

# **Pakistan: The Crisis Of the State**

by Akmal Hussain

## **Introduction**

Pakistan is in the grip of perhaps the most acute and wide-ranging crisis in its history. The political, legal, and social institutions through which the aspirations of the people are articulated and which constitute the basis of the creative development of the people are on the verge of collapse. At the same time, the state apparatus, bereft of a legitimising ideology, stands today in stark confrontation with the people. At such a moment, a serious analysis of the crisis is a pre-requisite for its creative resolution. Such a resolution of the crisis is necessary if the people and the state they embody are to survive and remain independent.

To understand the principal elements of the present crisis in terms of the interplay of political and economic forces, it is necessary to examine the nature and genesis of the Pakistan Movement. It is also necessary to analyse the dominance of the state apparatus over the political process in Pakistan -a dominance whose trajectory brings the power of the state into confrontation with the power of the people. An analysis of the nature of the development of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy is also relevant to an understanding of the situation in Pakistan, as is also an examination of the relationship between the process of economic growth, the political environment, and the crisis of the state.

In considering the nature and origins of the Pakistan Movement, one comes across two kinds of equally simplistic views at opposite ends of the, ideological spectrum. At one end, there is the metaphysical view of Muslim communal 'historians', who confine the concepts of culture and nation strictly within the bounds of religion. In this view Pakistan is seen as a historical inevitability rooted in the doctrinal differences between Hinduism and Islam. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the view that conceives history in terms of the political manipulations of individuals or governments. This view regards Pakistan as the result simply of a British conspiracy to divide and rule. Such approaches, however, cannot explain why religious differences between Hindus and Muslims acquired the importance they did in the first half of the 20th century in India or why the British policy of sowing discord fell on such fertile ground. These questions can be answered only by examining the nature of the political and economic forces at play during the twilight of the raj.

The origin of the demand for Pakistan can be located in the dynamic interaction of three political forces within India during the period from 1857 to 1940:

1. The British imperial government, which it can be argued was interested in undermining the gathering momentum of the national liberation movement by accentuating its internal contradictions.
2. The Congress, representing the interests of an Indian national bourgeoisie, which was essentially underdeveloped and therefore lacked genuine secularism in its political choices and political language. Consequently, the Congress was susceptible to Hindu communalist pressures, thereby increasingly alienating the Muslim fraction of the Indian bourgeoisie.
3. The nascent Muslim fraction of the Indian bourgeoisie, which was even less mature than its Hindu counterpart. Due to acute weakness in its rivalry with the more powerful Hindu fraction, the Muslim bourgeoisie was induced to seek support from Muslim landlords and the colonial state on the one hand and reliance on an explicitly religious ideology on the other.

### **The Emerging Muslim Bourgeoisie, the British and the Congress: 1857-1905**

One of the earliest attempts at articulating the political and economic interests of propertied Muslims in British India can be traced to the Muslim education movement of Syed Ahmed Khan. His political ideas during the 1850s expressed the interests of the rising Muslim bourgeoisie and the smaller landlords, who resented the feudal system in India and wished to receive economic concessions from the British authorities. Thus, Syed Ahmed Khan opposed the 1857 War of Independence as an attempt to restore the old feudal nobility and supported the British on this issue. While being a staunch loyalist of the British raj he urged industrial and commercial development and argued for administrative reforms whereby Indians could be given a place in the country's administration.. He called upon Muslims to educate themselves and to be receptive to modern scientific ideas. In the pursuit of this objective he founded a scientific society in 1864. In 1877, helped by the British, Syed Ahmed Khan founded the Muslim College at Aligarh. This institution sought to inculcate loyalty to the raj in Muslims and at the same time became an influential political and ideological centre of Muslim propertied classes. Aligarh College made an important contribution in producing a corpus of literature and a Muslim separatist political party in India.

The correspondence between the interests of the British raj and the political efforts of Syed Ahmed Khan can be judged from his complete change in posture in the period before and after the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. Until 1885, he was a champion of

Hindu-Muslim unity and conceived of Hindus and Muslims as part of the same nation:

*Do not forget that Hindu and Muslim are names referring to the religious denomination, but whether Hindu, Muslim or Christian, so long as these people live in our country, they form one nation regardless of their faith [emphasis added].*<sup>2</sup>

The formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was an attempt by Indian nationalists to challenge the political status quo and pressurize the British authorities for reforms and self-rule. Even though in the early phase of the Congress this struggle was conducted strictly within the structure of the colonial state, Syed Ahmed Khan and the Muslim propertied interests whom he represented strongly opposed the Congress struggle. Syed Ahmed Khan, who only a few years earlier had championed Hindu-Muslim unity within a single nation, now made an equally passionate attack on the notion of composite Indian nationalism. In a speech at Lucknow on 28 December 1887, he remarked as follows:

Now supposed that all the English were to leave India – then who would be the rulers of India? *Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations, Mohammedan and Hindu, could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power?* Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and inconceivable [emphasis added].<sup>2</sup>

The sharp change in Syed Ahmed Khan's position on the relationship between religion and nationhood expressed the imperatives operating upon the infant Muslim bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie of north-west India historically emerged much later than the bourgeoisie operating in Bengal and Bombay. In the latter regions, because of their proximity to the sea, the pattern of expansion of the colonial economy brought it to commercial and industrial activity much earlier than in northern India, where the production of cash crops remained the predominant function of the colonial economy. Consequently, the Muslim bourgeoisie which originated in north-west India was much weaker than the Hindu bourgeoisie, and in its competitive struggle against the latter, it had to rely on the support of Muslim landlords and British authorities. Accordingly, as the

Congress emerged to threaten the interests of British metropolitan capital, the weak Muslim fraction of the Indian bourgeoisie saw that in opposing the Congress it could win concessions from the British.

Soon after the founding of the Congress, Syed Ahmed Khan organized the first anti-Congress organization of Muslim landlords and bourgeois intellectuals, called the United Friends of India society. As Syed Ahmed said in a letter to his English friend, Graham, the purpose of this society was to combat the politics of the Congress.<sup>4</sup>

As the Congress organization was formed, the newly appointed Governor-General of India, Lord Dufferin, assisted by the British politician Allen Hume, discussed with British officials the chances of provoking anti-Congress disorders, in an attempt to undermine the nationalist movement.<sup>5</sup>

Soon after the formation of the Congress, a Hindu movement against cow-slaughter, which provoked Hindu-Muslim riots, arose as part of a movement for the purity of Hinduism. The Congress then declared that it was an all-India organization representing both Hindus and Muslims. However, the Indian national bourgeoisie was not fully developed, since it had emerged within the highly restrictive structure of the dependent colonial economy. Its growth had not occurred in the context of an economic and cultural conflict with feudalism, as in the European case. Accordingly, the Indian national bourgeoisie had not transcended the religious elements in its culture to achieve a secular political language. It was therefore not in a position to oppose effectively the anti-cow-slaughter movement. This failure led Syed Ahmed to brand the Congress a Hindu organization and to argue that the Congress' notion of self-rule would result in Hindu dominance of India.<sup>6</sup>

As the Congress gained organizational strength and enlarged its social base, its demand for a system of democratic representation of the Indian people began to press the British authorities. It was at this stage that Aligarh College began to play an active role against the Congress by posing the fact of different religious communities in India as an argument against a simple democratic representation, in which the Hindus would have been in the majority.

### **The Nationalist Movement and the Communal Question: 1905-28**

The Indian national bourgeoisie, because of its low level of development, had not been able to achieve genuine secularism in its consciousness. It was therefore susceptible to Hindu religious influence in both its political language as well as occasionally its political choices. This was an important factor 'in fostering a sense of insecurity about Congress intentions among the Muslim fraction of the Indian bourgeoisie. The nascent Muslim bourgeoisie was relatively so much weaker than its Hindu counterpart that it felt obliged to conduct its rivalry by aligning itself with the British authorities and Muslim landlords 'and by using an explicitly Muslim communal ideology in its anti-Congress rhetoric. This pushed the Congress even further towards a Hindu communalist direction. Thus, the veiled communalism of the Congress and the open communalism of the Muslim bourgeoisie fed off each other due to the underdeveloped nature of both the Hindu and Muslim fractions of Indian bourgeoisie. Whenever the nationalist movement led by the Congress intensified, the doubts and misgivings between the Hindu and Muslim communities were also

accentuated. This sociological and psychological characteristic of the relations between the Hindu and Muslim fractions of the Indian bourgeoisie was reinforced by the political imperatives operating on the British colonial regime, which aimed at intensifying communal conflict as a device to weaken the nationalist movement. It is this particular interplay of forces that explains the fact that at the high tide of the nationalist movement, in 1905, we see the emergence of the Muslim League as a separate political party of the Muslims.

As the national liberation movement in India gathered momentum and mobilized the masses, three important developments took place: 1) the partition of Bengal in 1905; 2) British support for the establishment of the Muslim League in 1906, which at that stage explicitly called upon its members for loyalty to the British; and 3) the introduction of separate electorates in 1909.

The real causes of the partition of Bengal were rooted in Hindu-Muslim communalism rather than in a desire to emancipate the poor of East Bengal. This was made clear during Lord Curzon's tour of East Bengal, where he addressed an assemblage of Muslim landlords in Dacca and argued that the partition of Bengal would bring untold benefits to the Muslims of Bengal. The partition of Bengal did indeed liberate many of the Muslim small landholders and poor peasants in East Bengal from the oppression of Hindu landlords and moneylenders. However, the Muslim landlords in this region remained untouched. In fact, in order to quell fears of Muslim landlords of increased taxes in East Bengal, the British authorities announced hastily that land taxation after partition would remain unchanged.<sup>8</sup>

The growing communalism in India during the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was not merely the result of British intrigue. The particular form of political mobilization conducted by the Congress also accentuated the existing distrust between the Hindu and Muslim communities. While the Congress was formally a secular organization, in practice, its campaigns and political language were characterized by Hindu symbolism. During the 1905-11 campaign against the partition of Bengal, the Congress could have won the support of most Muslim landlords because few Muslims supported the division of Bengal. Yet the Congress leaders alienated their Muslim supporters by using Hindu anthems and Hindu symbols in their mass campaigns. Many Muslim nationalists were outraged by this imagery and left the movement.

The Muslim middle classes in the competition for jobs felt at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their Hindu counterparts. The Aligarh group, with the support of the British authorities, directed this tendency towards the demand for separate electorates and an intensification of the communal issues. The English principal of Aligarh College, Archibald, undertook to arrange for a Muslim delegation to see the Viceroy. In 1906 Archibald went to Simla to meet the Viceroy's secretary (Colonel Dunlop Smith) and discussed the address which the deputation was to hand to the Viceroy.

Archibald proposed that the deputation should reject the principle of election to legislative councils on the grounds that it would be detrimental to the Muslim minority's interests. He suggested that nomination, or representation on the basis of religion, should be demanded instead. Although the Muslim delegation that went to see the Viceroy did not carry Archibald's idea of nomination as against representation, nevertheless the key proposal of Archibald for representation on a religious basis was the central issue that the delegation discussed with the Viceroy. Further evidence of the British attempt at formenting Hindu-Muslim communal tension is proved by a private conversation between Mohsin ul Mulk, and the Viceroy, Lord Minto. The Viceroy emphasized that Muslim political activities should aim at achieving community representation for Muslims in order to combat the political power of the Hindus; the Viceroy further pointed out that the British had high hopes for the loyalty of the Aligarh group.<sup>9</sup>

The British policy of opposing the Hindu and Muslim communities finally found a formal expression in the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which brought about separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims.

### **The Emergence of the Muslim League**

The efforts of the Muslim landlords and Muslim commercial interests to form a separate Muslim political party intensified in an environment characterized by the Congress' mass campaign for self-rule. This was increasingly couched in Hindu mythological images, thereby generating a growing concern among the bourgeoisie, landlords and middle class elements of the Muslim community.

The first specific proposal for a Muslim political association was made by Nawab Salimullah of Dacca. He argued that such an association should support the British administration, combat the mounting influence of the Congress and protect Muslim communal interests." The essentials of Salimullah's proposals were accepted at a subsequent Dacca Conference of Muslim leaders, chaired by the well-known Aligarh figure, Viqar ul Mulk. This conference named the new organisation the All India Muslim League.

The first conference of the All-India Muslim League opened in Karachi on 29 December 1907. The founding fathers of the Muslim League belonged to the Muslim groups of landlords and intellectuals from the Central and the United Provinces, Bengal and the Punjab. The most influential group among these founding fathers was the Aligarh group. These were intellectual nawabs from established families who had begun their careers in the ICS (Indian Civil Service) in the UP, later supported Syed Ahmed's Education Movement and finally devoted

themselves to the Aligarh College. Included in the founders of the Muslim League were a few Muslim manufacturers, the most notable being Adamjee Pirbhai. The Aga Khan (elected the first president of the league), apart from being head of the Ismaili community, was closely connected to the Muslim manufacturers of Bombay. The resolution in the Dacca Conference where the Muslim League was born defined the following goals:

- 1) To promote among the Mussalmans of India feelings of loyalty to the British Government and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of the government with regard to its measures.
- 2) To project and advance the political rights and interests of the Mussalmans of India and to respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the government.
- 3) To prevent the rise among the Mussalmans of India of any feeling of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other afore-mentioned objects of the League.<sup>11</sup>

Those few industrialists who had joined the Muslim League, while wanting to use the pressure of the League to win concessions from the British, also wanted the freedom to conduct business with the Hindu and Parsi communities. These Muslim industrialists put pressure on the predominantly landlord leadership of the League to adopt a less antagonistic attitude towards the Congress. It was this influence of the industrialists that resulted in the League adopting the third point of non-hostility towards other communities.

In 1908-10 the Muslim League established its main provincial bodies. These were headed by big landlords and conservative Muslim intellectuals closely associated with the landed elite. Thus, for example, the Punjab League was led by Shah Din and Mian Mohammad Shafi; the East Bengal branch was headed by Nazimuddin and Nawab Salimullah. The Muslim League leader from the United Provinces was Rajah Naushad Ali Khan (the biggest landlord of the region), and in south India the Nizam of Hyderabad and other princes and landlords headed the League. Only in Bombay, Bihar and Madras was League leadership in the hands of members of the bourgeoisie.

By the eve of the First World War, big Muslim merchants had begun to invest in industry. This generated a new dialectic of unity and rivalry, between the Hindu and Muslim fractions of the Indian bourgeoisie: on the one hand, the developing Muslim industrial bourgeoisie had an interest in strengthening and uniting the struggle of the Indian bourgeoisie against the colonial regime, and, on the other, as the Muslim commercial interests entered the domain of industry, their contention with the established Hindu industrialists intensified.

Jinnah grasped this dialectic before any of the other League leaders and called for a united action by the Congress and the League for a

constitutional struggle for self-rule. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was a well-known Bombay lawyer. Gifted with an incisive intellect and fierce personal integrity, he was to emerge later as the Quaid-e-Azam –the charismatic leader of the Muslim community. With his vigorous constitutionalist approach to issues and liberal ideas, Jinnah was in his early political career ideally suited as the champion of Hindu-Muslim unity. During the period of the First World War, Jinnah, while still a member of the Congress, rose to become an influential leader of the Muslim League. Both the League and the Congress accepted his idea for a joint session of the two parties in Bombay in December 1915. During this session, while urging rapprochement with the Congress, Jinnah also proposed that the agreement provide for the principle of special Muslim representation in the legislative bodies. The latter device was used to incorporate within the agreement the tendency of rivalry with the Hindus that prevailed among the Muslim bourgeoisie and rising middle class.

These efforts bore fruit in the Luck now Pact of 1916, which was endorsed by the League and the Congress at their respective sessions. The pact envisaged that the two parties would jointly struggle to establish self-government bodies by direct elections on the territorial principle, while retaining the system of separate representation for about ten years.

Between 1916 and 1920 there was a limited degree of co-operation between the Congress and the Muslim League. However, strains began to appear when during 1918-20 anti-British Muslim '*ulama*' mobilized Muslim masses for the *Khilafat* Movement and Congress declared support for it. Jinnah and his group in the League disapproved of the *Khilafat* Movement on constitutional grounds. Matters came to a head when at the end of 1920 the Congress launched a mass civil disobedience movement, and Jinnah attacked the decision on tactical grounds. He

stated in a letter to Mahatma Gandhi that he would not support it, because the movement put the masses in motion and thus would lead to chaos: 'What the consequences of this may be, I shudder to contemplate.'<sup>2</sup> At the 1921 session of the Muslim League in Calcutta, Jinnah argued that Gandhi's way was the wrong way. 'Mine is the right way', he declared. 'The constitutional way is the right way. ' The opposing positions adopted by Gandhi and Jinnah on the issue of the civil disobedience movement partly reflected the opposing political styles of the two leaders: Gandhi's flamboyant politics of the street as opposed to Jinnah's constitutional style of the legislative assembly. In any case, following disagreement on the civil disobedience movement, Jinnah resigned from the Congress in 1921, and the lukewarm Congress-League cooperation begun with the Luck now Pact in 1916 suffered a serious setback. While the civil disobedience movement was in progress, the Moplah revolt broke out in 1921. This was essentially an uprising by the poor peasantry of Malabar against the landlords. However, since the peasants were mainly Muslims and the landlords mostly Hindus, the British press publicized it as a communal Hindu-Muslim war.

The British interpretation was questionable, since in many places poor Hindus joined the revolt. Kunna Ahmed Haji, a peasant chief, wrote to the Madras daily *The Hindu* rebutting charges of communalism and accusing the government of attacking Hindu temples to induce discord between the communities. The rebellion was crushed by the army, resulting in the killing of over 2,000 peasants. 13 Neither the Congress nor the League raised a voice in support of the peasants when they were being massacred by the British.

During the period 1923-27 the frequency of communal riots between Hindus and Muslims increased alarmingly, resulting in 450 dead and thousands injured. To reduce the mounting communal tension, Gandhi and Muslim nationalists like Abul Kalam Azad initiated a move for a new 'national pact' between the Congress and the Muslim League. Jinnah and the League responded favorably.

In March 1927 at Delhi, there was a meeting of Muslim intellectuals who favored a united movement for home rule by the Congress and Muslim League. During this meeting a press statement was issued by the Muslim intellectuals declaring that the principle of general elections to central and provincial legislative bodies (as advocated by the Congress) was acceptable on the following conditions: 1) the establishment of Sind as a separate province; 2) provincial self-government for NWFP and Baluchistan on an equal footing with other provinces; 3) seats for Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal provincial legislative bodies in proportion to the Muslim population of these provinces; and 4) not less than one-third of the seats for Muslims in the central legislatures.

This document, which became famous as the Delhi Manifesto, was drawn up by Jinnah and Maulana Mohammad Ali and was the basis of a new, albeit transient, understanding between the Muslim League and the Congress. The League declared that it was prepared to disown the separate representation system on the terms set out in the manifesto, a position it was to maintain until 1937. This was an important concession. The Congress in its Madras session the same year also declared approval of the Delhi Manifesto and called for an all-parties conference to devise a new constitution.

These events appeared to indicate that a favorable situation for Hindu-Muslim unity had arisen. Yet communal conflicts soon expressed themselves in the relations between the Congress and the League, as indicated earlier. The Congress, in spite of its secular ideology, was susceptible to Hindu communal influence in its political language and its choices. The political position adopted by the Congress at the All-Parties Conference was an important illustration of this fact. Under pressure from the right-wing Hindu religious party called the *Hindu Mahasabha*, the Congress leadership in violation of its earlier stand rejected the basic points of the Delhi Manifesto. Jinnah urged that the basic demands of the Delhi Manifesto be worked into the constitution being devised at the All-Parties Conference. However, his appeals were turned down by the All-Parties Conference in both Lucknow (June 1928) and Calcutta (December 1928). Thoroughly disillusioned by the Congress,

Jinnah declared after the abortive Calcutta conference: 'This is the parting of the ways.'<sup>14</sup> History proved him right.

After the failure of the attempts at League-Congress cooperation in 1928, and with the onset of the world economic crisis (1929-33), the prospects of growth of the Muslim bourgeoisie in alliance with the Indian national bourgeoisie were severely constricted. There was a growing awareness among the leaders of the Muslim League that its political future lay across classes with all Muslims. This required an ambitious political programme with a broad-based appeal. The first step towards this objective was the formulation of Jinnah's fourteen points, after the All-Parties Muslim Conference in Delhi in January 1929. The crucial feature of these fourteen points (later submitted to the Round Table Conference in 1930) was the recognition of the regional diversity of India and the need for provincial autonomy. Jinnah demanded a federal constitution with residuary powers vested in the provinces and a uniform measure of autonomy for all provinces. Jinnah also demanded guarantees for the free development of the various national languages and the freedom of religion. The most important of the points affecting the interests of Muslims were as follows:

- 1) The reservation of not less than one-third of the seats in the central and provincial cabinets for Muslims;
- 2) Granting Muslims an adequate share along with other Indians in all the services of the state and local self-governing bodies;
- 3) Solution of communal questions to be subject to an affirmative vote of three fourths of the community concerned;
- 4) Establishment of Sind province, which was to be separated from the Bombay presidency;
- 5) Legislative bodies for NWFP and Baluchistan.

Jinnah's fourteen points won the support of almost all the Muslim political groups, including those which had taken part in the civil disobedience campaign. This constituted the first step in enlarging the support of the Muslim League among all Muslims. When the British government announced the Communal Award and the fundamentals of the new constitution, the Muslim League initially supported it. However, by the time the Government of India Act was published in 1935 the campaign of the Congress against the new constitution had gained wide popularity among the masses, including many Muslim peasants. Jinnah had the sagacity to recognise that continued support for the constitution would preclude the possibility of the Muslim League gaining a mass following among the Muslims. Accordingly, in its April 1936 session at Bombay, the Muslim League reversed its earlier position and refused to approve the constitution of

1935. This was a turning' point in the history of the Muslim League, for it represented a recognition by the Muslim League leadership of the need to gain the support of broad sections of the Muslims of India.

The results of the 1937 elections showed that the Indian National Congress had emerged as an all-India organisation, capturing 716 out of 1585 seats and qualifying to form ministries in six provinces.<sup>15</sup> At the same time the Congress claim that as a secular party it represented all communities was not borne out by the election results. For the Congress failed to get a significant percentage of the Muslim vote -having won only 26 out of a total 482 seats reserved for Muslims (i.e. 5.4% ). While the Muslim League made a stronger showing compared to the Congress in the Muslim reserved seats -winning 109 seats out of 482 (i.e. 23% ) - it could not claim on the basis of 23% of the Muslim reserved seats to be the representative of Indian Muslims.<sup>11</sup> What was perhaps even more worrying for the Muslim League was that it was weakest in the Muslim majority provinces. For example, the League won only two seats in the Punjab (compared to the Unionists, who won 101 out of 167 provincial assembly seats); in Sind and NWFP the Muslim League could not win even a single seat.

The results of the 1937 elections brought home an important lesson to the Muslim elite which led the League: if the Muslim League were to negotiate with the British as a representative of Indian Muslims, then an effective party organisation in at least the Muslim majority areas was of crucial importance. Equally important was the need to articulate a new political programme and new slogans which could mobilize the emotional charge of broad sections of the Muslim masses. Soon after the elections the Muslim League, in its October 1937 session at Lucknow, adopted a new constitution. The basis of this new constitution was the 'Two-Nation' Theory and the demand for autonomy of Muslim majority provinces within a fully independent Indian federation. The new constitution catered to poorer sections of Indian Muslims by opening its membership to all Muslims regardless of class, reducing its membership fee to a nominal two annas per month and envisaging a reduction in rent, relief from usury and a guaranteed minimum wage for workers.

The demand for the autonomy of the 'Muslim nation' was accompanied by campaigning for specifically Muslim chambers of commerce, industry and similar organizations in the agriculture sector. The Muslim League campaign of focussing politics along the communal principle found expression in the first session of the Sind branch of the Muslim League. At this session (presided over by Jinnah) there was a demand for the division of India into a federation of Hindu and Muslim states. The new constitution contributed to the increased influence of the Muslim League among the Muslims of India. Another factor enhancing support for the League among Muslims was the deterioration of Hindu- Muslim relations as the result of the mode of operation of the Congress

provincial ministries. The Congress ministries, while ignoring the demands of Muslims, claimed to represent the interests of Muslims as well as Hindus. It therefore recognised only Muslim members of Congress as representative of the Muslims. What outraged the religious feelings of the Muslims was that whereas legislation passed in provinces where Congress governments were in power permitted songs and dances in front of mosques, killing cows, which was against the religious beliefs of Hindus, was made a criminal offence. The suspicion among Muslims that the Congress had a Hindu communal orientation was given further weight by the fact that *Bande Matram*, a patriotic hymn expressed in Hindu images, was declared the national anthem. The Congress stand on the language issue also incensed many Muslim intellectuals. Hindi was made compulsory in schools while the Congress refused to introduce the Urdu language and Arabic and Persian literature even in regions where the traditional Muslim community regarded these as the basis of Muslim education.

This susceptibility of the Congress to Hindu communal influence, together with the appeal to Muslim communalist sentiment by the political campaign of the League, intensified the polarisation between the Hindu and Muslim communities. By the time of the Second World War, the earlier demand of Muslim leaders for autonomy of Muslim majority provinces within an Indian federation began to be replaced by the demand for secession of these provinces. The Working Committee of the Muslim League, in the session of 17 -18 September 1938, rejected the federal objective on grounds that such a federation would 'necessarily result in a majority community rule' and argued that this was totally unacceptable in a country 'which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state'.<sup>17</sup>

In December 1939 with the resignation of Congress ministries in NWFP, Sind and Assam, followed by anti-Congress riots in many provinces, communal passions rose to a new pitch. As the momentum of communal conflict built up, the Muslim League at its Lahore session on 20-23 March 1940 made a historic declaration. It was proclaimed that the Indian Muslims sought the division of India on religious principles and the establishment of a Muslim state called Pakistan.<sup>18</sup> Subsequently, between 1940 and 1946, the Muslim League in its negotiations with the Congress and the British authorities kept open the option of a number of solutions short of the outright partition of India. However, by 1946 all other options were closed, and Pakistan came into being as an independent state on 14 August 1947.

As Imran Ali in a well-documented paper on the decade 1937-47 has argued, the growth of mass popularity of the League in this period was associated with the growth of tension between the Hindu and Muslim communities. However, on the regional level, , ...the role of non communal factors such as class, the existing power structure. ..and internecine rivalries can by no means be discounted'.<sup>19</sup> In the Punjab,

The emergence of the League as a major political force involved not only an exercise in the use of popular politics, but also an accommodation with the Punjab National Unionist Party -the party of the big feudal landlords of the Punjab. An important factor in the victory of the Muslim League in the 1946 election was that by then, through a combination of intimidation and conciliation, the Muslim League had won over from the Unionist Party the most powerful of the Muslim feudal landlords of the Punjab.<sup>20</sup> In the vital months that followed the 1946 election up to August 1947, the Muslim League and the Pakistan Movement were controlled mainly by the Punjabi feudal elite.<sup>21</sup> This phenomenon led to the dominance of Pakistan's power structure by the landlords of the Punjab during the post-Partition era.

It has been seen that the vicissitudes of Jinnah's attempts at achieving Hindu-Muslim unity (1909-28) expressed the contradictions of an emerging Muslim bourgeoisie, which was competing for a market against an established Hindu bourgeoisie. These contradictions became antagonistic because they occurred in a situation where the economic space for both was severely restricted by the economic structure of a colonial regime and the predominance of metropolitan capital. What gave these economic contradictions between two fractions of an embryonic class an explosive political potential was a deep-rooted tension between the Hindu and Muslim communities, which had ebbed and flowed with the rise and fall of the Mughul empire. The process of the development of state structures and ruling ideologies in India had not succeeded in creating the institutions within which diverse communities of the subcontinent could evolve a fundamentally unified identity.

### **The Military-Bureaucratic Oligarchy**

The predominant position of the bureaucracy and the army in the structure of state power in the newly formed country was due to the form of the freedom struggle on the one hand and the nature of the Muslim League on the other. Since the freedom struggle was essentially a constitutional one, the state apparatus of the colonial regime remained largely intact at the time of independence. The bureaucracy and the army, which constituted the 'steel frame' of the raj, continued after the emergence of Pakistan to determine the parameters within which political and economic changes were to occur. The predominance of the bureaucracy and military in the exercise of state power in Pakistan was also due to the fact that, unlike the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League was more a movement than a political party. During the Pakistan Movement, it had not been able to institutionalize its popular support in terms of a stable party structure, a manifesto based on mass support for the solution of Pakistan's economic and political problems and a political culture which could ensure the primacy of representative political governments in the structure of state power. The dominance of the

Muslim League by retrogressive landlords had further undermined the ability to create, in the new country, a political framework within which popular aspirations could be realised.<sup>22</sup>

At the time of independence, the principle protagonists in the exercise of state power were the bureaucracy, the military, the big landlords and the nascent bourgeoisie. Hamza Alavi in a seminal paper has argued that because of colonial development the institutions of the army and the bureaucracy are 'overdeveloped' relative to the ruling classes (the landlords and the bourgeoisie),<sup>23</sup> Accordingly, the military-bureaucratic

oligarchy has 'relative autonomy' within the state and is able to intervene and mediate whenever the rivalry between the ruling classes becomes so intense that it threatens the framework within which rivalry is conducted. Having restored the framework within which the ruling classes pursue their interests, Alavi suggests that the military-bureaucratic oligarchy withdraws from the conduct of political affairs.

Alavi's characterization of the function of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy may have been relevant during the 1950s and 1960s, but it would need to be modified in order to explain the contemporary crisis of the state. The reason is that important changes have occurred since the 1960s within the military-bureaucratic oligarchy and in its relationship with civil society.

The military-bureaucratic oligarchy in Pakistan was never a static monolith but an institution whose internal social composition and relationship to society were subject to change in the process of economic and social development. Thus in the immediate post-independence period the officers were predominantly from the landowning class with an ideology derived essentially from the British military traditions. Attitudes of professionalism and the need to insulate the armed forces from the daily conduct of civil affairs prevailed. However, during the mid- 1960s and 1970s the social origin of the officer corps shifted towards the petite bourgeoisie in the urban areas and in the countryside. This shift in the class origins of the officer corps was accompanied by increasing ideological factionalism in terms of a fundamentalist religious ethos on the one hand and a liberal left-wing ethos on the other.<sup>24</sup> The tendency towards the emergence of opposing political perspectives within the officer corps was reinforced by two important developments. First, the right-wing Jama'at-i-Islami systematically sent its sympathizers and many of its cadres to seek commissions in the armed forces; second, the radical nationalist rhetoric of former Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto and the rapid promotion of officers who appeared committed to his regime also influenced the officer corps.

The most important consequence of the opposing ideological trends within the military was its politicization as an institution and thus the erosion of its 'relative autonomy'. To the extent that the military was politicized by opposing political forces operating outside it, the ability of the 'military-bureaucratic oligarchy' to 'mediate' between these opposing

political forces was undermined. Moreover the task of mediation was also made increasingly difficult as the regional question gained importance of Pakistan, and the military began to be seen as the representative of the interests of the ruling elite of the Punjab by the people of the other provinces of Pakistan. It is in the context of the change in the social composition of the armed forces and its increasing penetration by political forces operating in the country that Alavi's theory of the 'relative autonomy of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy' needs to be modified. In any case, the issue of whether this institution was ever 'relatively autonomous' also merits re-examination. Even if the military-bureau- critic oligarchy was 'relatively autonomous' during the 1950s vis-a-vis the indigenous ruling classes, it could be argued that it was never autonomous (even relatively) vis-a-vis the interests of metropolitan capital.

In Pakistan, the military and the bureaucracy assumed control of state power soon after independence. Such dominance of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy was derived from the structure of state power itself; moreover, political institutions and the forms of mobilizing political power were not developed enough to ensure the dominance of the popular will. In contrast to the political institutions, the military-bureaucratic oligarchy which Pakistan inherited from the colonial state was highly developed, and after independence it began to reign supreme.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor-General of Pakistan, was a man with a towering personality and a democratic vision. However, at the dawn of independence he was too ill to wield effective control over the state. He was therefore unable to establish an institutional framework through which the military and the bureaucracy could be subordinated to the political process. He was a sick man during most of the first year of Pakistan and died in September 1948.

Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, Jinnah's trusted assistant, lacked the initiative and imagination to control the affairs of state effectively after Jinnah's death. The provincial assemblies were elected on the basis of a limited franchise extended to only 15% of the populace. Consequently, members of these assemblies and the cabinets which they elected were aware of their isolation from the masses. They therefore willingly became instruments of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. This comes out clearly in the events of 1953. In April 1953, the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad, who was an old bureaucrat, dismissed the Nazimuddin government even though the Constituent Assembly had given it a vote of confidence. Soon after the dismissal of the Nazimuddin government by the Governor-General, the Constituent Assembly met again and passed another vote of confidence -this time in favour of the new prime minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, who had been nominated to that office by the Governor-General. Not only did the Governor-General appoint a new prime minister, but he also nominated ministers and assigned them their respective portfolios. Thus, state power effectively passed into the hands of the Governor-General. The function of the Constituent

Assembly was reduced merely to rubber-stamping the actions of the Governor-General and the military-bureaucratic oligarchy whom he represented. Over the years there have been some shifts in the relative power exercised by each partner, but what has remained is the complementarity between these partners in the military-bureaucratic oligarchy.<sup>25</sup>

### **The Sociology of the Officer Corps**

Indian officers in the British Indian Army were recruited from the landowning class, though not necessarily from the aristocracy. As MacMunn suggests, 'the staunch old Indian yeoman who came into the Indian commissioned ranks via the rank and file of the Indian landowner of lesser class made the Indian officer as we know him'.<sup>26</sup>

In the post-Partition period in Pakistan, two factors have further integrated the officer corps into the propertied class: 1) since the Ayub era, the policy of giving land grants to senior army officers has created a landed elite among even those officers who did not come from large landowning families. This phenomenon has continued to this date, with the addition that now many officers are being granted land in urban estates; and 2) Many army officers have been provided with opportunities of joining the trading or industrial elite. A number of officers were given prestigious places on boards of companies after retirement, while for others contracts and credits were arranged to help set up prosperous firms. Since 1977, this tendency has appreciably intensified. The appointment of army officers as chairmen of many public corporations in the nationalized sector as well as WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) and the NLC (National Logistics Cell) has increased the military's ability to grant lucrative contracts to officers operating private firms in trade and industry. Thus, an influential section of the army establishment is now closely integrated with the landed and business classes of Pakistan.

According to Stephen Phillips Cohen, there have been three distinct generations in the Pakistan officer corps:<sup>27</sup> 1) the 'British' generation: pre-1947; 2) the 'American' generation: 1953-65; and 3) the Pakistani generation: 1965 to date. It must be emphasized that each generation absorbed some of the characteristics it inherited from the earlier generation, through the culture embodied in the process of training, promotion and daily social life of the officer. The British-trained officers who entered the Pakistan Army at the time of Partition consisted of three distinct groups, but all three had served during the 1939-45 war. Two of these groups had entered the British Indian Army during peace time and received their training either at Sandhurst (e.g. Ayub Khan) or at the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun (e.g. Mohammad Musa). The third group of officers (the Indian Emergency Commissioned Officers)

joined the British Indian Army during the Second World War (e.g. Mohammad Zia ul Hag). All the prewar officers have now retired, and only a few who entered during the Second World War remain in the Pakistan Army today. However, the older officers left a permanent impact on the culture and attitude of the officer corps, for they had organized the main training and educational establishments after Partition and served as a model for the younger officers.

Officers who joined the British Indian Army on regular commissions before World War II were carefully selected from prestigious or upper-class families. A few were included from the ranks and were generally the sons of JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers) who had distinguished themselves in service. However, the same rigorous criteria of selection did not apply to officers who had joined during the war through the Emergency Commissioned Officers' scheme. The official British analysis regarding such officers was that they were on the whole inferior to both regular Indian Commissioned Officers and their British Emergency Commissioned Officer equivalents.<sup>28</sup>

Apart from the differing professional and attitudinal characteristics of the officers who originated in the British Indian Army, there was another important sociological characteristic. About 12% of the Muslim officers in the British Indian Army were not from areas that later constituted Pakistan. Many Muslim officers from Delhi, UP (United Provinces), Eastern Punjab and Central Provinces constituted an important section of the senior ranks of the Pakistan army until recently. The sons of these officers constitute an important fraction of the current officer corps. These officers exercised the option of migrating from their hometowns in India and are especially charged with a sense of communal feeling against the Hindus and a sense of mission about living in an Islamic state. For example, one of the most senior officers of the Pakistan Army stated in an interview with Cohen:

I am a pure Rajput; my family has been Muslim for only two or three generations. But I felt that India had to be divided, and told Messervey (the first Commander of the Pakistan Army) that I would rather live in a small country as a free man than as a sweeper in a large country. ..I did not want to see my children serve under Hindus.<sup>29</sup>

Another senior officer who was a lieutenant colonel in 1946, and who also chose to leave his home for Pakistan, saw the new state as an opportunity to build a society according to Islamic values:

I basically belong to India, Lucknow; all the people who belong to this part of the world (Pakistan), they came here automatically. We had the choice or option: but I think more than anything else it was a desire to have a homeland of your own where you could model it according to your own ideology, your own genius.<sup>30</sup>

With the establishment of Pakistan's military relationship with the US in 1953, extensive changes took place in the Pakistan military establishment at the level of organisation and training. But perhaps even more important was the Americanisation of the ethos of the officer corps. This occurred essentially as the result of two aspects of the American military aid programme. 1) Hundreds of Pakistan Army officers were sent to the US for specialised training; the mental attitudes that were inculcated during this period and the ideological perspective adopted were then diffused within the officer corps on their return. 2) An extensive motivation programme was mounted by US Army personnel in Pakistan; this was done by creating a separate cell in the Inter-Services Directorate and involved systematic indoctrination of the Pakistan officer corps.

Evidence of the extensive organizational changes and of the Americanisation of the Pakistan Army's ethos is provided by a close associate of former President Ayub Khan:

The changes brought about in this army -few other armies went through such extensive tremendous changes. The field formations, the schools, the centres and even GHQ -everything was changed. The Americans affected everything- the scales were completely different, hundreds of our officers went to America, and we had new standards of comparison.<sup>31</sup>

The profound effect which the training of Pakistan army officers of the US had on their minds can be judged by the views of a young Pakistani colonel who was trained with the US Special Forces:

...We were friends. I made many friends in the U.S. Didn't you know we were the best friends and allies you had in the area, the only dependable one? Why don't you realize that? Our two countries are so much alike, we think alike, we like the same things. ...there could be a new alliance to hold back the Russians.<sup>32</sup>

Perhaps the most effective penetration by US Army personnel at the ideological level was done by means of the motivation programme conducted by a special cell in the Inter-Services Public Relations Directorate:

The USIS extended its operations in Pakistan under the so called Motivation (later Troop Information) Program. A separate cell was created in the (Pakistan) Inter-Services P .R. Directorate to handle the collection and distribution of American journals, books and films throughout the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force. The so-called Motivation Program was an elevation of normal P.R. to a higher sphere of intellectual education and indoctrination. It formed an integral part of the entire military aid program.<sup>33</sup> This infiltration of the ideological and institutional structure of the Pakistan military establishment by US military personnel reached a stage

where the very national image of the armed forces was affected:

The American military presence somewhat compromised the purely national image of the armed forces. ..It seemed as if there were two military establishments in one country: one national, the other foreign.<sup>34</sup>

The foregoing analysis has indicated that close organizational and ideological links between the Pakistan and US military establishments developed during the period 1953-65. Thus, in the very period in which the military-bureaucratic oligarchy could be regarded as being 'relatively autonomous' from the domestic ruling classes, we find that it had close structural connections with the institutions of metropolitan capital.

The important characteristics of officers who have joined the Pakistan Army in the last fifteen years are as follows: 1) they are drawn much more from the middle classes than the landowning classes as in earlier years; and 2) they have been subjected the least to direct foreign professional influence and are the products of the purely domestic educational system. Many such officers who joined in about 1971 are now majors or colonels. As Eqbal Ahmed has suggested, this generation of officers with petit bourgeois social origins and a purely indigenous specialization is highly susceptible to the fascist ideology of the Jama'at-i-Islami.<sup>35</sup> This tendency may be further reinforced by two factors: 1) the active attempt made by the Jama'at-i-Islami to penetrate the officer corps with its own trained cadres on the one hand and to distribute its literature in the military establishment on the other; and 2) the new programme of sending combat officers to universities in Pakistan has subjected many officers to more systematic indoctrination by the Jamaat, which dominates some of the important universities of the country.

### **Politicisation of the Military**

During the period after 1971 not only was the officer corps subjected to the indoctrination of the Jama'at-i-Islami but officers were also exposed to the populist rhetoric of the Pakistan People's Party. Many young officers with a social conscience who were worried about the economic deprivation of the masses and the crisis of the state saw in Bhutto the harbinger of a strong new Pakistan. The nationalization of some big industries, the melodramatic handcuffing of some of the biggest industrialists, and the radical rhetoric against feudalism had an impact on not only the middle peasants and urban professional classes but also the new generation of army officers who originated from these classes. That the army top brass itself is aware and concerned about the influence of the Bhutto phenomenon on the minds of army officers is indicated by a 'prayer' issued to all units by General Headquarters, Military Intelligence

Directorate, Rawalpindi in 1978-9: 'God will provide men to the army who have strong minds, great hearts, true faith, and ready hands. ... There is an implicit reference to the just-executed Prime Minister Bhutto: men who can stand before a demagogue and damn his treacherous flatteries without winking.

It appears that perhaps the fundamental feature of the 'Pakistani generation' of officers is that they were politicized from both the left and the right wing of the political forces in civil society. This suggests that underlying the strict discipline there may be potential or actual factionalism among the officers, which may manifest itself if the armed forces as an institution are used to crush a popular political movement in Pakistan.

To the extent that politicization of the officer corps has occurred, the military may have lost the 'relative autonomy', which Alavi regards as the basis of its ability to mediate between opposing political forces. In fact it can be argued that the Politicisation of the army and the erosion of its ability to mediate between opposing political forces are apparent from the nature of Pakistan's military regime. It has three characteristics which provide evidence for our argument: 1) the fact that the military regime is not using a politically neutral ideology (as was the Ayub regime) but is using a particular form of religious ideology that is explicitly linked with the political position of a particular political party ( the Jama'at-i-Islami) ; 2) the thinly veiled support of the regime for the Jama'at-i-Islami and, more importantly, the provision of access to the political apparatus of the lama' at into various institutions of the government; and 3) the failure of the military regime to constitute a convincing civilian facade behind which it can retreat, as in the case of the Ayub regime.

These three characteristics of the regime suggest that this military regime is organically linked with particular political forces. Therefore the military cannot now be regarded as having political 'neutrality' and relative autonomy on the basis of which it is supposed to mediate between opposing political forces to re-establish civilian rule.

Apart from the current erosion of its 'relative autonomy', it is important to consider its nature even in the 1950s, when the military-bureaucratic oligarchy was much less politicized. It was precisely in that period that the military-bureaucratic oligarchy in Pakistan developed close organizational and ideological links with the US military establishment. Therefore, in dealing with the issue of 'relative autonomy', a distinction should be made between the domestic ruling classes and the metropolitan ruling classes. Even in the period when the Pakistan military-bureaucratic oligarchy could be said to be 'relatively autonomous' with respect to the domestic ruling classes, it was nevertheless integrally connected with the institution of metropolitan capital. Such a formulation would enable us to grasp that the framework within which the military-bureaucratic oligarchy mediated the conflicts between the domestic ruling classes, was conditioned by the long-term interests of metropolitan capital.

### **Contradictions and the Nature of Economic Growth**

The ruling classes at the dawn of independence consisted of an alliance between the landlords and nascent industrial bourgeoisie backed by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. The nature of the ruling elite conditioned the form of the economic growth process. However, the latter process itself generated powerful contradictions that in turn influenced the form in which state power was exercised. To comprehend the factors that have led to the recent crisis of the state in Pakistan, it is necessary to examine the principal elements of the growth strategy that was devised by the capitalist-landlord elite. It will also be necessary to analyse the consequences of the growth process in terms of the major contradictions it generated and the conditions for the emergence of the Pakistan People's Party. The changing class composition of the PPP after it came to power as well as the economic and social conditions underlying the anti-PPP movement also require close examination.

The basic objective of the planning strategy during the decade of the 1960s was to achieve a high growth rate of gross national product (GNP) within the framework of private enterprise. The investment targets were to be achieved on the basis of the doctrine of 'functional inequality'. This meant deliberately transferring income from the poorer sections of society, who were thought to have a low marginal rate of savings, to the high income groups, who were expected to have a high marginal rate of savings.<sup>36</sup> It was thought that by thus concentrating income in the hands of the rich, the total domestic savings, and hence the level of investment, could be raised.<sup>37</sup> It was argued that in the initial period, when domestic savings would be low, the gap between the target level of investment and actual domestic savings would be filled by a large inflow of foreign aid. It was thought that as growth proceeded and income was transferred from the poor to the rich, domestic savings would rise, until by the end of the Perspective Plan in 1985, the country would become independent of foreign aid.<sup>38</sup>

During the decade of the 1960s, the above strategy was put into practice, and at a superficial level at least, in terms of its growth targets, it was successful. For example, the growth rate of GNP was 5.5% per annum; manufacturing output increased by an average annual rate of about 8% , with large-scale manufacturing increasing at over 10% per annum. The elite farmer strategy of concentrating new agricultural inputs in the hands of rich farmers also bore fruit by generating a growth rate in agricultural output of 3.2% per annum (compared to less than 1.5% in the previous decade). However, this impressive performance in terms of aggregate growth rates was accompanied by an economy which became structurally and financially so dependent on the advanced capitalist countries that the very sovereignty of the state began to be undermined. Apart from this, the nature of the growth process generated such acute inequalities between regions that the internal cohesion of society began to be seriously eroded.

The particular growth process in Pakistan generated four fundamental contradictions: 1) a dependent economic structure and the resultant high degree of dependence on foreign aid; 2) an acute concentration of economic power in the hands of 43 families and the resultant gulf between the rich and the poor in urban areas; 3) a growing economic disparity between regions; and 4) a polarisation of classes in the rural sector and a rapid increase in landlessness.

Underlying the apparently impressive figures of the growth of manufactured output (10% per annum in the large-scale manufacturing sector) was an inefficient and lopsided industrial structure. Growth was concentrated not in heavy industries which could import self-reliance to the economy but rather in consumer goods produced with imported machines. Thus, by 1970-71, cotton textiles alone accounted for as much as 48% of value-added in industry, while basic industries such as basic metals and electrical and transport equipment accounted for only 21% of the value-added in manufacturing in Pakistan. Not only was growth concentrated in consumer goods industries, but also the efficiency of these industries was very low. This was due to the high degree of protection and support given by the government in the form of high import tariffs, an overvalued exchange rate, tax holidays and provision of cheap credit.<sup>39</sup> Industrialists could thus earn annual profits of 50% to 100% or more and were under no pressure to increase efficiency. Apart from this, export subsidies enabled manufacturers to export goods at an extremely high rupee cost per dollar earned. In some cases, goods were profitably exported at dollar prices which were less than the dollar value of the raw materials embodied in the goods.<sup>40</sup>

Given the failure to develop a heavy industrial base and the emphasis on import-dependent consumer goods industries, the structure of Pakistan's industry induced increasing dependence on imported inputs. At the same time the failure to increase domestic savings pushed the economy further into dependence on foreign aid. The policy of distributing income in favour of the industrialists succeeded, but the assumption that this would raise domestic savings over time failed to materialize. Griffin points out, for example, that 15% of the resources annually generated in the rural sector were transferred to the urban industrialists, and 63% to 85% of these transferred resources went into increased urban consumption.<sup>41</sup> Far from raising the domestic savings rate to the target level of 25% of GNP, the actual savings rate never rose above 12% of GNP and in some years was as low as 3% to 4%.<sup>42</sup>

The low domestic savings caused by the failure of capitalists to save out of their increased income resulted during the decade of the 1960s in growing dependence on foreign aid. According to Government of Pakistan figures, foreign aid inflow increased from \$373 million in 1950-55 to \$2701 million in 1965-70.<sup>13</sup> This sevenfold increase in the volume of aid was accompanied by a continuing change in the composition

of aid from grants to loans so that whereas 'grant and grant-type' assistance constituted 73% of total aid received during 1950-55, this type of assistance declined to 9% by 1965- 70. Thus not only had the volume of aid increased dramatically but also the terms on which it was received had become increasingly harder. The result was that debt servicing alone by the end of the 1960s constituted a crippling burden. While debt servicing, as a proportion of export earnings was 4.2% in 1960-61, by 1971-72 it had become 34.5%. Clearly, such a magnitude of export earnings could not be spent on debt servicing if vital food and industrial inputs were to be maintained. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, economic survival began to depend on getting more aid to pay back past debts. This pattern of aid dependence continues to this day. In 1981, for example, 66% of gross aid received was returned as payment for debt servicing charges on past debt; foreign aid financed 37% of gross domestic investment in 1981. What is perhaps even more significant is that the conditionality clauses of 'foreign aid' specify in great detail the economic policy that the government of Pakistan is required to follow.<sup>44</sup> Aid-giving agencies, for example, specify policies from the price of gas and fertilizer to the import policy, from the method of administering the railways to the allocations to be made by the government in each sector of the economy. These increasingly comprehensive macro-economic policy packages accompanying foreign aid seriously erode the sovereignty of Pakistan's economic decision-making.

The process of economic growth upon which Pakistan embarked during the 1960s was designed to concentrate incomes in the hands of the industrial elite on the one hand and the big landowners on the other. It is not surprising therefore that by the end of the 1960s a small group of families with interlocking directorates dominated industry, banking and insurance in Pakistan. Thus 43 families represented 76.8% of all manufacturing assets (including foreign and government assets) .In terms of value added, 46% of the value added in all large-scale manufacturing originated in firms controlled by 43 families.<sup>45</sup>

In banking the degree of concentration was even greater than in industry. For example, seven family banks constituted 91.6% of private domestic deposits and 84.4% of earning assets. Furthermore, there is evidence to show that the family banks tended to favour industrial companies controlled by the same families in the provision of loans. State Bank compilation of balance sheets of listed companies indicates which banks these companies dealt with. In virtually all cases, banks controlled by industrial families were one of the two to four banks that were dealt with by the industries controlled by the same industrial families.<sup>46</sup>

The insurance industry, although smaller in size than banking, also had a high degree of concentration of ownership. The 43 industrial families controlled 75.6% of assets in Pakistani insurance firms. The portfolios of these industrial family-controlled insurance companies tended to favour industrial companies owned by the same group. The insurance company investments were used for providing a ready market for the shares of the

families' industrial companies whenever they wished to sell shares without depressing the share price.<sup>47</sup>

The major industrial families and entrepreneurs were a fairly close-knit group. Not only did many of them have caste and kinship relations, but members of the families tended to sit on each other's boards of directors. About one-third of the seats on the boards of directors of companies controlled by the 43 families were occupied by members of other families within the 43.<sup>48</sup>

Not only were the 43 families dominating industry, insurance and banking, but they also had considerable power over government agencies sanctioning industrial projects. For example PICIC (Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation) was the agency responsible for sanctioning large-scale industrial projects. Out of the 21 directors of PICIC, seven were from the 43 industrial families. It is not surprising then that the 43 leading industrial families were actively involved and influential in the administrative institutions that directly affected their economic interests.

During the process of rapid economic growth of the 1960s while an exclusive and highly monopolistic class was amassing wealth, the majority of Pakistan's population was suffering an absolute decline in its living standards. For example, the per capita consumption of food grain of the poorest 60% of Pakistan's urban population declined from an index of 100 in 1963-64 to 96.1 in 1969-70. The decline was even greater over the same period in the case of the poorest 60% of the rural population. In their case, per capita consumption of food grain declined from an index of 100 in 1963-64 to only 91 in 1969-70.<sup>49</sup> There was an even larger decline in real wages in industry. For example, Griffin suggests that in the decade and a half ending in 1967, real wages in industry declined by 25%.<sup>50</sup> S. M. Naseem, in a more recent study for the ILO, has estimated that in 1971-72 poverty in the rural sector was so acute that 82% of rural households could not afford to provide even 2100 calories per day per family member. (2300 calories a day per head are regarded as the minimum for a healthy active life.)

In an economy where investment takes place on the basis of private profitability alone, there would be a cumulative tendency for investment to be concentrated in the relatively developed regions. Consequently, regional economic disparities would tend to widen over time. This is in fact what happened in the case of Pakistan. The Punjab and Sind provinces, which had relatively more developed infrastructures, attracted a larger proportion of industrial investment than the other provinces. In Sind, however, the growth in income was mainly in Karachi and Hyderabad. Thus economic disparities widened not only between East and West Pakistan, but also between the provinces within West Pakistan. During the 1960s the factor which accelerated the growth of regional income disparities within what is today Pakistan was the differential impact of agricultural growth associated with the so-called 'Green Revolution'.

Since the yield increase associated with the adoption of high-yield varieties of food grain required irrigation, and since the Punjab and Sind had a relatively larger proportion of their area under irrigation, they experienced much faster growth in their incomes, compared to Baluchistan and NWFP.<sup>51</sup>

In a situation where each of the provinces of Pakistan had a distinct culture and language, the systematic growth of regional disparities within the framework of the market mechanism created acute political tensions. Defusing these tensions required a genuinely federal democratic structure with decentralization of political power at the provincial level. Only such a polity and large federal expenditures for the development of underdeveloped regions could ensure the unity of the country. In the absence of such a polity, the growing economic disparities between provinces created explosive political tensions.

The failure to conduct an effective land reform in Pakistan has resulted in a continued concentration of landownership in the hands of a few big landlords.<sup>52</sup> Thus, in 1972, 30% of total farm area was owned by large landowners (owning 150 acres and above). The overall picture of Pakistan's agrarian structure has been that these large landowners have rented out most of their land to small and medium-sized tenants (i.e. tenants operating below 25 acres).<sup>53</sup> In such a situation, when 'Green Revolution' technology became available in the late 1960s, the large landowners found it profitable to resume some of their rented-out land for self-cultivation on large farms using hired labour and capital investment. It is this process of the development of capitalist farming which has generated new and potentially explosive contradictions in Pakistan's rural society. These contradictions have resulted from the highly unequal distribution of landownership.

During the period when high-yield varieties of food grain were being adopted, there was a rapid introduction of tractors. The number of tractors increased from 2000 in 1959 to 18,909 in 1968.<sup>55</sup> By 1975 there were 35, 714 tractors with an additional 76,000 tractors being imported between 1976 to 1981.<sup>56</sup> What is significant is that most of these tractors were large-sized in a country where 60% of the farms are below 25 acres. An important reason why large tractors were introduced was that large landowners, responding to the new profit opportunities, began to resume rented-out land for self-cultivation on large farms. Given the difficulty of mobilizing a large number of labourers during the peak season in an imperfect labour market and supervising labourers to ensure satisfactory performance, the large farmers found it convenient to mechanize even though there is no labour shortage in an absolute sense. Polarisation has occurred in the size distribution of farms, especially in the Punjab; i.e. , the percentage share of large and small farms is increasing, while the percentage share of medium-sized farms ( eight to 25 acres) is declining.<sup>57</sup> This polarisation is essentially the result of large landowners resuming their rented-out land for self-cultivation on large

farms, The land resumption has had the greatest impact on medium-sized tenants.

Along with polarisation in the rural class structure, landlessness has increased as many tenants are evicted following land resumption by big landowners. It has been estimated that during the decade of the 1960s, 794,042 peasants became landless labourers; i.e. 43% of the total agricultural labourers had entered this category following proletarianization of the poor peasantry.<sup>58</sup> Unlike in Europe, where the growth of capitalism in agriculture was associated with the emancipation of the peasantry, in Pakistan the development of capitalist farming has intensified the dependence of the poor peasantry. The reason is that in Pakistan capitalist farming has occurred in a situation where the political and economic power of the landlords is still intact. Consequently, the big landlord is able to control local institutions for the distribution of credit and other inputs. The result is that the poor peasant, in order to buy tubewell water, seeds, fertilizer and pesticides and to market his output, has to depend on the good offices of the landlord. Thus, as the inputs for agricultural production become monetized and insofar as access to the market is via the landlord, the poor peasant's dependence has intensified.

As money costs of inputs increase without a proportionate increase in yield per acre of the poor peasant (due to poor timing and inadequate inputs) his real income is being reduced. Evidence shows that both the quantity and quality of diet of poor peasants have deteriorated.<sup>59</sup>

The particular form that capitalist farming in Pakistan has taken is increasing landlessness, unemployment, class polarisation and poverty. Each of these features has arisen because capitalist farming is occurring in a situation where landownership is highly unequal, and where the feudal power of the landlords is intact and, because of the nature of the prevailing political system, is being further consolidated.

### **Class Composition of the Pakistan People's Party and the State Apparatus.**

The PPP was originally composed of radical elements of the petite bourgeoisie of the Punjab and Sind on the one hand and substantial elements of capitalist farmers on the other. The radical elements of the petite bourgeoisie were dominant in the PPP until 1972. This was evident from the manifesto, which was anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and against monopoly capitalism. The same stratum also played a key role in devising a propaganda machine suited to the manifesto and presenting it as a 'revolutionary' programme, thereby getting the support of the urban workers and poor peasantry.

This radical stratum was, however, drawn from diverse social origins and had differing political objectives, and its members therefore connected themselves to Bhutto in separate groups or fractions. The inability of

Different factions of the petite bourgeoisie to constitute them-selves in to a single loc within the PPP facilitated to the purges that come after 1972.

By 1972 Bhutto had consolidated his power and began to shift the balance of class forces within the PPP in favour of the land group. This shift was not accidental, not was it a personal betrayal of the radicals on Bhutto's part as it was subjectively experienced by the party cadres. Changes in the internal class composition of PPP were objectively determined by the changed position of the PPP in relation to the state. In the pre-election period the dominance of the radical petite bourgeoisie and its radical rhetoric were necessary if the PPP was to get a mass base for an election victory.

After the elections, Bhutto realized that if the socialist rhetoric of the left wing of the PPP was to be implemented, it could not be done through the existing state apparatus. It would involve institutionalizing party links with the working class and the peasantry by building grass-roots organizations. This would soon generate a working-class leadership which would not only threaten his own position within the party but would also unleash a momentum of class conflict that would place the PPP on a collision course with the military and the bureaucracy. Given Bhutto's own commitment to seek social democratic reforms within the framework of the state as constituted at the time, he was unwilling to take a path that would lead to a confrontation with the state apparatus. Consequently the socialist rhetoric of the PPP had to be toned down, its radical petty bourgeois elements quietened or purged from the party, the rudimentary organizational links with the working class and poor peasant broken and the landlord elements of the PPP firmly established as the dominant element within the party.

The decision to purge the radical elements within the PPP and to separate it structurally from its worker-peasant base meant that Bhutto had to rely on the bourgeois state apparatus to respond to the political challenges emanating from three directions: first the intensification of the working class in the Punjab and Sindh; and finally, those parties representing the industrial bourgeoisies.

The strategy of selective repression of the political opposition necessitated changes in the state apparatus so as to make it more effective as a coercive instrument. Bhutto brought about three types of changes. 1) He streamlined and strengthened the internal security services and formed a new para-military organization called the Federal Security Forces, consisting initially of 10,000 men. This was essentially a political police force responsible directly to the Prime Minister. 2) An attempt was made to reduce the power and autonomy of the elite CSP (Central Services of Pakistan) cadre of the bureaucracy. This was done first by purging 1300 officers on grounds of misuse of power and filling their vacancies by pro-officers on ground of misuse of power and filling their vacancies by pro PPP men. Second, a new system of lateral entry was instituted. Through

this, direct appointments at all levels of the administrative services were made on recommendation from the PPP leadership. By thus short-circuiting the hierarchy of the CSP and penetrating it with officers who were loyal to the PPP, large sections of the bureaucracy were politicized and made more amenable for use by the PPP. 3) In the armed forces, Bhutto conducted two purges in quick succession. He first discarded the five top generals who had dominated the government before and during the Bangladesh crisis, and second, he ousted those commanders like Lieutenant-General Gul Hassan Khan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan who had been instrumental in the transfer of power to Bhutto himself. Thus enemies and benefactors alike were removed on grounds that they had Bonapartist tendencies. The new chief of the army staff was Tikka Khan, who was succeeded by Zia ul Haq, whom Bhutto promoted by superseding four other generals in the hope that he would be obliged to be loyal. However, as was realized later, a coup *d'etat* cannot be prevented by simply placing loyal generals in command. What is necessary is to change the very structure of the armed forces and its relationship to the political system. What he had to do to prevent a coup was to subordinate the armed forces as an institution to the political system. This change in the structural position of the armed forces within the state, from a position of dominance to a position of subordination to the political system, could only have been achieved by organizationally linking the PPP to its mass base. This was something that Bhutto was not prepared to do.

While Bhutto in his attempt to use the state apparatus to quell political opposition was internalizing some sections of the state apparatus into his political apparatus, a parallel process of infiltration was being covertly conducted by another political party - the Jama'at-i-Islami.

The Jama'at-i-Islami an extreme right-wing religious party composed of the most retrograde section of the urban petite bourgeoisie. It had suffered a humiliating electoral defeat in 1970, having obtained only 5% of the vote and three National Assembly seats. After this defeat it started concentrating on preparing for a coup by increasing its infiltration of the army and bureaucracy.<sup>60</sup> The Jama'at from its very inception was a semisecret, extreme right-wing organisation of disciplined cadres, some of whom are given combat training. After 1970 it was able to expand its influence over strategic sections of the state apparatus for a number of reasons. 1) The earlier generation of generals in the high command were British-trained, liberal officers, drawn largely from the affluent land-owning class. However, in the 1960s a new generation of officers began to occupy command positions. These were less literate and more religious, drawn largely from the economically depressed migrants from East Punjab (like General Zia ul Haq) and the unirrigated Potwar region of West Punjab. This new generation of officers was socially more conservative than the earlier generation, was brought up in a religious culture and was highly susceptible to the puritanical ideology of the Jama'at.<sup>61</sup> 2)

Similarly, patterns of general recruitment in the army had changed, whereby many of the rank and file as well as the junior officers tended to come not from the prosperous central Punjab, but from the relatively impoverished northern districts of the province, where a fundamentalist religious ethos still prevails.<sup>62</sup> 3) The demoralization of the armed forces following the defeat in Bangladesh had opened the way for an obscurantist ideology. In the absence of ideological work among the ranks by the left, the average soldier turned to the Islamism of the Jama 'at for an explanation both of his failure as well as his future purpose.<sup>63</sup> 4) The Jama'at's propaganda among troops was officially sanctioned by commanding officers at the battalion level and above. General Zia ul Haq, a close relation to Mian Tufail (the chief of the Jama 'at), provided ample protection for secret cells of the Jama 'at inside the armed forces.<sup>64</sup>

It appears that the relative autonomy and internal coherence of the state apparatus has been considerably undermined due to its infiltration by PPP sympathizers on the one hand and by Jama 'at cadres on the other. The consequent factionalizing process within the armed forces and the bureaucracy is an important factor in the nature of the July 1977 coup as well as an explosive element in the present crisis of the state.

#### Socio-Economic Causes of the Anti-Bhutto Movement

The essential political aspect of the nationalization of nine basic industries, banks and insurance companies was that it enabled the PPP to buy the political support of a section of the urban petite bourgeoisie through provision of credit and contracts for consultancy, construction projects and production of components. The nationalization of banks particularly enabled the PPP to strengthen its support among the kulaks by providing them with low-interest loans. For example, in 1975 alone, Rs. 1,650 million were provided to kulaks. In the period 1971-72 to 1975-76, loans from nationalized commercial banks for tractors and tubewells increased by 400% , and loans for other farm needs ( so-called taccavi loans ) increased by 600% .Similarly, government subsidies for chemical fertilizers rose from \$2.5 million to \$60 million during the period 1971 to 1976. The same rapid expansion of rural credit is indicated by loans given by the Agricultural Development Bank:

	1971-72	1975-76
Tractors	Rs. 370.41 million	Rs. 2,200 million
Tubewells	Rs. 180.41 million	Rs. 860.67 million

The nationalization of banks and the subsequent credit expansion for financing loans to industries and capitalist farming led to heavy deficit financing and an increase in the money supply. Thus, notes in circulation increased from Rs. 23,000 million in 1971-72 to Rs. 57,000 million in

1976-77. There was a sharp slowing in the growth rate of both agriculture and industry. Thus, industrial growth fell from an average of 13% per year during the 1960s to only 3% per year during the Bhutto period from 1972 to 1977. Similarly, the agricultural growth rate declined from an average of 5.65% in the 1960s to a mere 0.45% in the period 1970-75.

The sharp increase in the money supply during a period of virtual stagnation in agriculture and industry was reflected in a very sharp rise in the rate of inflation. The wholesale price index at 1959-60 prices rose from 150.3 in 1971-72 to 288.8 by 1974-5, with the sharpest increases being recorded in food grain prices, which rose by 200% over the three-year period. It appears then that, although nationalization of industry and credit expansion enabled the PPP to buy the support of a section of the urban petite bourgeoisie through the provision of jobs, contracts, licenses and loans, the available funds and contracts were not large enough to enrich the entire petite bourgeoisie. In fact a section of the lower middle class that did not gain from the PPP, especially salaried lower-level employees in the government and the private sector, suffered an absolute decline in their real incomes due to the high inflation rate. It was the frustrated section of the urban petite bourgeoisie and the large lumpen-proletariat which had been stricken by inflation that responded to the call for a street agitation in March 1977. The agitation was of course fuelled by the fact that the PPP had blatantly rigged election results in a number of constituencies.

## **Conclusion**

The current crisis of the state in Pakistan has arisen out of a state structure in which the dominance of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy systematically constrained the development of the political process. The oligarchy devised a political framework which, while allowing rivalry between the landlords and the industrial bourgeoisie for the division of the economic surplus, maintained the mode of appropriation of the surplus through which the existence of these elites could be perpetuated. The predominance of the army and bureaucracy in the structure of state power in Pakistan was due to the form of the freedom struggle in the pre-Partition period on the one hand and the nature of the Muslim League on the other. At the time of independence, the state apparatus of the colonial regime was largely intact, and it articulated the framework within which politics were to occur. The second factor in the failure to subordinate the army and bureaucracy to the political system lay in the two basic characteristics of both the Muslim League before Partition and the Pakistan People's Party during the 1970s.

Both the Muslim League in the pre-Partition period as well as the Pakistan People's Party during the 1970s were movements rather than parties. They were therefore unable to establish an organizational

structure on the basis of which the power of the people could be institutionalized and used to subordinate the army and the bureaucracy to the political system. The Muslim League in the decade before Partition, and the PPP during the early 1970s, were taken over by landlords whose political interest lay in constraining the process of political development within the confines specified by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy.

The nature of economic growth which occurred in an economy dominated by the landlords and the industrial bourgeoisie generated acute economic inequality between rich and poor on the one hand and between regions on the other. These economic contradictions manifested themselves in growing political tensions between classes and regions -tensions which could have been mitigated (although not necessarily resolved) only within a democratic political system that was responsive to the aspirations of the dispossessed classes and poor regions. As it was, in a state structure within which the political system was severely constrained by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy, these tensions merely built up pressure on the state structure. The growing political tensions between social groups and regions developed at a time when the internal cohesion of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy was being eroded as the result of its politicization. Thus, while the task of mediating the conflicting political forces became increasingly difficult, the ability of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy to do so became weaker. It is in this perspective that the following major elements of the contemporary crisis of the state in Pakistan can be understood:

- 1) The repressive apparatus of the state has itself become the political apparatus. Mediation between the propertied classes and the property less is sought not by a populist party but by the Jama' at-i-Islami , which has a narrow social base. This has therefore accentuated class tension.
- 2) The state dominated by the repressive apparatus is highly centralized and does not recognise, let alone grant, the rights of the various nationalities. This will enhance separatist tendencies since the army is drawn predominantly from the dominant province of the Punjab.
- 3) The state's interpretation of religion is seen by the people as sanctifying particular class interests and justifying repression against those who dare to question it. The state is therefore bereft of a legitimising ideology. For this reason the army, unlike in the past, cannot withdraw behind a civilian facade. Its explicit presence in running the government has become necessary in a situation where the ruling class cannot justify its rule except by the threat of force.
- 4) The prolonged military rule and the demise of the 1973 constitution have eroded the balance between the various institutions of the state, i.e. the armed forces, the bureaucracy, the judiciary etc. There is therefore an institutional crisis of state authority.

## References and Notes

1. Syed Ahmed Khan, *Asbab-i-Baghavat-i-Hind*, cited in Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gordon Polonskaya, *A History of Pakistan 1947-1948* (Lahore: People's Publishing House, n.d.), p. 14.
2. A. Akhtar, ed. , *Muzamin-i-Sir Syed* cited in Gankovsky and Polonskaya, *History*, p. 16.
3. Speech by Syed Ahmed Khan, *Times* (London), 16 January 1888.
4. A. B. Rajput, *Muslim League Yesterday and Today*, cited in Gankovsky and Polonskaya, *History*, p. 19.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
6. The Lucknow Speech was reported in *Times* (London), 16 January 1888.
7. *Aligarh Institute Gazette*, 9 January, 1907, cited in Gankovsky and Polonskaya, *History*, p. 34.
8. *Ibid.*, p.27.
9. *Ibid.*, p.30.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
12. H. Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan* (London, 1954), p. 84.
13. Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive?* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), pp. 24-5.
14. H. Bolitho, *Jinnah*, p. 95.
15. Z. H. Zaidi, , *Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy 1937-47*, in C.H. Phillips and M.D. Wainwright, eds., *The Partition of India* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 253.
16. Imran Ali, *Punjab Politics in the Decade Before Partition*, Research Monograph Series No.8, South Asian Institute (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 1975), p. 1.
17. *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-1947*, 2 vols. (London, 1957), pp. 488-90, quoted in Gankovsky and Polonskaya, *History*, p. 71.
18. Chaudhry Mohammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 38-9.
19. Imran Ali, *Punjab Politics*, p. 5.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
21. *Punjab Legislative Debates 1936 and 1946*, cited in Imran Ali, *Punjab Politics*, p. 48.
22. For a more detailed analysis and documentation of this proposition see Imran Ali, *Punjab Politics*, pp. 7-54.
23. Hamza Alavi, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', *New Left Review*, July-August 1974.
24. These ideological factions do not normally manifest themselves due to the rigid chain of command in the military hierarchy and the stake of all officers in the integrity of the armed forces as an institution. Nevertheless, the successful attempt at a coup d'etat in 1977 by what later emerged as a religious fundamentalist military regime, and the unsuccessful attempt by younger officers against the regime in

January 1984, are symptomatic of the differences in ideological perspectives within the military.

25. See Hamza Alavi , 'The Military in the State of Pakistan' , paper presented at the Institute of Development Studies and Institute of Common-wealth Studies Conference, Sussex, England. (Revised version of mimeograph written in February 1974. )

26. Sir George MacMunn, *The Martial Races of India*, (n.d.) p. 233 in US Department of State, Office of External Research, *Security Decision-Making in Pakistan*, by Stephen P. Cohen, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984).

27. US Department of State, *Security Decision-Making in Pakistan*, chapter 3.

28. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Berkeley: University of California, 1971), p. 145.

29. U .S. Department of State, *Security Decision-Making in Pakistan*, p. 61.

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

35. Eqbal Ahmad, 'Pakistan: Sign Posts to a Police State', *Outlook*, 18 May, 1974.

36. 'It is clear that the distribution of national product should be such as to favour the savings sectors.' Government of Pakistan Planning Commission, *The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70* (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, May 1965). p. 33.

37. 'Savings are a function not only of the level of income but also of its distribution.' Mahbub-ul-Haq, *Strategy of Economic Planning* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 30.

38. Government of Pakistan, *Third Five Year Plan*, p. 17.

39. For a discussion of inefficiency of Pakistan's industry, see R. Soligo and J. J. Stern, 'Tariff Protection, Import-Substitution and Investment Inefficiency', *Pakistan Development Review* (Summer 1967). See also C. C. Winston, 'Over-invoicing and Industrial Efficiency', *Pakistan Development Review* (Winter 1970).

40. R. D. Mellon, 'Export Policy in Pakistan', *Pakistan Development Review* (Spring 1966).

41. K. Griffin, 'Financing Development Plans in Pakistan', in *Growth and inequality in Pakistan*, ed. K. Griffin and A. R. Khan (London: Macmillan & Co., 1974), p. 133.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-2.

43. Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Pakistan Economic Survey, 1973-74* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1974), p. 133.

44. See 'The Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Pakistan and the World Bank, 1980.' (Typescript.) Also see 'Economic Policy Memorandum of the Government of Pakistan for 1981-82', May, 1981. (Mimeograph.)

45. L. J. White, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 63.

46. Ibid" pp. 74-5.
47. Ibid. , pp. 79-80.
48. Ibid., pp. 81-5.
49. N. Hamid, 'The Burden of Capitalist Growth: A Study of Real Wages in Pakistan', *Economic and Social Review* (Spring 1974). Pakistan', *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* (Spring 1974).
50. Griffin and Khan, *Growth and Inequality*, pp. 204-5.
51. For a detailed study of regional disparities within West Pakistan, see: N. Hamid and A. Hussain, 'Regional Inequalities and Capitalist Development', *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* (Autumn 1974).
52. For discussion and evidence on the failure of the attempts at land reform in 1959 and 1972, see A. Hussain, *The Land Reforms in Pakistan*, Group 83 Series (Lahore, February 1983), n. pag.
53. Ibid.,
54. Landowners with 150 acres and above rent out 75% of their owned area to tenants operating 25 acres or less. See A. Hussain: 'Impact of Agricultural Growth on Changes in the Agrarian Structure of Pakistan: 1960-78' (D. Phil. thesis, Sussex University, 1980).
55. A. Hussain, *Land Reforms*.
56. Ibid.
57. A. Hussain, 'Impact of Agricultural Growth'.
58. A. Hussain, *Land Reforms*.
59. Ibid.
60. For a more detailed description of the Jama'at-i-Islami, see Aijaz Ahmad, 'Democracy and Dictatorship in Pakistan', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 1 (Winter, 1978).
61. Ibid., p. 503.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.