it decided to 'go it alone' bypassing the politicians and political parties. Another implication of the revival of the American connection was in the realm of foreign policy: with a direct channel established between the military regime and Washington, there was no need for intermediaries like Agha Shahi. A more trusted man was now needed to occupy the key slot of foreign minister. In any case, in his negotiations with the Americans in 1979 and 1981, Mr. Agha Shahi had come across as a rigid proponent of Pakistan's position on non-alignment and the nuclear programme.⁴

Second, the two changes in the 'club' in 1980 and 1984 respectively followed feeble inhouse 'conspiracies' against the regime. In February 1980, retired Maj. Gen. Tajammal Hussain, who had commanded a division in Jehlum in 1976, was arrested for planning an assassination, together with a couple of junior officers who were his relatives. Soon after these arrests, Chishti and Ghulam Hassan Khan were retired.⁵ In January 1984, a group of junior army officers was said to be involved in an anti-regime conspiracy that was linked to the London-based Ghulam Mustafa Khar who, in turn, was said to be linked to India. Soon after the arrests of these junior officers, Iqbal and Sawar were retired.

Third, within the military regime a modern-day version of the old Chinese system of 'warlordism' was in operation. The four provincial Governors, as well as some generals occupying key governmental sectors, ran their respective domains as 'warlords', the only proviso being that they do not 'rock the boat'. There were powerful governors like General Fazle Haq in the Frontier and General Ghulam Jilani Khan in Punjab plus Generals like Mujib who ran the media, Saeed Qadir responsible for Production and Rahim Khan heading the Defence Ministry, including PIA. The only civilian members of the 'club' were Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Sahibzada Yaqub Khan.

Informal linkages of rank, position and relationship were institutionalized during this period. For example, every cabinet meeting was preceded a day or two earlier by a 'club' meeting, where the real decisions were taken, which were then formalized in the

Cabinet. On Afghanistan a committee used to meet every month to review the situation with 'club' members in attendance plus the governors of Frontier and Baluchistan.

It was only after the lifting of martial law that the 'club' ceased to exist in terms of its composition and manner of functioning. The devolution of power that followed brought about a new balance within the Establishment, which caused infighting and other problems, such as tensions between the President and the Prime Minister.⁶

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Apart from the army, a key component of the power structure is the Intelligence, whose role, for the most part, remains shrouded in secrecy.

In Pakistan, the Intelligence network has basically comprised the two main organizations, namely the Intelligence Bureau (IB) staffed by the police, and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) run by the military. The IB has been used by civilian governments and the ISI has been the reliable mainstay of military regimes. Even during the early period of Independence, in the fifties, the role of the police was politically important. The IG Police in Punjab, Qurban Ali Khan was more powerful than the ministers and the IG Police in the Frontier Province, Sardar Abdur Rashid was appointed Chief Minister to replace Qayyum Khan way back in 1952. Even then the Intelligence was used by the government for political purposes and during the Prime Ministership of Liaquat Ali Khan he ordered the Intelligence to ensure surveillance of Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of the Father of the Nation. She was then seen by Liaquat as being in the 'opposition'.

Soon after the 1965 war with India had begun, Ayub Khan faulted the ISI for not providing 'timely and correct intelligence.' The DG, ISI candidly replied, "all these years because we were not doing our real work, i.e., counter intelligence, because we were too busy chasing your domestic political opponents."⁷ In fact, one task entrusted by Ayub Khan to ISI during that period. Which they commendably refused to do, was to 'eliminate' Na-

wabzada Nasrullah Khan, who was Ayub Khan's political opponent. The ISI reported back to Ayub Khan, after thorough investigation that since Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan had no personal enmity, the crime, if committed, by an organ of the State, would probably be traced back.⁸

In the days of Yahya Khan the head of IB, N.A. Rizvi, and Chief of Security, Maj. Gen. (Reid.) Omar, were part of his inner circle. During the Bhutto period, Lt. Gen. Ghulam Gilani Khan was the only senior holdover from the days of Yahya Khan to retain his position as D.G., ISI which he continued even during the early period of General Zia, thus spanning three administrations. During the civilian interlude of Mr. Bhutto, his D.G. Federal Security Force, Masud Mahmood and Chief Security Officer, Saeed Ahmad Khan, were quite influential. I carried their intelligence operations to such ridiculous lengths that even the popular 'Pak Tea House' cafe in Lahore was bugged with view to knowing what the intellectuals of Lahore were saying and thinking about the Bhutto regime!

Under General Zia, two things happened on the intelligence front. The ISI grew in size and strength in the power structure due to the dependence of the regime on intelligence information and the Afghan operation. Probably no Third World Intelligence Agency had such a huge budget to oversee such vast political cum-paramilitary operations on such a scale. The closest other parallels could be the RAW in East Pakistan in 1971 and Syrian Intelligence in Lebanon.⁹ Over Dine, the D.G., ISI Gen. Akhtar Abdur Rehman became the de facto number two of the Zia regime. Secondly, the LB became weak and sidelined owing to the instinctive distrust by the army of the police. It was only in 1985, just a week before the inauguration of Mr. Junejo, that General Zia-ul-Haq appointed Maj. Gen. Agha Nek Mohamad, a serving Army Officer, as Director of IB.¹⁰

From implementor of policy, the 151 became the policy maker. In early 1987, when there was a 'problem' between General Akhtar Abdur Rehman and the Vice Chief of Army Staff, General K.M. M General Zia preferred Akhtar and promptly retired Arif. In 1982, following the resignation of Agha Shahi as Foreign

Minister, he was asked by a confident Akhtar Abdur Rehman: “What do you think of our choice of Yaqub Khan as your successor. We deliberated this matter a great deal before appointing Yaqub.” This clearly indicated that Akhtar was one of the persons close to General Zia who was calling the shots.¹¹

The problem of IB is a hangover of colonial days. Basically, the IB is an extension of the Police, since it comprises cops who alternate stints in IB with field duty as police officers. Thus the IB lacks professionalism which a first-class Intelligence Organization must have. In fact, the IB is very jealous about its ‘turf’ since it is assumed to be the ‘exclusive domain’ of the police. In 1967, when Ayub Khan proposed putting a senior civil servant, Roedad Khan as Director of Intelligence Bureau, there was a near revolt in the police ranks.¹² The IB approach to collecting intelligence is often puerile and even semi-literate. In 1954, when the Communist Party of Pakistan was banned and the communists were being rounded up by the Intelligence, there was a raid on the house of a prominent communist. The Intelligence chap said to him “We have come to arrest you because you are a communist.” He replied, “I am anti-communist”. The Intelligence Officer replied with an air of supreme confidence: “We don’t care what kind of a communist you are, anti or whatever, as long as you are one.” Similarly, when Faiz Ahmed Faiz was in jail, he was not allowed to receive ‘the Communist Manifesto’ since it prominently carried the label ‘communist’ but when he requested that he be given Marx’s *Capital*, this was promptly allowed!

It needs to be understood that there is a consistency in the pattern of behaviour of all governments in Pakistan vis-a-vis Intelligence.

- Ali governments civilian or military have used intelligence for political purposes, particularly through the pursuit of opposition figures;
- At almost all crucial moments in Pakistan’s politics, the intelligence have been proven wrong, either in their assessments of the popular mood or intentions of the opposition; even in 1988, the intelligence misread the mood in Sind;¹³

- All governments have used the intelligence for political contacts and dialogue with the opposition.

During Benazir Bhutto's days, both of the country's premier Intelligence organizations were much in the news, and interestingly the activities of both were highlighted in the context of domestic politics. In May 1990, the National Assembly even admitted a privilege motion moved by an Opposition member against the alleged efforts of the ISI to keep tabs on him, the first such instance in Pakistan's history. And another important Opposition leader, the UI Parliamentary Grief. Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, accused the IB of spending Rs 80 million on influencing loyalties of members of Parliament during the crucial days in October 1989 when a motion of no-confidence was tabled against Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. He also accused the IB of spending much of its budget on keeping track of those politicians who opposed the PPP government.¹⁴

Whatever the truth or otherwise of these allegations, the fact remains that the role of intelligence in Pakistan does not change with the change of government. Both military and civilian governments find intelligence a handy tool to hound their political opponents. Some can perhaps justifiably argue that the very nature of Intelligence, a covert, secretive body, digging up information, condemns it to a role that is at variance with democratic professions and practices. Others can also attribute the use of Intelligence by successive governments the insecurity of weak, civilian governments that have traditionally had a relationship of mutual distrust with other components in the power structure, who are perceived to be attempting destabilization of civilian

However, the real reason for the excessive reliance on Intelligence is because successive governments have tended to repeat the mistakes of their predecessors. All governments in Pakistan without exception, have used Intelligence to wiretap the Opposition, for dirty trick operations and for a host of other political purposes since they invariably assume that governmental interest and the national interest are synonymous. The misuse of Intelli-

gence is, of course, not just a characteristic of an authoritarian society. Even in a democratic country like India, one of the first things when Prime Minister V.P. Singh came to power. was to accuse RAW of all sons of illegalities, including disinformation against the Opposition, and in one of his first measures, he proposed the establishment of a National Security Council to collate and oversee all Intelligence operations. An important underlying purpose of V.P. Singh's proposal for a NSC was to clip the wings of RAW.¹⁵

Similarly, when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto took office, one of her first acts just after four weeks in Islamabad was to set up a high-level committee to reorganize Pakistan's Intelligence set-up. Headed by Air Chief Marshal (Retd.) Zulfiqar Ali Khan, who also served as Ambassador in Washington, the committee was entrusted with proposing long term measures to revamp the various Intelligence organizations in Pakistan.¹⁶ Regrettably, like other steps which have been steeped in adhocism, nothing much came out of the report. According to what was published in the national and international media when the report was formally submitted to the Prime Minister in May 1989. The report had apparently made some useful recommendations which, had they been implemented, would have gone a long way in strengthening the work of Pakistani Intelligence organizations. The Intelligence Reorganization Committee was, for instance, said to have recommended the establishment of a National Security Council, to be headed by the Prime Minister as well as a new body called the Joint Intelligence Committee, as a permanent body staffed by a small secretarial and headed by a Chairman who need not be professionally an Intelligence man. It was envisaged that such a body would perform two key functions, namely, coordinate the work of all Intelligence organizations in Pakistan and function as a crisis-management group whenever situations required it.

According to other reports, the Committee was also said to have proposed the setting up of a Joint Intelligence Training Academy for integrated training of all Intelligence services in Pakistan, rather than separate training schools as is the case at present. And it was said to have also recommended a specialized

National Intelligence Service, similar, say, to the Foreign Service or the Police, to provide officers for all the intelligence organizations in Pakistan. Sadly, none of these recommendations were ever implemented and even in the case of the removal of heads of Intelligence organizations, the purpose seemed more to effect a change of face, not reorganization of the Intelligence apparatus.

Few governments in Pakistan have really understood that no Intelligence organization has ever saved a government or a ruler in Pakistan. Perhaps, a brief look at the Intelligence track record in Pakistan would be instructive:

- Intelligence was not able to forewarn Ayub Khan that his Generals were readying to dump him in 1969.
- The Intelligence assessment fed to Yahya Khan was not even remotely accurate as to what the 1970 election results would be.
- Intelligence was not able to tell Mohammad Khan Junejo what General Zia had in store for him when he returned from a triumphant foreign tour on 29 May 1988.
- Intelligence was not able to know before-hand that General Zia was to be assassinated in the company of his best foreign friend — the American Ambassador — and his closest military confidante — General Akhtar Abdur Rahman — and that too within the confines of his core constituency, the Army, on 17 August 1988.
- The Intelligence was never able to gauge the popular mood in rural Sindh in the November 1989 elections, thereby upsetting all official projections as to the eventual outcome.
- The Intelligence was never able to inform Benazir Bhutto that the no-confidence move was in the offing in November 1988 or that the MQM had decided to ditch the PPP even earlier.
- Even when it comes to external events, the Intelligence performance is hardly any better. Two examples will suffice: The Tanai coup had already collapsed in Kabul when the intelligence was feeding the government tall tales of

victory and even tentative lists were said to have been drawn up as to which Cabinet Minister would like to land in Kabul with the first triumphant flight amidst all this 'glory'! And regards Kashmir, a senior Intelligence official privately admitted that 'we were wrong in predicting events there.'¹⁷

Basically, three kinds of roles can be attributed to Pakistani intelligence organizations: -

- Dabbling in domestic politics, which essentially means acting as the 'eyes and ears' of a regime and keeping track of political opponents;
- Counter-intelligence, which is after all, the primary professional function of any intelligence outfit, and
- Formulation and implementation of a given policy in a specific area, as the ISI has been doing on the Mg issue since 1979.

Some of the problems that arise in Pakistan, in the context of the role of the Intelligence, pertain to the peculiar nature of the Pakistani power structure with its multiple components and often divergent, if not conflicting perspectives. This has been the case since the lifting of Martial Law in 1985, which first spawned a dyarchy when General Zia was alive and after his death, a triarchy. The result has been three-fold. First, the intelligence organizations are perceived to represent opposing power structures: the civilian government by the LB and the military by the ISI. They end up working more as rivals, with overlapping functions and competing roles. The hostility among them is often not concealed as is evident by the fact that, on both occasions, 29 May 1988 and 6 August 1990, when Prime Ministers were dismissed by the Presidents, the LB headquarters was the first target, with offices sealed and records scrutinized, in "operations" reminiscent of the style of a coup *d'état*. Second, the role of Intelligence under the triarchy is specified in a loose but unstated manner, that is, the civilian governments repose their trust in the IB, while treating

ISI with varying degrees of suspicion. The fact that the D.G., ISI, who is a serving Army officer, invariably reports to his boss, the Chief of Army Staff (barring the case of Lt. Gen. (Retd.) S.R. Kallue who was Benazir Bhutto's nominee), adds to the distance between the ISI and the civilian Prime Minister. Third, decisions related to the Intelligence, taken by the Prime Minister, are often linked to assertion of Prime Ministerial authority vis-a-vis other components of the triarchy.

Politically, some of the most significant decisions taken by civilian Prime Ministers in Pakistan in the last six years, were all related to the intelligence. At the first opportunity after what was perceived by him to be an immensely successful journey to the United States, in July 1986, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo removed Major General Agha Nek Mohammad as the Head of IB and replaced him by Malik Aslam Hayat, a senior Police official. Agha Nek Mohammad had been put in charge of the IB only a week before the installation of Mr. Junejo as Prime Minister by General Zia and he was the first Army officer to head the IB.

When Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto removed Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul as the Head of ISI in May 1989, it was then seen as her most significant political move. Even today, Benazir Bhutto privately concedes that "this was my most significant blunder since Hamid Gul is a brilliant man and I could have put him to good use".¹⁸ Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also was quick to appoint a former senior ISI official, Brig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Alimad as Director of the IB. Brig. Imtiaz had been removed by Benazir Bhutto from the ISI in March 1989 and he had then served in the provincial administration of Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab as Additional Chief Secretary.

As there is little possibility of changing the nature of the power structure in Pakistan, given both the constitutional compulsions and the political realities in the country, successive governments have failed to devise some institutional mechanism of a permanent nature for Pakistan's intelligence, rather than relying on ad hoc measures that can, at best, add to the "spy versus spy" nature of the relationship among the intelligence organizations.¹⁹

THE CIVIL BUREAUCRACY

The civil bureaucracy, essentially a body of conservative bastions of the status quo, feels comfortable with whatever is perceived by it to be ensuring 'stability and security'.²⁰ Its role and response to a particular regime stems from two essential considerations. First, the feeling that there is security of service, which essentially means the, sense of political pressures and the lack of any 'tampering' of the system or purges in their ranks. The bureau racy was, for instance, very uncomfortable in the days of Yahya Khan who dismissed 303 bureaucrats, or in the regime of Zulfikar All Bhutto who had removed from service 1,400 of them. Second, the bureaucracy has a good sense of where 'power lies'. For the civil bureaucracy, 'power' is operationally defined as the ability to grant them promotions, transfers, and extensions. In other words, 'power' emanates from the source where the file eventually ends i.e. For instance, till 29 May 1988, in the case of Pakistan, that source happened to be Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo.

Given this context, it is not surprising that the civil bureaucracy had gaited looking up to Mr. Junejo for the seeking of favours and the extension of patronage. In other words, in their eyes, he w the Boss to please and the one who mattered. Conversely, in the situation that prevailed till 29 May General Zia felt ignored and isolated within the system that he himself had spawned. He had two basic complaints regarding the senior civil servants, many of whom have felt his ire in various ways following Junejo's sacking. Zia felt that the bureaucracy switched sides and effectively ditched him. It was not just as if they would not call on him or not respond promptly enough to his occasional communications. In a situation of polarization within the system between d President and the Prime Minister, the bureaucracy invariably went in the direction of the files. The second complaint that General Zia had regarding most of the bureaucracy was that it failed to the fine distinction between the formal power structure headed by the Prime Minister and the real structure that General Zia continued to lead, despite the absence of his direct

involvement in the day-to-day running of the administration.²¹

However, the senior segments of the civil bureaucracy felt that such criticism on the part of the President was unjustified. As one of them aptly put it: “The President appoints a Prime Minister and Rules of Business are framed which say all files go to the Prime Minister. Despite this if we are expected to play a double game and report to him on the Prime Minister, that is grossly unfair.” Ironically, the political ministers who retained their slots despite the ouster of Mr. Junejo, were apparently “smarter” than their bureaucratic counterparts since they maintained contact with the President during this entire period being aware of the realities of Pakistan’s power structure.

Zia’s behaviour towards the civil bureaucracy after 29 May 1988, both in style and substance, was atypical of Pakistani rulers. In terms of style General Zia was generally more stable in his relationships with the senior civil bureaucracy. During the years of Martial Law, it was perhaps for the first time in Pakistan’s history that such key Secretaries to Government those responsible for Finance, Information, Defence, Establishment and Interior remained in position for a good five years each without change. In substantive terms, General Zia was the first ruler since 1958, which did not begin with a purge of civil servants. In fact, he did a lot to undo the impact of some of Mr. Bhutto’s administrative reforms, which had diluted the importance of the old CSP cadre. He also did away with the lateral entry system, although it was replaced by institutionalized induction of army officers. Unlike Mr. Bhutto, who was seen by the civil bureaucracy to be ‘pampering the public’, General Zia more or less restored the bureaucracy as a junior ruling partner of the army — a role that first began in the early sixties during the rule of Ayub Khan. Another hallmark of General Zia’s Martial Law years was the frequency of extensions granted to senior civil servants.

However, after Junejo’s dismissal, General Zia’s behaviour towards the civil bureaucracy was in marked contrast to those ‘good old days’ of Martial Law. It was almost as if General Zia had ‘captured’ state power and he wanted to ensure that the bureaucrats ‘fell in line’. However, this attitude ignored one vital

Ingredient of every bureaucracy, namely, that its loyalty is always to whosoever is in charge. Therefore, its loyalties are seldom, if ever, personalized.

If the bureaucracy “switched” to Junejo in Zia’s presence, it would be instructive to examine its relationship with Benazir Bhutto’s short-lived regime. During her twenty months, the Government of Pakistan witnessed an unprecedented “openness” given the frequency of disclosure of what would usually be deemed as official or “confidential” communication. Some major examples of “leakages” of official communication under Prime Is Benazir Bhutto:²²

- a letter from the Finance Minister to the Banking Council instructing it to investigate the bank accounts of twenty top Opposition leaders;
- a letter from the Labour Minister to the Prime Minister seeking Rs 1.5 million so that this amount could be used to achieve “positive results” in support of a preferred union in a referendum in the PTA;
- all official communication, including summaries addressed to the Prime Minister, regarding the notorious Lake View Hotel, which turned out to be a key deal involving financial and legal irregularities;
- communication between the Ministry of Defence and the Chairman, PIA, regarding various appointments including reinstatement of a Captain “dismissed for smuggling of
- summaries regarding a contract with an American Company worth \$450 million for establishing a Satellite Communication System. which was initially rejected by the government on the advice of its own experts but this decision was later retracted for inexplicable reasons, giving rise to speculation that somebody may well be “on the take”;
- a letter sent from the Prime Minister’s Secretariat to the Director General, liner Services Intelligence (ISI), ordering the agency to keep tabs on a prominent IJI Member of Parliament, who, in turn, filed a privilege motion in the

National Assembly terming this act as “a breach of privilege”. This privilege motion was admitted by the Speaker, the first time there had been such a move against an intelligence agency in Pakistan’s Parliament.

All these events indicated a growing disillusionment within the bureaucracy with the PPP government, lack of effective control by the PPP government over its own official apparatus, and a polarized polity whose cleavages extended to various layers of the bureaucracy as well. By the time of its ouster in August 1990, the hard fact was that most of the bureaucracy in Islamabad had been successfully alienated by the PPP government through its acts of omission or commission.

Such a state of affairs was in marked contrast to the situation that existed when the PPP came to office in December 1988. An overwhelming majority of the bureaucracy in Islamabad had welcomed and indeed supported this change in the expectation that Benazir Bhutto and her team of young political loyalists would be the harbingers of fresh initiatives in better governance. The bureaucracy had hoped that their core interests would be well protected in the new order. And they felt a certain affinity with the PPP given their own anti-Army ethos since the civil bureaucracy and the military are rivals in the power structure. Their ‘core interests’, as perceived by the bureaucracy, are security of service, acceptance of the established criteria for inductions, promotions and transfers and no ‘outside’ inductions into the system so that the hierarchy of decision-making is not unduly disturbed.²³

All these hopes and expectations were dashed and twenty months into its second stint in office, the PPP government ended up presiding over a lx and disaffected bureaucracy. There were a number of reasons why the bureaucracy was alienated from the PPP government whose leaders many of the bureaucrats had privately admired or sympathized with when it was out in the political wilderness. At least three such reasons merit attention. The PPP began its rule in Islamabad with a basic distrust of the system and its cogs, which were under its cogs. This situation was accentuated by the grudges and grouses which the PPP and

its top leadership carried owing to their decade-long 'struggle against the system.' The result was a broad, often senseless renoval of officials from their positions and placing them for long periods as Officer on Special Duty (OSD). Second, there was an attempt to bypass the established procedures for induction of Party loyalists via an institution which was termed as Placement Bureau, functioning directly under the Prune Minister's Secretarial. Although it was wound up in the second half of 1989, the damage had been done since the Placement Bureau's arbitrary actions generated a lot of resentment within the bureaucracy. Even the lateral entry scheme of the first PPP government had an institutional character, unlike the Place Bureau. Finally, there were the widespread allegations of corruptions at the top layer of the PPP government, aptly summed up by a remark of a leading bureaucrat "all that most Ministers are interested in is making money".²⁴

On top of these difficulties, the PPP had yet to grapple with the task of governance, a task made much more difficult by the broader political situation in the country with a strong Opposition coupled with non-PPP governments in the Punjab and Baluchistan. In terms of running the government in Islamabad, examples of three specialized areas which are vital in any administration will suffice. The Foreign Office had just too many Foreign Ministers, and often one did not know what the other was doing. (Apart from Sahibzada Yaqub Khan who was formally the Foreign Minister, Happy Minwala and Iqbal Akhund functioned as defacto foreign ministers.) The "good work" that the Information Ministry had done for the PPP was reflected in the fact that by the summer of 1990 not one journalist worth the name was willing to publicly defend the government's performance or most of its actions. And both the intelligence agencies, the Police-dominated Intelligence Bureau and the Army-dominated ISI, were being nut by retired Army Officers who did not enjoy the confidence of most of their own colleagues.²⁵

Additionally, it was dangerously simplistic on the part of the PPP to dismiss most of the bureaucracy as being "remnants of Zia-ul-Haq". Since the government failed to take account of the

fact that just a couple of years before, when General Zia was still President and Mr. Junejo Prime Minister, almost the entire bureaucracy had switched to the civilian Prime Minister from Sindh. Even making a genuine allowance for inexperience, the teething troubles for the PPP government vis-a-vis the bureaucracy were unending.

An extension of the civil bureaucracy, the Foreign Office is one of its vital specialized components since it straddles the divide on the realm of national security, where increasingly, its functions have overlapped with the military. Basically, Pakistan's Foreign Ministers can be slotted into three broad categories: those who were bureaucrats, (i.e., from within the Foreign Office), those who were technocrats and others who were politicians.²⁶ Pakistan's bureaucrat Foreign Ministers have included Mian Arshad Hussain, Aziz Ahmed and Agha Shahi. Among its technocrat Foreign Ministers were Sir Zafarul-lah Khan (who, with seven years in the Foreign Office, had the second longest tenure), Manzoor Qadir, Sharifuddin Pirzada and General Yaqub Khan. The politicians who became Foreign Ministers, included Hamidul Haq Chaudhry, Sir Feroze Khan Noon, Mohammad Ali Bogra. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Zain Noorani.

Certain traits have been common to most of Pakistan's Foreign Ministers. The majority has been pro-American, have had little link with their own people, and have lacked an imaginative approach in the conduct of foreign policy. Mr. Bhutto was the exception to the rule and apart from him. Pakistan's political Foreign Ministers have been the weakest.

While most Foreign Ministers have merely continued existing policies, implemented new ones, three have been crucial to the conception, formulation and execution of major policy initiatives. In September 1954, Foreign Minister Sir Zafarul-lah Khan went to Manila to attend the formative meeting of SEATO as an observer. He had no authorization from the Cabinet to sign on the dotted lines of this US-sponsored pact. But apparently on his own initiative, he made Pakistan a partisan of the Cold war and it was much bier, in February 1955, that Pakistan's Cabinet ratified its Foreign Minister's decision. In 1963, Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto presided over the first major re-orientation in Pakistan's foreign policy from exclusive reliance on the West to a cautious opening to the East. In 1981, it was Foreign Minister Agha Shahi who negotiated the revival of the 'special relationship' with the United States following the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. His subsequent insistence on Pakistan's commitment to non-alignment alienated him both from the Army and the Americans, leading to his exit from office.

However, in one of the most historic events in contemporary diplomacy, in which Pakistan played an important role — the opening to China — the Foreign Office had little or no input. It was Yahya Khan himself who handled the secret message from the Americans which he personally passed on to the Chinese. Some of the notes were in Yahya Khan's own handwriting. Probably the only Foreign Office role in this opening to China was when Foreign Secretary Sultan Mohammad Khan accompanied Dr. Henry Kissinger in his car in July 1971 to the Chakala Airport to put him on board the secret historic flight to China?

In many of the vital decisions affecting Pakistan's foreign policy, the involvement of its Foreign Ministers and Foreign Office was minimal. In 1952, when the first Pakistan Military Attaché went to Washington to take over his assignment, he received an important briefing from his superiors in GHQ but not from the Foreign Office. He was told clearly by his Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan and Defence Secretary, Iskandar Mirza, to go and seek aims from the Americas but, added the Military Attaché's superiors, he was not supposed to take the Ambassador or the Foreign Office into confidence because 'these politicians cannot be trusted with such sensitive matters'.²⁸

In 1956, when the Suez crisis was developing, Foreign Minister, Hamidul Haq Chaudhry went to Cairo, met Gamal Abdel Nasser and assured him of Pakistan's support to Egypt. From Cairo he went to London, where he reversed his position, an act for which Nasser never forgave Pakistan. When Foreign Minister Feroze Khan Noon tried to pursue a policy somewhat independent of the British on Suez, he was reprimanded by Iskandar Mirza for 'betraying my friends'.²⁹

In more recent times, both under the Bhutto regime as well as under General Zia-ul Haq, details of the Afghan operation which was coordinated by General Nasirullah Babar and General Tikka Khan, aimed at the destabilization of the Daud regime in Kabul and an attempt to restore Zahir Shah in collaboration with the Shah of Iran. The rationale behind it was kept secret even from the Foreign Office. This was aptly summed up by Mr. Bhutto to one of his confidants: "Let Agha Shahi not know about it, so that he can deny it with a clear conscience."³⁰ Under General Zia, the Afghan policy was being run by General Fazle Haq and General Akhtar Abdur Rahman on the domestic front, while General Arif and General Yaqub coordinated diplomacy not just on Afghanistan but on such key issues as India and the United States.

Interestingly, General Zia continued the pattern that Mr. Bhutto had set of keeping the Foreign Office out of vital aspects of the Afghan operation. In October 1979, when Foreign Minister Agha Shahi went to Washington to negotiate with the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, his American counterpart, took him aside during a break in the talk and casually made a remark which stunned Agha Shahi since he was totally in the dark about it. Vance asked Agha Shahi: "I hope the Afghan Mujahideen have started receiving the shipment of arms which our two countries had agreed upon earlier." Agha Shahi could only nod diplomatically, since a statement to the contrary would have been embarrassing, given that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan had not been taken into confidence on a decision which had essentially been arrived at between the CIA and the ISI.³¹

Often there is a reverse bypass of the Foreign Office, that is, the Ambassador of an important country can develop a certain intimacy with the President or play a key role during a sensitive situation. In Pakistan, there were at least five such envoys who played key roles over the heads of the Foreign Office. US Ambassador Horace Hildreth, who served in Karachi during the Iskandar Mirza period used to see the Pakistan President several evenings every week and it is said that major decisions would be taken during those encounters. The fact that Hildreth's daughter was married to Mirza's son added to the intimacy between the Ameri-

can Ambassador and the President of Pakistan.³²

In the 1973 book, *The Anderson Papers*, written by the investigative reporter Jack Anderson, there is a chapter called *The Dictator and the Diplomat*. It reveals: “Yahya Khan had an extraordinary relationship with American Ambassador Joseph Farland; they met almost daily and sometimes shared a bottle of Scotch. With a ring of military reverses in Bengal, Yahya depended on Farland more than ever, and the two men developed a relationship that was unusual for a Head of State and a Foreign Ambassador. The Pakistani President needed a friend to confide in as his army fell back day after day.”³³

In 1973, American Charge d’ Affaires Sidney Sobers played a significant behind-the-scenes role in talking to opposition politicians to forge the consensus that brought about the 1973 Constitution. However, the most unprecedented of any Ambassador in Pakistan was that of Saudi Arabia’s Riaz al-Khatib, who was the mediator between the PPP Government and the PNA during the 1977 agitation.

Probably the most influential American Ambassador after Horace Hildreth was Robert Oakley. Oakley’s influence was at its peak during the PPP period, when he personally sat in on meetings of the Afghan Cell,³⁴ which took policy decisions on the Afghan operation, and when Benazir Bhutto reportedly rushed to him to verify whether “rumors of a coup are true or not”. Even on 6 August 1990—the day of her dismissal—Benazir sent one of her trusted Ministers to the US Embassy to ‘check from Oakley’ whether the President had finally decided to dump her.

As events have proven in Pakistan, Foreign Ministers have not only little to do with their own people but also other parts of the government that they serve as well. For example, on July 5, 1977, Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed went to his office early in the morning business-as-usual, and it was the somewhat unpleasant and embarrassing task of his Foreign Secretary to inform him that a military coup had taken place at dawn and ousted the government of which he was Foreign Minister!³⁵

RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVILIAN REGIMES AND THE MILITARY

Well before the first martial law was imposed in October 1958, the Pakistan Army had emerged as an autonomous power centre not subordinate to civilian authority. This creeping militarization of the Pakistani power structure began soon after the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951. Two factors were largely responsible for this growing ascendancy of the Army. The first was the American Connection, which made the Army the most important institutional vehicle for US political influence in Pakistan. Brig. Mian Ghulam Jilani (who later joined the NAP) was going on his assignment as Military Attache to the United States, when he was called by General Ayub Khan, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Arms'. Ayub's instructions to Jilani were quite clear: "Your basic task is to establish a military aid relationship with the Pentagon. You must deal directly with them and don't take the Ambassador into confidence. After all, we cannot mist these civilians with such sensitive matters." The second reason for the creeping military influence in the power structure was political instability in Pakistan aggravated by weak politicians who increasingly lost control within the power structure. As early as March 1955, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, in a dispatch to the State Department, was already referring to Ayub Khan as the "final arbiter of the destiny of Cabinets", in the same dispatch, the American Ambassador made a revealing appraisal, which was a pointer to Pakistan's political future: "After more than two years of recurrent crises, political power in Pakistan has been openly assumed by a small group of British- trained Administrators and military leaders centering around Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and his two principal associates, General Iskandar Mirza and General Ayub Khan".³⁶

Ever since Pakistan's first military regime took over in 1958, Pakistan has seen three civilian interludes in the last thirty-one years. Zulfikar Au Bhutto was Prime Minister for five years in 1972-1977, Muhammad Khan Junejo was Prime Minister from 1985-1988 and Benazir Bhutto was in office for twenty months.

In all these civilian governments, problems of control over the army and relations between the civilian structure and the Armed Forces cropped up and these subsequently proved a catalyst for the downfall of at least two regimes. Within the first ninety days of taking over as Prime Minister, Benazir's father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto removed the Chiefs of the Army and Air Force who were perceived to be playing the role of "king makers". When he ousted Lt Gen. Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan in March 1972, this was probably the first time in Pakistan's history after Quaid-e-Azam's death that civilian supremacy was enforced over the Army.³⁷ In an address to the Pakistani people on the occasion, Bhutto also attacked Bonapartism: "The people of Pakistan and the Armed Forces themselves are equally determined to wipe out the Bonapartist influence from the Armed Forces. It is essential so that these tendencies never again pollute the political life of Pakistan. Bonapartism is an expression which means that professional soldiers turn into professional politicians. I use the word Bonapartism because what has happened in Pakistan since 1954 and more openly since 1958, is that some professional Generals turned to politics not as a profession but to plunder and as a result, the influences that crept into Pakistan's socio-political life destroyed its fabric as the influence of Bonapartist had affected Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. But come what may, these Bonapartist influences must be rooted out in the interest of the Armed Forces and the people of Pakistan".³⁸ Bhutto also changed the designation of the Services heads from Commander-in-Chief to Chief of Staff, fixed their tenure at three years and in what was labelled as reorganization of the defence structure, created the position of Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC) who would act as a Coordinator of all the three Services.³⁹ Unlike, say, the case of Turkey where the Chief of Joint Staff has direct command of the three Services, the case of Pakistan's Chairman JCSC is different since he has no direct authority and command of the troops, which remains in the hands of the particular Chief of Staff of that service. Despite these attempts, the civilian government of Mr. Bhutto was unable to prevent a mili-

tary coup in July 1977 which led to the longest period of Martial Law in Pakistan's history.

In March 1985, after elections had been held. General Zia handpicked Mohammad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister who also did not take long in attempting to assert Civilian control over the Armed Forces. In March 1987, Mr. Junejo insisted upon the retirement of General K.M. An! as Vice Chief of Army Staff (General Zia had continued to hold the position of Chief of Army Staff) and General Rahimuddin Khan as Chairman JCSC (who was also a relative of General Zia) upon completion of their three- year tenures. A year later, in March, 1988, there was a sharp difference of opinion between Mr. Junejo and General Zia over the promotion of Lt. Generals, who would later serve as Corps Commanders. Under the Pakistani Constitution, while the President has the power to appoint the Services Chiefs and Chairman JCSC, all appointments up to the rank of three star Generals are done by the Prime Minister. Mr. Junejo even went to the extent, and this goes to his credit, to endeavor to establish Parliamentary control over the purse-strings of the military. For the first time in the history of Pakistan, the question of defence spending was brought before the public and critically examined. This was done through the Parliament's Public Accounts Committee (PAC).⁴⁰

In March 1988, the PAC had a press conference in Islamabad and criticized the pattern of defence budget which sought to 'hide' specific information about the quantum of expenditure on various functions of the defence services unlike the practice on the civil administration side. Conversely, the Defence Ministry had responded to this criticism with the conventional argument that since the military budget is a "sensitive sub its details could not be divulged to the public. The PAC based its argument for more openness on the defence budget on the plea that "if you don't keep our people informed of our defence potential, it does not mean that the others do not know about it".

Apart from this "public's right to know" principle, the other rationale provided by the PAC was that "the confidence of the people is based on the information they have and if they feel that

the resources made available by them were not being effectively utilized for furtherance of the objective for which they are meant, they would resist parting with such resources. However, if the people are aware that the expenditure is essential for their security, they would gladly come forward to share the burden". The Junejo government took this argument further when in early May, 1988 the Finance Minister announced that a Special Review Committee of the government had even decided to reduce defence expenditure. He said that "real defence capability of the country could be protected, even increased, while reducing the expenditure on defence". He added that during the deliberations of the Special Review Committee, composed of members of Parliament and officials from the Economic Ministries, proposals were also put forward for raising a small professional army, comprehensive training for all citizens and the setting up of a National Defence Council, functioning under the Parliament to scrutinize defence spending. While there was no formal feedback from the military quarters to what were definitely revolutionary proposals by Pakistani standards, a rejoinder came from General Zia-ul Haq himself during a speech in Islamabad on 22 May 1988. General Zia lauded greater public discussion of defence issues saying that 'we are not angels in uniform and we should be open to persuasion and correction and the Armed Forces need not be sensitive to public criticism since the institution of the Armed Forces is no longer a sacred cow'. However, responding to proposals for slashing defence expenditure, General Zia was quite categorical that "the situation demands that national defence must be bolstered and Pakistan cannot afford any cut or freeze in defence expenditure, since you cannot freeze threats to Pakistan's security"- It not surprising that exactly a week after this speech, on 29 May 1988 General Zia sacked Prime Minister Junejo and the National Assembly which had become increasingly critical of the Armed Forces.⁴¹

During her twenty months in office, while Benazir Bhutto was certainly not oblivious of these developments vis-a-vis the unmilitary during the tenure of her civilian predecessors, she too fought

at least three major “battles” to assert her control over the military. In May, 1989, she insisted on removing Lt. Gen Hamid Gul as Director General Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) despite reluctance from both President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg.⁴¹ Similarly, the controversy over Admiral Sirohey again indicated the desire of her government to ensure that key appointments in the military were subject to civilian control.⁴² Additionally, just weeks before her ouster, Benazir Bhutto tried but failed to get “her man”, Lt. General Alam Jan Mahsud, appointed as Vice Chief of Army Staff, since General Beg opposed it strongly.⁴³ These problems notwithstanding, Benazir Bhutto was careful in not annoying General Beg or the rest of the military brass. On the occasion of Pakistan Day, on 23 March 1989 she proclaimed the award of the Medal of Democracy to all members of the Armed Forces “for their meritorious services in upholding the Constitution and restoration of democratic rule”. She publicly reaffirmed her praise and respect for the Armed Forces saying “by keeping out of politics, the Generals and the people are now one.”⁴⁵ In another gesture to demonstrate her support for the military’s professional role of defending state frontiers, Benazir Bhutto personally visited Siachen Glacier where she indicated “there would be no compromise over the national interest”. She also appeased the military by personally visiting Pannu Aqil.⁴⁶ Cantonment in Sindh, a politically controversial issue in her home province, in marked contrast to Junejo who declined the military’s invitation to visit Pannu Aqil. Equally importantly she ensured that there was no large scale purge in the civilian government structure of military officers who had been appointed during the days of General Zia. In fact, key positions in her government were also occupied by military officers, all retired of course. For example, her Foreign Minister, her Minister of State for Defence, key civilian intelligence aide, Press Secretary and her Chief of Staff who headed her Secretariat were all Army Officers. In her time, three out of Pakistan’s four provinces were headed by governors who were former Generals.

Basically, the government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto

seemed to be following a three-pronged strategy to deal with the Army since that was viewed as the main source of 'threat' to Pakistani civilian regimes. First, she continued to appease the Armed Forces through various gestures, including the Army's presence in Sindh, particularly the Pannu A cantonment which was controversial in provincial politics. Second, she allowed the Army exclusive responsibility for the conduct and control over Afghan policy.⁴⁷ Third, she was banking on support from the United States, whose key members of Congress made it clear that "the United States will stop all aid, military and economic, in case of a military coup."⁴⁸ Despite this attempt to purchase political risk insurance at home and abroad against a possible threat of military intervention, Benazir Bhutto had to employ all the political skills that she could command so that she was not haunted by the specter of "Bonapartism", like her father. As her own short-lived tenure showed, such tight-rope walking is always easy.

However, 6 August 1990 was avoidable had Benazir Bhutto demonstrated skills in governance and seriously attempted to resolve some of the real problems which eventually led to her dismissal and dissolution of the National Assembly. These problems were linked to specific political issues and increasing complications within the Pakistani power structure. If specific issues are any guide to why the President acted the way he did on 6 August 1990, then a linkage can be drawn between the situation in Sindh, the crisis in Kashmir and the sudden surfacing of the Shariat Bill as yet another point of controversy in Pakistan's already divided polity. In the backdrop of these issues was Benazir Bhutto's deteriorating relationship with the other members of what had constituted the triarchy in Pakistan's power structure since December 1988, namely, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg. In her understanding of the dynamics of the Pakistani power structure, Benazir Bhutto in 1990, just before her ouster, erroneously assumed that her real problem was in the person of the Chief of Army Staff, while she felt that she had "won over" the President by taking two of his sons-in-law into her camp. Interestingly, for

the greater part of 1989, Benazir had assumed that within the triarchy, it was the President who was her main “adversary”. while the Army, particularly General Beg. was on her side.

The hard fact is that both these assessments were not quite correct. Tactical considerations notwithstanding, the Pakistani Establishment basically viewed Benazir Bhutto as a temporary intruder into the corridors of power and their view of her conduct in office confirmed some of their worst suspicions about her. Their initial feeling later turned into a conviction that Benazir Bhutto simply failed to outgrow her partisan or parochial considerations. Additionally, this perception was reinforced by the feeling in the Pakistan Establishment that Benazir Bhutto and her team could not quite be “trusted” with sensitive national security issues.⁵⁰

Ironically issues such as Sindh and Kashmir which were the initial bases of Benazir’s political strength later turned out to be catalysts for her dismissal. It was the overwhelming mandate which the PPP received in Sindh in the November 1988 elections that clinched the Prime Ministerial office for Benazir Bhutto. But it was her abject failure to defuse the Sindh situation that convinced the Establishment that her continuance in office would further aggravate matters in that troubled province. The Kashmir issue, which some of her confidantes had viewed as “our Afghanistan”, increasingly became an albatross around the PPP neck. The reason was simple: Kashmir given its linkage to Pakistan-India relations and the menacing deployment of Indian troops on the border, lifted the Army to a ‘driving seat role’ on this question of national security. And the feeling in the Army was with the ‘respite’ they had got in terms of time could then be utilized to “settle” Sindh since the Army understandably dreaded fighting on two fronts, one external and the other at home. However, a feeling grew since early 1990 that somehow the PPP government was not providing the Army with this opportunity and the time that the Army felt it had gained on Kashmir was being frittered away at the altar of PPP’s petty partisanship in Sindh.⁵¹

The Shariat Bill also injected a new element of danger in what was already a growing drift in national politics. The Army also’

felt that the timing of the tabling of the Shariat Bill, courtesy the incompetence of the PPP government and the rank opportunism of the opposition, would contribute to further divisions, this time of a sectarian kind, among the Muslims of Pakistan, a situation which the country could ill-afford given the looming threat on the borders. The timing of the dissolution was, therefore, linked with the convening of the National Assembly since it was assumed that once the Assembly was convened on 8 August 1990 and it started discussing the divisive Bill, events would not be in the control of the government. Three separate incidents during Benazir Bhutto's tenure provide an insight into the extent of deterioration of relations between the PPP government and the Pakistan Army. The Army developed certain views of the Prime Minister and her team, not views of individual Generals, but what can now be clearly analyzed as the "corporate view" of the Pakistan Army. First, sortie of the conversation Benazir Bhutto had with former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Islamabad, which were motioned, showed that she had certain views on the Army's role in the past, that she expressed in private to her Indian counterpart, which were at variance with her public professions. It was some time during the second half of 1989, in this context of suspicion about the Prime Minister, that she and her team were declared a "security risk". Sensitive matters of national security were handled by the President and the Chief of Army Staff with the Prime Minister taken into confidence only on perfunctory and routine matters.⁵²

The second incident which indicated the military view of the PPP government was the 7 May 1990 briefing at GHQ for fifty four Generals who had gathered together for their annual Promotion Board parleys. it was in the course of this briefing that a key member of the former Prime Minister's team was dubbed a "RAW agent", by the Dire General, Military Intelligence.⁵³ The third incident which showed the deep divide between those in Islamabad in the PPP government and those in Rawalpindi in the GHQ occurred on 17 July less than three weeks before her ouster. On that evening at 6 p.m., the Corps Commander in Karachi was summoned to the Chief Minister's house to meet the visiting

Federal Interior Minister and Minister of State for Defence. The Corps Commander, who had felt that the government had botched up matters by renegeing on a personal commitment of Benazir Bhutto to give all the powers that were needed by the Army to tackle Sindh, declined to come to the Chief Minister's House for that meeting. Instead, he invited the two visiting Ministers to join him for a cup of tea in his house the next morning, which they predictably declined.⁵⁴

The countdown towards dissolution began in earnest from May 1990 onwards. Serious thinking started, the President began legal consultations and he started raising the issue of dissolution in his conversations with visiting Opposition politicians. During three such separate conversations in May. the President wondered aloud whether there was "any utility left in the National Assembly."⁵⁵ The President had legal consultations with his lawyer- confidants, Sharifuddin Pirzada, Aziz Munshi and Rafi Raza. With the acrimonious debate over the deployment of the Army in Sindh becoming public and the government virtually paralyzed by indecision and inaction, by the middle of July. the President had made up his mind. He revealed his intentions to a senior COP leader, who supported the proposed move. All that was now left to do was to put the modalities together, decide on the new team and on the caretaker Prime Minister. The date of the 'operation' was decided to be any time between 3-7 August, that is, soon after the Muharram weekend and just before the National Assembly session. The Army had told the President that they needed just 48 hours prior notice to move the troops, although they later reduced this to 24 hours. When Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi arrived in Islamabad on 30 July he was informed of the impending 'operation' and of his own proposed role in it. During the Muharram week end, 1-3 August the President busied himself in the draft of his speech and dissolution order (both of which had been prepared in July), plus preparing the lists of people who were to be given important slots in the hierarchy. Jatoi's name was picked for Prime Ministership from among a short list of three, the other two being Malik Miraj Khalid and Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was finally picked because he was an 'old friend',

he was a Sindhi like Benazir and he was sufficiently antipathetic to her.⁵⁶

On 6 August 1990, Benazir Bhutto had sent her Ambassador at Large, Happy Minwalla, to the President who apparently assured the Prime Minister's emissary that "I will not do anything against the Constitution".⁵⁷ Ironically, for Benazir, who had laid great stress all through the twenty months of her bumbling government, on cultivating the Americans on the assumption that if they were on her side nobody could touch her, the last 'outsider' to see the President at high noon on that fateful day was none other than the Ambassador of the United States of America. It is perhaps no accident that the first foreign reaction to the President's action was from the United States which called it "a constitutional change and an internal matter for the people of Pakistan to decide."⁵⁸

In her first press conference after her ouster, Benazir Bhutto, shocked and bitter, accused the Military Intelligence (MI) of masterminding "this constitutional coup". She even alleged that GHQ's Judicial Branch, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) had prepared the Presidential Order of her dismissal and the National Assembly's dissolution although these allegations were not repeated. They brought into focus a larger issue, namely, the Army's role in Pakistan's politics.

Interestingly, the discussion that followed Benazir's ouster regarding the Army's political role also contained suggestions that it should be granted a 'constitutional role on the Turkish model'. Ironically, the first public suggestion in this regard came from a political leader belonging to the PPP, although he tempered his remarks by saying that it was just his "personal opinion". 'It is a fact that he chose to air these publicly, in September 1990, without being contradicted by any of the PPP high command indicated that it was a trial balloon of the former ruling party in one of its sense of moves at back tracking from its initial criticism of the Army in the aftermath of 6 August including Benazir's allegations regarding the MI and JAG.⁶⁰

Before examining various perspectives of this issue, it would be necessary to set some myths at rest in this regard. Three such

myths, both in the popular perception as well as in statements of politicians are noteworthy. First, the question of the Army's 'constitutional role' is somehow always confused with its political role. As the most powerful component of the power structure in Pakistan, the Army has been a key political player since the 1951 assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat All Khan. Yet, there has never been any formal political role assigned to the Army in any Constitution of Pakistan. The closest that the Army came to acquiring a constitutional role was in 1985 when General Zia-ul-Haq added the provision of a National Security Council (NSC) as part of the 8th Amendment. But he deleted this provision during the bargaining under which the 8th Amendment was passed by the National Assembly and made a part of the 1973 Constitution. Such legalism notwithstanding, the hard fact is that when the Chief of the Army Staff was 'elected' President through the rigged Referendum of 1984, an 'election' subsequently ratified by the National Assembly, the Army's role in the power structure was of course given legitimacy, both constitutionally and politically.

The second myth is regarding what is bandied about in Pakistan as the 'Turkish model'. The Turkish Constitution, which was approved in November 1982, does not provide for any formal, constitutional role for the Army. It has only two provisions, one for a National Security Council comprising all the Services Chiefs under the chairmanship of the President for the purposes of "formulation, establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the State". The other provision is the power given to the President to "declare Martial Law in one or more regions or throughout the country", but this is subject to the approval of Parliament which, according to the Turkish Constitution, may "reduce or extend the period of Martial Law or lift it". This provision adds that "the Martial Law Commanders shall exercise their duties under the authority of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff". This provision is similar to what Mr. Bhutto attempted in April 1977, namely, imposing a 'limited Martial Law' in three cities where he was facing political agitation. The important thing to note in the context of the Turkish

political experience is that, unlike Pakistan, after three military interventions in 1960, 1911 and 1980, the Turks have managed a *modus vivendi* between civilian politicians and the Army.

Pakistan's failure is more waited since its squabbling politician have not even managed to have a *modus vivendi* among themselves, let alone between themselves and the Army. This is where the third myth comes in which sees politicians as "defenders of civil society locked in an intractable battle for democracy against the Army". The, truth, regrettably, is quite the contrary. At least two of the three military interventions in Pakistan — 1969 and 1977 — took place with the active connivance and concurrence of politicians who sought the removal of their political opponents horn office through a con with the generals. In 1969, Mr. Bhutto was in close contact with Yahya Khan to remove Ayub Khan and in 1977. Important sections of the PNA were in league with General Zia to remove Mr. Bhutto. Similarly, Mr. Junejo's sacking by a President who also doubled as Chief of the Army Staff was with the concurrence of all political forces, including the PPP led by Benazir Bhutto.

In fact, politicians of both Left and Right have actively cooperated with the Army to defeat their political opponents in an unfortunate replay of events which illustrate their inability to devise even basic "rules of the game" in Pakistani politics. During the 1965 Presidential elections, which, were also rigged, the prominent leader, Maulana Bhashani actively cooperated with a military dictator to oppose Miss Fatima Jinnah. During 1971, Mr. Bhutto connived with the generals to ensure that power was not transferred to the leader of the majority party of that time, namely, Sheikh Mujib. Similarly, in 1979, most of the politicians including those of the Left and the Right concurred in the decision to hang W. Bhutto.

Regarding the Army's political role, it would be instructive to briefly examine the track record of the two major forces on the Paki political horizon: PPP and IJI. In 1970, Mr. Bhutto was the first politician to give the thesis "the three political forces", in which be included the PPP, the Awami League of Sheikh Mujib and the Army. After the 1988 elections, the PPP, led by

Mr. Bhutto's daughter, sent its first emissary not to the President but to the Chief of the Army Staff, prior to the transfer of power. It was after these contacts that a four-point deal was brokered, in which the Americans were also invited to participate. It included a PPP commitment to support Ghulam Ishaq Khan for President, retain Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan for 'continuity in foreign policy', uphold the accord with the IMF on the economy, and not to meddle in internal army matters like transfers, promotions and retirements of senior officers. The PPP willingly and eagerly agreed to abide by this arrangement, and it was only after its concurrence to these four points, that Benazir Bhutto took office as Prime Minister on 2 December 1988.⁶¹ After the renewal of us government on 6 August 1990, the PPP was the first political party to moot the idea of "a constitutional role for the Army".

As for the IJI, it owes its genesis to GHQ in September 1988.⁶² Interestingly, the architects of IJI provided two reasons for it. If no alliance had been formed prior to the polls in 1988, the IJI founding fathers felt, then elections would have been difficult since most of the smaller, splinter parties were fearful of the PPP majority. And the second reason given for the formation of IJI was that it would be "good for democracy since a basis of a two-party system was laid, both representing constituencies with their respective vote-banks".⁶³ According to G.M. Syed, during an October 1983 interview at his residence in Sann, Wali Khan told him in 1971 that "one-fourth of the generals are from the Frontier Province and, therefore, we will also get our share of power."⁶⁴

Regrettably, Pakistani politicians' track record smacks of duplicity publicly saying that the Army should have no political role while privately deals are struck with the Army to attain power and the Army's help eagerly sought to "sort out" political opponents, as Mr. Bhutto sought in 1977 or his daughter med in Sindh in 1990. Had Mr. Bhutto tolerated opposition governments in the two provinces of Pakistan and Benazir Bhutto similarly accepted opposition governments in two other provinces of Pakistan during her tenure, the history of Pakistan would have been different and neither the 5 July 1977 coup, nor the 6 August 1990 action would have taken place. Civilian democracy failed to find sustenance in

Pakistan because politicians could not develop a collective stake in the political process, preferring to expend energies in seeking each other's elimination.

As far as the presidential dimension goes, the President's authority as the supreme civilian leader is acknowledged by the armed forces. The President apparently wanted to go down in history as the second civilian leader, after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who presided over a normal transition among the service chiefs. During Bhutto's time General Tikka Khan completed his normal tenure as Chief of Army Staff and this time around as well President Ghulam Ishaq Khan was keen to answer that all the vices chiefs, who were retiring in 1991 were able to do so on schedule with his nominees succeeding them in a normal, routine manner.

It is perhaps for this reason that President has reportedly turned down two proposals said to have emanated from the military: One pertaining to the establishment of a National Security Council which could coordinate and formulate all decision making in the realm of defence, foreign office, intelligence and national security. The other was a proposal, again from the brass, which was also turned down by the President, seeking the establishment of the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, which would put effective control of the three services in one office replacing the current office of Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Committee, which remain essentially a staff position with no operational control over the three services. Such an office as that of a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces would have been similar in scope and content to Turkey, which has a Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces who wields effective control over all the three services including army, navy and air force.⁶⁵

Regarding relations of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with the Army, in this key responsibility he is a Pakistani politician with a difference. His level of intimacy with the army has probably been without precedent for a Pakistani politician before becoming Prime Minister, save perhaps for Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who also enjoyed a cordial and intimate relationship with the brass before becoming Prime Minister. Three facts testify to

this past intimacy between Nawaz Sharif and the army. First, as a politician who began his political career under a martial law government when he became Finance Minister in the Punjab in 1981, Nawaz Sharif's political career has been characterized by eschewing any opposition to martial law or any aspect of military role or army rule in Pakistan's politics. Second, there is little doubt that Nawaz Sharif managed to forge the IJI in September 1988, after the death of General Zia and on the eve of the November 1988 elections with the live assistance, encouragement and support of the military. The IJI proved to be an effective counter weight to the PPP, serving first as an opposition and then as the coalition, which successfully defeated the PPP during the 1990 elections. Third, as Pakistan's principal opposition leader during the twenty months of Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif enjoyed support from his powerful allies in the Pakistan Establishment during his political battles with Benazir Bhutto, particularly from the Armed Forces. In March 1989, after Benazir Bhutto's attempt to destabilize the Punjab Provincial administration headed by Nawaz Sharif had fizzled out, at a time when the ISI backed assault on Jalalabad had also failed, a senior general was heard to remark "although we could not take Jalalabad, we managed to save the Punjab."⁶⁶

Since taking over as Prime Minister there have been signs of Nawaz Sharif's distancing himself from the army. This is part of the process of Nawaz Sharif coming into his own as a political leader with a popular power base who no longer needs military props for his political purpose related to this distancing is the assertion of Prime Ministerial authority vis-a-vis the military. This process began soon after he became Prime Minister when he took a decision to send an armored brigade to Saudi Arabia after his brief visit there in the second half of November 1990, a decision that followed the earlier refusal of the army high command to the Saudi request in this regard. On the Gulf War there was a divergence of perceptions between the Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff and during his 4 February address to parliament, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif even made a veiled public criticism of the Chief of Army Staff's 28 January speech. Subse-

quently, at a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet during February their perceptions on the Gulf again differed. One reason why Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Defence Advisor Ijlal Haider Zaidi lost his job, somewhat suddenly, was because the Prime Minister apparently suspected Zaidi of having bypassed him on the question of appointing the Chief of Air Staff more than one specific detail pertaining to the new air chief was the fact that it was not as a prelude to what will be anticipated to be the most significant event in the tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, namely, the appointment of a new Chief of Army Staff in August 1991. Ground rules which were set in the "test case" of the Chief of Air Staff would operate between the President and the Prime Minister when the "real" decision for COAS comes up.⁶⁷

Then there is also a question of a distance and even a distrust of sorts between the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the military run ISI in suspicion between the two that is remarkably similar to the distrust of ISI that was evident under Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo and Benazir Bhutto. That suspicion was illustrated by the fact that, at the first available opportunity, both changed the ISI chiefs with nominees that they had personally picked.

Four aspects have determined the direction of civil-military relations during the tenure of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif so far. First, as a Punjabi, he does not see himself as an "outsider" in a power structure that is essentially northern-dominated, namely, by Pakhtoons and Punjabis. For one, unlike Junejo and Benazir, Nawaz Sharif should not have much of a problem in socializing with the men in khaki with whom he has cultivated a comfortable rapport in the last decade or so. Second, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif managed to play a role in influencing the appointment of a new Chief of Army Staff under the Constitution, while the President is responsible for appointments of the services chiefs, the Prime Minister has the discretion to appoint and promote an officer up to and including the rank of a three star general. In this regard, past practice is also a guide to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, especially the experience of Junejo and Benazir. The third

aspect of civil military relations under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is a conscious attempt to strengthen himself politically at home so that his differences with other political forces are not susceptible to be “exploited” and nor is there a need on his part to seek the military’s support as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or Benazir Bhutto did in Baluchistan and Sind respectively. This effort at strengthening himself politically on the part of Nawaz Sharif is evident in his gestures of accommodation with the PPP, his desire to defuse inter-provincial tensions through the water agreement and his attempt to cover his flanks with respect to the clerical lobby over the Shariat Bill. Finally, Nawaz Sharif is attempting to tilt the balance in civil military relations in his favour through foreign policy moves aimed at reducing tensions with India, reviving the American connection and restoring an economic role for Pakistan in the oil-rich Persian Gulf states.

However, in the coming years, the Prime Minister will have to tackle “gut Issues” in civil military relations that are vital for the stability of his government and its relations with the brass, including, issues like the defence budget, the shape of relations with India especially in the context of the uprising in Kashmir, and the degree of compromise he is willing to seek on the nuclear programme in order to generate closer ties with Washington. These “gut Issues” will determine how civil military relations eventually develop during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s tenure and how stable his government will be.

NOTES

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4. “Documents from the Espionage Den”, Volume I on Pakistan, P. 19.

5. Khar’s Indian connection is described in detail in Tehmina Durrani’s *My Feudal Lord*, Lahore, 1991: An Indian Mole in Pakistan, *The Telegraph*, 11 May 1991.
6. An account of how the Zia-Junejo dyarchy collapsed is in Mushahid Hussain’s *The Zia Years*.
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9. Mushahid Hussain, “Intelligence and the Politics of Power in the Third World: The Pakistani Experience”, Outline Paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Conference, April 11-13, 1990, Washington, DC, USA.
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11. Akhtar Abdur Rahman’s role is examined in detail in a flattering biography by Haroon Rashid Faith (Victor). Jang Publishers, 1990: Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
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13. Mushahid Hussain, “The Invisible Government”, *The Nation*, 5 February 1989.
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18. Comments at a Private dinner in d l of journalists.
19. Mushahid Hussain, “Spy Wars”, *The Nation*, 21 April 1991.
20. Different perspectives on the bureaucracy include: Dr. Muneer Ahmad, *The Civil Servant in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press 1964; Hassan Habib, *Babus, Brahmans and Bureaucrats*, Lahore 1970.
21. For General Zia’s relations with civil bureaucracy, after Junejo’s sacking. see: Mushahid Hussain, “Civil Bureaucracy, and Power Structure”. *The Nation*, 7 August 1988.
22. Mushahid Hussain *Supra* 14.
23. This definition of “core interests” came from a senior bureaucracy
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25. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) S.R. Kallue, DG. ISI and Major (Retd.) Masood Sharif, Joint Director. Intelligence Bureau.
26. Mushahid Hussain. “Pakistan’s Foreign Ministers: A Profile”. *The Nation*, 17 March 1991.

27. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Little, Brown and Company, 1979, p. 740.
28. Major General Mini Ghulam Jilani conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
29. "Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1956 Volume VII, South Asia.
30. Major General Nasirullah Babar conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
31. Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
32. Hildreth's role is documented in *Supra* 29.
33. Jack Andersen, *The Anderson Papers*, Ballantine Books, 1974, especially Chapter "The dictator and the Diplomat", p. 274.
34. *The New York Times*, 23 April 1989.
35. Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
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37. They were removed in rather dramatic fashion: See excerpts from Bhutto's speech on the occasion in Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, (Progressive: Lahore), pp. 287-88.
38. Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi, *op. cit.*
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